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As the United States becomes increasingly religiously diverse, public schools must also 
face the implications of such diversity. While all public schools may not witness such 
diversity in the classroom, it is a socio-cultural phenomena impacting the greater public 
conversation about what it means to be a democratic nation with the constitutional 
provision of religious liberty. Because of an increasingly secularistic norm promoted in 
many schools and religious exclusivism dominating others, public schools risk 
marginalizing religious minorities. Furthermore, most public schools do not provide 
adequate education on religious thought or religious liberty, resulting in religious 
illiteracy that threatens to undermine an understanding of other nations in the 
international community, many of which are devoutly religious. However, attention to 
teaching about religion is not sufficient; schools must become places in which religious 
liberty may thrive and new understandings of the concept can continue to develop. This 
dissertation proposes a “New American Settlement” in the form of a thought experiment 
as a way for public educators and public schools to take religious liberty seriously and 
address continually expanding religious diversity – and the issues sparked by it – in 
keeping with constitutional commitments. The New American Settlement is a blend of 
educational thought and philosophy, including theories of multiple educational agency, 
experience, and care theories, as a way to regard religion as a live option – a critical 
component of taking religious liberty seriously. Furthermore, the New American 
Settlement considers specific religious notions that can be legitimately incorporated into 
secular educational thought to develop a system that takes religious liberty seriously. 
Practical application within schools is also considered as a thought experiment; the 
	 vii 
results of which conclude that the New American Settlement is much more feasible for 
most public school teachers than is dedicating more time, which many do not have, to 












































“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” - 
Justice Robert H. Jackson, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette1 
 
“Having bought Truth deare, we must not sell it cheape, nor the least graine of it for the 
whole World, no not for the saving of Soules, though our owne most precious; least of 




     Of the ideals that dot the canvas of American imagination, liberty is surely among 
the most compelling. Americans sing proudly of it: “Oh, say! Does that star-spangled 
banner yet wave/O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave?” “Our country ‘tis 
of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.” Allies give gifts in honor of it: the Statue 
of Liberty sits proudly on the banks of New York Harbor. Poets spin prose around it: 
Walt Whitman (1819-1892) declares, “more precious than all worldly riches is 
Freedom.”3 Emily Dickinson (1830-1886) weaves a poignant vision:  
No rack can torture me/My soul’s at liberty/Behind this mortal bone/There knits 
a bolder one. You cannot prick with saw/Nor rend with scymitar/Two bodies 
therefore be/Bind one, and one will flee. The eagle of his nest/No easier 
divest/And gain the sky/Than mayest thou. Except thyself may be/Thine 
enemy/Captivity is consciousness/So’s liberty.4  
 
Soldiers die striving for it, and entire movements are emboldened by it, forming their 
framework around it. Nineteenth century Abolitionist Frederick Douglass (1818-1895) 
																																																						
1 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (No. 591) (United States Supreme Court 
1943). 
2 Roger Williams, The Complete Writings of Roger Williams, Volume 3: Bloudy Tenent of 
Persecution (Eugene, Or: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2007). 
3 Walt Whitman, Walt Whitman: Poetry and Prose, ed. Justin Kaplan (New York, N.Y: Library 
of America, 1982), 1073. 
4 Emily Dickinson, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (Boston: 
Back Bay Books, 1976), 181. 
	 2 
proclaims, “No man can put a chain about the ankle of his fellow man, without at last 
finding the other end of it fastened about his own neck.”5 The remarkable Abolitionist 
Harriet Tubman powerfully remarks, “I had reasoned this out in my mind, there was one 
of two things I had a right to, liberty or death; if I could not have one, I would have the 
other.”6 Elizabeth Cady Stanton (1815-1902), among the most famous of American 
Suffragettes, spoke pointedly of liberty, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all 
men and women are created equal.”7 Nineteenth century Poetess Ella Wheeler Wilcox 
(1850-1919) sagely resounds:  
Therefore I do protest against the boast/Of independence in this mighty land. 
Call no chain strong, which holds one rusted link. Call no land free, that hold 
one fettered slave. Until the manacled slim wrists of babes/Are loosed to toss in 
childish sport and glee/Until the mother bears no burden, save/The precious one 
beneath her heart, until/God’s soil is rescued from the clutch of greed/And given 
back to labor, let no man/Call this the land of freedom.8  
 
Hinmatóowyalahtq’it (Chief Joseph, 1840-1904) of the Nez Perce, observes, “You 
might as well expect the river to run backward as that any man who was born free 
should be content penned up and denied liberty to go where he pleases.”9 Civil Rights 
activist Martin Luther King Jr. reinforces the American ideal of freedom: “I say to you 
that our goal is freedom, and I believe we are going to get there because however much 
																																																						
5 Frederick Douglass, Frederick Douglass on Slavery and the Civil War: Selections from His 
Writings (Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2003), 29. 
6 Sarah Bradford, Harriet Tubman: The Moses of Her People (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 2004), 17. 
7 Lori D. Ginzberg, Elizabeth Cady Stanton: An American Life, First Edition edition (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 58. 
8 Ella Wheeler Wilcox, Poems of Problems (Chicago: W.B. Conkey Company, 1914), 154–155. 
9 Thelma Moore and Carolyn Durling, Whispers on the Winds: Messages of Wisdom from the 
Ancients (S.l.: Strategic Book Publishing, 2012), 150. 
	 3 
she strays away from it, the goal of America is freedom.”10 Liberty is both the aim and 
the reminder: Humorist and author Mark Twain (1835-1910) speaks candidly of 
American freedom, saying “It is by the goodness of God that in our country we have 
those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and 
the prudence never to practice either of them.”11 And, on personal liberty, Henry David 
Thoreau (1817-1862) writes, “If a man does not keep pace with his companions, 
perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which he 
hears, however measured or far away.”12 American life seems smitten indeed with the 
idea of liberty, of personal and collective freedom. And, while no path to freedom is 
perfect, it seems to be a constant Clarion cry, pointing out injustices.  
     There are many ways to interpret liberty, many conversations that could take place, 
many resources, scholars, and histories to examine. Grounded in the conviction that the 
centuries of commitment, however imperfect, to liberty are worthy of continual striving, 
this project is about one particular aspect of that ongoing conversation: religious liberty 
in America. More specifically, it examines religious liberty from within the context of 
education. Its primary concern is the experience of children and their religious identity 
within the public school. In these pages, I develop the argument that urges public 
schools and their stakeholders, which should include all citizens, to take religious 
liberty and the religious experience of children seriously through the curriculum and 
																																																						
10 Making a Way Out of No Way: Martin Luther King’s Sermonic Proverbial Rhetoric, First 
printing edition (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2010), 241. 
11 Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World, Revised ed. edition (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1989), 195. 
12 Henry David Thoreau, W. S. Merwin, and William Howarth, Walden and Civil Disobedience, 
Reissue edition (New York: Signet, 2012), 226. 
	 4 
school culture. Rather than arguing for the inclusion of religion as a subject, which has 
much support in theory but little in practice, this project goes further and points out that 
it is not only the lack of exploring religion as an object of study that is often missing 
from public education, but the inclusion of children’s own religious identity as a 
valuable aspect of who they are as developing people and citizens is largely missing 
from the public school experience.13 There are many ramifications that follow from this 
missing element of schooling, just as there are a number of exceedingly important 
reasons to support religious liberty in schools. This chapter will touch on each of these 
in turn. At its most basic, the point shall always be drawn back to the children we teach, 
to the human persons we guide, for it is they who matter most, they who rely upon us all 
as educational agents to provide them with the best ways forward as they evolve into 
their potential – or not as is too often the case. Before delving into the rationale for this 
project, however, let us first clarify some terms, specifically the that of religion, 
religious experience, religious liberty, and education. It should also be noted that I use 
the terms liberty and freedom interchangeably in these pages, despite any etymological 
differences between them. 
 
Discussion of Concepts & Terms 
Religion, Religious Experience & Religious Liberty 
Religion 
																																																						
13 Warren A Nord, Does God Make a Difference?: Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools 
and Universities (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 44–57; Charles C 
Haynes, “Religious Liberty in Public Schools,” in Religious Freedom in America: 
Constitutional Roots and Contemporary Challenges, ed. Allen D Hertzke, Studies in American 
Constitutional Heritage (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 123. 
	 5 
     Defining “religion” is an increasingly difficult task. Scholarship of old barely 
questioned the term, settling on the general agreement that religion formed around the 
belief in a deity and the practices that developed around that belief. Today, scholars 
debate what can be said about religion – is it universal? Merely a human construct?14 
Does it even exist as a separate category? Indeed, recent scholarship argues that religion 
as its own category is a modern construct and that it cannot really be understood apart 
from the culture within and around which it develops.15 Others more easily group 
religion into major “world” religious categories – Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, etc. – and 
go on to speak about them in more universal terms.16 The point to this discussion is that 
religion is tricky to define – it may even be undefinable. That is for religious studies 
scholars to debate. While there is merit in the argument that one should not consider 
religion as a separate category, for this discussion of religious liberty and education it is 
necessary to treat religion as such, acknowledging that there is no way to truly separate 
aspects of culture from one another, nor do these pages seek to objectify religion. For 
																																																						
14 Sigmund Freud and Peter Gay, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey, The 
Standard Edition edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989); Sigmund Freud and 
Peter Gay, The Future of an Illusion, ed. James Strachey, 1 edition (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 1989). 
15 The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the 
Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005); Brent Nongbri, Before 
Religion: A History of a Modern Concept, Reprint edition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 2015); Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and 
Ideology, trans. William Sayers (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); and 
for a contrary argument see Jeppe Sinding Jensen, “Conceptual Models in the Study of 
Religion,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, Reprint edition (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 246. 
16 Huston Smith, The World’s Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions, Rev Rep edition (San 
Francisco: HarperOne, 1991); Jacob Neusner, ed., World Religions in America, Fourth Edition: 
An Introduction, 4 edition (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009); Stephen 
Prothero, God Is Not One The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World and Why Their 
Differences Matter (Harper,2010, n.d.). 
	 6 
the purpose of this project, I submit that religion is a broad category that includes the 
belief or conviction in the existence of the Transcendent/Immanent Ultimate – or God, 
by any name or number one chooses, and has its own models of God.17 Atheism and 
agnosticism, here, are described in relation to religion but are not included in the 
category. Indeed, many Atheists would find labeling Atheism as a religion deeply 
troubling.18 Every religion has a model for the divine – or multiple models. Theologian 
Sallie McFague argues that in the attempt to understand the infinite, humans construct 
models, which become their way of understanding and relating to Ultimate Reality.19 
Some simply term this the “supernatural,” but that is incomplete, for it implies that all 
beliefs in God or the divine submit that God is beyond human experience – which many 
reject. Thus, religion is not merely the belief in the supernatural, but it does have basis 
in and conviction around the idea that there is some kind of organizing unity that is 
beyond human control or complete understanding and is in some way involved with the 
created world. From there, religions diverge, forming their own understandings of what 
this ultimate principle is like. While a number of theorists argue that religion does not 
have to have a belief in the divine in some capacity, for the sake of simplicity I reject 
the notion. For one thing, it merely confuses the issue because most who hold that they 
are members of a religion have some kind of belief in Ultimate Realty/God/gods. Such 
negations often simply reject the concept of a supernatural being and not necessarily the 
																																																						
17 Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 105–106. 
18 Consider, for example, remarks against religion in general by such writers as Sam Harris and 
Richard Dawkins: Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, 
Reprint edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005); Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, 
Reprint edition (Boston: Mariner Books, 2008). 
19 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, 105, 108. 
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belief in God as an immanent, organizing presence, or something akin to Paul Tillich’s 
“ground of being” – or even Joseph Campbell’s idea of Ultimate Reality as “Primal.”20 
For these pages, religion, then, is a system of beliefs around some sort of understanding 
of divine presence or Ultimate Reality/God, however varied it may be.21 Furthermore, 
in general I use the term “God” in these pages, mainly for the sake of simplicity. I mean 
for it to include all models of divine presence, Ultimate Reality, 
transcendent/immanent-ultimate and the like, except when speaking of polytheistic 
deities, in which case I will use specific names associated with them; often these deities 
are concrete manifestations of Ultimate Reality.22 Thus, religion, for our purposes can 
be described as the varying beliefs and practices that evolve around human models of 




     Religious experience is obviously a related category, but for our purposes it is a way 
of describing what one might say is the foundation of religion itself – the experience of 
Ultimate Reality. I use the term religious experience to describe more than what one 
experiences in religious settings, although those experiences may certainly be included. 
Religious experience is in a sense a priori to religion. In that way, it is akin to 
																																																						
20 Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, Edition Unstated edition (New York: 
Touchstone, 1972), 189; Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, Third edition 
(Novato, Calif: New World Library, 2008). 
21 I am aware that certain branches of philosophical Buddhism may not entirely fit this way of 
contextualizing religion, however the term “Ultimate Reality” is an attempt to circumvent this 
problem. 
22 For example, Hinduism has many gods, but they are usually considered in some way to be an 
embodiment of Brahman – Ultimate Reality. 
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spirituality, for it includes the inward experience of divine presence or God that 
transcends definition and description. Religious experience is partly what makes 
religious liberty such a volatile subject. If religion were only about committing to a 
corporate creed and following along with the instruction of religious leaders, it would 
be possible for outward forces to make changes to that religious structure to fit whatever 
particular agenda is desired. Religious experience defies mere institutionalized religion, 
however, and is the unknown in the equation. Religious experience is a maverick, in a 
sense, for it is not something that outward forces can control however much they may 
influence it. To provide a concrete example, during the nineteenth century Americans 
were enveloped in what is now termed the Second Great Awakening.23 Sociologists and 
historians describe this period of time as a movement away from the established 
somewhat emotionally-subdued Protestant churches to a more charismatic experience. 
Americans embraced a new way to look at God, Jesus, and salvation by droves.24 If we 
only examine the surface, the change makes little sense. What was the catalyst for such 
drama that rocked the foundation of American Protestantism and literally reshaped the 
way American’s engaged in Christian practices? It was surely not a change from the top 
of an institution, nor was it better marketing. The participants in the cosmic makeover 
of American Christianity felt a quickening, a change in the way they experienced God 
and received the Gospel. It was their experiences that made the movement unstoppable. 
Such experiences may not be common, but they are the driving force behind sincere 
religious conviction. It is not for this project to debate what is a legitimate religious 
																																																						
23 Stephen Prothero, Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know--and Doesn’t 
(New York, N.Y.: HarperOne, 2008), 14. 
24 Ibid., 112–113. 
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experience. However, sincere belief that comes from religious experience, whatever 
shape it may take, is of vital importance to the task at hand for it is what makes religion 
volatile and unpredictable. It compels people to risk life and limb, it emboldens and 
drives them, so for educators and public school stakeholders to dismiss religion as 
merely one commitment among many a human person makes in his or her lifetime is 
shortsighted to say the least. Of the depth of religious experience, religion scholar 
Huston Smith writes, “The reality that excites and fulfills the soul’s longing is God by 
whatsoever name.”25 Writing of religious experience in general, Christian theologian 
Miroslav Volf remarks, “When we come to “rest” in the divine…the relation to the 
divine becomes the axis of our lives. It shapes how we perceive ourselves and the 
world, what desires we have and how they are satiated.”26 Following our description of 
religion, religious experience is one’s inward relationality to that which is ultimately 
beyond complete comprehension – God. From there, it compels humans to act, in 
influences the ways in which we participate in life, and it shapes personal and collective 
identities, and thus it impacts choices and behavior.  
     Religious experience is of vital importance to the study of education, for adults are 
not the only people who have religious experiences. In fact, significant identity changes 
prompted by religious experiences happen during childhood. In his book Ordinary 
Resurrections: Children in the Years of Hope, Jonathan Kozol writes of the depth of 
children’s faith life. The book recounts Kozol's years teaching children in Mott Haven, 
																																																						
25 Huston Smith, Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief 
(New York, N.Y.: HarperCollins, 2001), 3. 
26 Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (Yale University 
Press, 2016), 81. 
	 10 
an area of the South Bronx riddled with poverty, pediatric asthma, and, at the time, 
pediatric and maternal AIDS.27 All of the children are black or Hispanic, and all are 
very poor.28 Despite – or perhaps because of – the challenges these children face, they 
have surprisingly engaged faith; they muse about the nature of God, they establish their 
own rituals and practices, and it is clear throughout the stories Kozol tells of these 
inner-city children that their faith matters to them. In fact, perhaps it would be better to 
speak of it this way: they do not defend a set of beliefs, they have experiences of God 
that are so real to them they become part of their very identity. Kozol recalls one child 
named Elio who was sure that he could tell how God was feeling: “He doesn’t seem to 
doubt that God has power to affect his life, but he believes that he has power too, 
because his own behavior, as he seems to be convinced, can help determine whether 
God feels good or bad.”29 Elio believes that when something wrong occurs, God cries; 
Kozol ponders this and asks him how he knows and Elio replies: “I can hear God 
crying.”30 This forms the basis for a special process of reconciliation that Elio willingly 
initiates.31 Another child, Lucia, experiences God another way. “How powerful is 
God?” Kozol asks – “He’s powerful to make hearts,” Lucia tells him.32 She goes on to 
say, “What would make the world better is God’s heart. I know God’s heart is already 
in the world. But I would like if He would…push the heart more into it. Not just 
																																																						
27 Jonathan Kozol, Ordinary Resurrections, 1 edition (New York: Crown, 2000), 3. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
29 Ibid., 65. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 66. 
32 Ibid., 71. 
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halfway. Push it more!”33 Kozol does not argue that these children are little theologians, 
rather, “I simply think the gifts of faith and fantasy they bring to us are often beautiful 
and wise in their simplicity. To me, these are the bread and wine; and I am always 
thankful to receive them.”34 However simplistic or sophisticated, that children ponder 
life’s “big” questions and travel along their own faith path is perhaps the most important 
reason why taking religious liberty in school seriously matters; it matters that we as 
educators protect their right to develop their own minds and hearts, which brings us to 
the subject at hand: religious liberty. 
 
Religious Liberty 
     Religious liberty is, fortunately, somewhat more concrete than either religion or 
religious experience. Still, it begs some discussion, most of which will take place in 
chapter two. For the time being, we may understand religious liberty as the affirmation 
of the right to conscience regarding one’s faith commitments. Roger Williams, one of 
the earliest Americans to clearly articulate an understanding of religious liberty argued 
for the separation of church and state over a century before Thomas Jefferson’s famed 
“wall of separation.”35 He believed that “soul libertie” demanded a free conscience to 
follow God’s will however one discerned it and that to link the government with the 
church jeopardized the purity of the church itself.36 Much later, Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison would argue for the same practical approach to institutionalized religion 
																																																						
33 Ibid., 72. 
34 Ibid., 79. 
35 Warren A Nord, Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma, 1st New 
edition edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 135. 
36 John M. Barry, Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul: Church, State, and 
the Birth of Liberty (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 308, 333. 
	 12 
and government, albeit less theologically. Article 16 of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights 
(1776), which was influenced heavily by Madison, states: “That religion, or the duty 
which we owe our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by 
reason and conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore, all men are entitled to the 
free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience…”37 Madison believed 
state established religion undermined both the church and government: “religion is 
essentially distinct from civil Government, and exempt from its cognizance; [and] a 
connection between them is injurious to both.”38 These thinkers, and many others, 
helped lay the groundwork for the idea that, though religious commitment may 
influence public life, government has no business involving itself in church affairs, nor 
can it gain its public authority from the power of the pulpit. Though today the 
conversation about religious liberty in America often focuses on the separation of 
church and state and upon the dangers of religious actors influencing state matters, 
earlier conversations saw the need for such separation as a protection for churches as 
well as for the government.39 Thus, the early American conversation around religious 
liberty seemed to hold two foundational points: that preventing a state establishing 
religion by separating government from institutionalized religious bodies is essential, 
																																																						
37 T. Jeremy Gunn Witte, John, No Establishment of Religion: America’s Original Contribution 
to Religious Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 162. 
38 Michael I. Meyerson, Endowed by Our Creator: The Birth of Religious Freedom in America 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 249. 
39 Roger Williams, A Plea for Religious Liberty (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 
2014); Neal Riemer, “Madison: A Founder’s Vision,” in Religion, Public Life, and the 
American Polity, ed. Luis E. Lugo (Univ of Tennessee Pr, 1995), 40. 
	 13 
and that human persons must have freedom of conscience or “soul liberty” (though, 
shamefully at this time in history, not all people were considered full persons).40  
     The First Amendment describes, however vaguely, religious liberty in practice: 
“Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof…” So it would seem that part of religious liberty is the ability to 
practice one’s religious convictions apart from governmental restrictions, while at the 
same time safeguarding citizens from any one organized religious body garnering the 
authority of the state, and vice versa. Twentieth and twentyfirst century advocates 
defend religious liberty on more fundamental grounds; it is not merely a practical 
application of governmental organization, but a fundamental principle, a first right.41 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18 asserts, “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion…to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”42 The U.S. International Religious 
Freedom Act of 1998 begins with these words: “Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the 
United States.” It goes on to say, “Freedom of religious belief and practice is a universal 
human right and fundamental freedom…”43 More than just a right, religious liberty 
scholar Allen Hertzke suggests that “the right to religious liberty lies in human nature 
																																																						
40 Steven D Smith, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014), 46. 
41 Allen D. Hertzke, ed., The Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 5–7. 
42 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” accessed July 9, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml. 
43 Frank Wolf, International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 1998, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2297.pdf. 
	 14 
itself, who we are.”44 Religious liberty is a fundamental right because part of what it 
means to be human is to develop and exercise our conscience and our sense of 
relationality with the world around us – and for many, that relationality is intrinsically 
imbedded in our religious experience. To deny a person religious liberty – the freedom 
to believe and to practice those beliefs in accordance with one’s conscience – is among 
the severest of restrictions.  
     Lest it be considered a free-for-all, religious liberty does not imply that religious 
actors can simply do whatever they want, nor is religion a legitimate support for 
extremism. Far from it, religious convictions are just that and come with specific 
precepts, commitments, and restrictions which place specific sets of limits upon the 
believer. Religious liberty is, fundamentally, the protected right to adhere to the system 
of belief that one finds ultimately compelling. Put another way, if we take Williams’ 
“soul liberty” at face value, we assert that human being’s soul must be permitted to be 
formed in the image of its maker and that restricting one’s ability to practice sincere 
faith injures one’s freedom as a citizen – or a student – as well as one’s spirit. Huston 
Smith puts it beautifully,  
the reality that excites and fulfills the soul’s longing is God by whatsoever 
name. Because the human mind cannot come within light-years of 
comprehending God’s nature, we do well to follow Rainer Maria Rilke’s 
suggestion that we think of God as a direction rather than an object. That 
direction is always toward the best that we can conceive…45 
 
In this view, religious liberty is not a thing itself, but a parameter that safeguards the 
intrinsic process of the “soul’s longing” toward goodness. We do not often speak of 
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such romantic things as the soul’s longing, especially in academia, but we should, for to 
reiterate, adults are not the only one’s whose soul’s long. Children, far more in touch 
with mystery and magic, have a natural sense that reality is more than what we can see, 
rationalize, and explain. As educators, it is our sacred (I use the word intentionally) trust 
to see to it that a child’s right to explore the innermost reaches of her or his own soul is 
protected from the harshness of nihilism and futility.46 To develop this idea further, two 
literary examples involving children are helpful. The first is from Ntozake Shange’s 
Sassafras, Cypress & Indigo, named after the three sisters in the story.47 Of the three, 
Indigo is the most overtly imaginative and magical; she is also much younger than they, 
still a child living with her mother in South Carolina. Indigo, unlike the adults in her 
life, knows that life is more than what can be seen. Her dolls talk – they really do – and 
so do the Ancestors, those who with wisdom embody the experiences of slaves long 
gone and the true power of spiritual freedom, not unlike Dickinson’s poem: “Captivity 
is consciousness/So’s liberty.” Indigo listens and longs, and she has the unusual 
capacity as a child to ignore the smothering good intentions of the adults in her life to 
keep her feet on the ground and her imagination in a box. Uncle John, who is not really 
her uncle but an eccentric neighbor, sees the way in which Indigo engages in life, hears 
her confessions and her questions, and gives the little girl a violin.48 The instrument has 
magic in it too, so the pair is well matched. It would be incorrect to say that Indigo 
learns to play the violin, or teachers herself to play it; rather the two fuse and channel 
the music of the spheres, bringing about varying reactions from those who hear her play 
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as the music calls to the depths of them – some pretty and not-so-pretty places. Indigo 
has much to teach us, but she exemplifies the sense of mystery that exists within the 
child who has not been dampened by convention. And, while none of this sounds 
particularly religious, Indigo most certainly responds to that which both transcends 
ordinary reality and that dwells within the deepest part of her being. In the end, she 
grows into a level-headed, thoroughly whole-hearted woman with deep compassion and 
a yearning to continue healing people. Her childhood experience and ability to follow 
her soul’s “libertie” allow such depth to develop. 
     Louisa May Alcott does not characterize her “little women” with quite the flair of 
Shange, but these sisters also embody what childhood wonder is all about.49 Little 
Women is usually understood from the perspective of Jo – Alcott’s pseudo identity – but 
it is helpful to explore the story from the perspective of all the women. In this case, 
Marmee, the girls’ mother is a wonderful example of how a teacher deals with the 
growth and development of young people. In a sense, she acts as a spiritual director, 
encouraging play, imagination, and openness while encouraging the girls to develop 
their own ethical and moral compass. Each of the daughters is profoundly shaped by the 
deftness of Marmee at encouraging them to call forth that which is already within them, 
and these childhood experiences of tapping into both their depth and what lies beyond 
them forms them into the adults and generous citizens they become.50 Once more, 
Alcott’s characters do not directly deal with religious liberty questions (although her 
father, Amos Bronson Alcott was an educator and religious leader), but they do signal 
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the intensity of childhood spiritual development and the importance of providing safe 
spaces for such development to occur.  
     From an educational standpoint, religious liberty is a right and a trust, but it is also a 
practice. It is a right because, at the very least, our founding documents and many 
others that have followed agree that freedom of conscience is a basic right, and because, 
though there may certainly be exceptions, religious experience – even the experience of 
pondering one’s place in the universe – is a universal human experience. It is a trust 
because, as citizens of a democracy, we commit ourselves to safeguarding religious 
liberty as a right, and also to safeguarding the proper distance between the religious 
oversight of government, and the governmental oversight of religion. And, it is a 
practice, particularly for educators, because religious experience is not stagnant, it is 
ever evolving within the experience of people. To practice religious liberty within the 
context of education means to create environments in which children’s religious identity 
can develop, whether that means growth of religious conviction or diminishment of it. 
This leads well into our next subject – what do we mean by education? 
 
Education 
     If religion and religious experience resist concrete definition, education should be 
easier to pin down. Or is it? For most people, the word education brings to mind an 
activity done in schools, or schooling. Even the most devoted teachers blur the lines 
between schooling and education. In her recent book, Reign of Error, Diane Ravitch 
speaks of “public education” when she describes the public school system, without 
	 18 
overtly acknowledging that public education is also a much broader concept.51 
Education, while it includes schooling, is a much broader concept, and reducing it to 
schooling hides from our view aspects of culture that contribute to education. 
Philosopher of Education, Jane Roland Martin puts it this way: “In reducing education 
to schooling, the deep structure of educational thought causes us to lose sight not only 
of the culture’s vast array of educational agents but also of the vast amount of cultural 
stock that is not in the school’s portfolio.”52 Martin conceives of education as 
encounter, which, simply put, means that education happens whenever and however a 
person interacts with elements of cultural stock that then become “yoked” with 
individual capacities.53 I will discuss Martin’s theory in chapter three as it is 
enormously useful for the task at hand. For now, suffice it to say that education is 
broader than schooling, and that education can happen anywhere, at anytime, to any 
person. When the parameters of education are expanded to to include encounter and 
experience, then all such encounters come under educational examination, which is 
essential. Consider, for example, television advertising about prescription medication. If 
education is reduced to schooling, then these ads are probably not going to be explored 
for their educational content or potential miseducational dangers. However, even if such 
ads exist for the purpose of consumer promotion they absolutely do educate, or 
miseducate as the case may be. Now, if schooling is only one place or method of 
education, and education is a broad concept that includes any number of encounters, 
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these ads are well situated within the educational realm. What they imply about health, 
about prescription drug use, even about the ethnicity and gender of the users now matter 
from an educational perspective. This means, as well, that they can be justifiably 
critiqued from an educational standpoint for they are no longer out of the realm of 
education.  
     Consider another example: the modeling industry. Recent trends in fashion 
modeling, particularly in women’s fashion, flaunt the increasing ideal of ultra-thin 
bodies. Skinny women in skinny jeans pack the runway and appear on the covers of 
fashion magazines. Women’s bodies in such venues are increasingly scantily clothed; 
complete nudity is now commonplace in the simplest make-up or perfume ad with 
hands covering strategic places so as to avoid the classification of pornography. 
Women’s heads are cut out of movie shots, television commercials, and photographs, 
showing women’s bodies from the neck down. Researchers point to the sexual 
objectification of females through these sorts of images, which contribute to the 
acceptance of violence towards women.54 The effects of this practice are untouchable if 
we do not see this as a form of education. Viewed merely as entertainment or 
marketing, the ultra-thin/ultra-skin craze is merely a fad to sell purses and scents, and 
other things not spoken of in polite company. But, viewed as an educational encounter, 
the whole picture changes. We can justifiably comment on the violence done to the 
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image of a woman when her head is consistently cut off from view. We can talk about 
the impossibility of achieving the coveted size double-zero body and the terrible effect 
on a woman’s health and self-esteem by trying to reach that goal. We can scream about 
the messages it sends to our young women – that what they look like is their only value. 
And we can look in horror at the messages about women sent to our young men.55  It 
matters that we understand education in the broadest sense possible, for cultural 
liabilities can only be corrected if they are seen.  
     For the purpose of this project, it is important to expand the parameters of education 
outside of schooling in order to see the educative value of children’s (and adult’s) 
religious identity and religious experience. If education is reduced to schooling, it is 
easy to assume that a student’s faith life is something she or he can simply leave behind 
at the school doors. But, if we understand education as encounter, it is apparent that a 
child’s religious experience, however conceived, is an important part of their 
development and it is most definitely part of their educational experience, whether it is 
acknowledged in the classroom or not. Moreover, broadening the parameters of 
education beyond schools acknowledges the importance of public conversations around 
religion, diversity, and secularism that may not relate directly to schools but that most 
certainly impact educational encounters. Furthermore, we can acknowledge that 
religious actors are educational agents, too. Martin E. Marty argues that, in some 
respects, all schools, even private schools, impact the public and thus are relevant to a 
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discussion on the ways in which public schooling impacts culture.56 In a similar sense, 
all education is public education, for the division between what is private and what is 
public is blurry at best. 
 
Education & Religious Liberty 
     While religion as a topic receives much consideration in academic circles, 
surprisingly few modern scholars of education take the question of religious liberty and 
religious identity within the parameters of the school community seriously.57 John 
Dewey, often considered the founder of Educational Studies as a discipline within 
academic study, paints an overall negative picture of religion in his classic essays 
entitled, “A Common Faith.”58 In these essays, Dewey takes the position of what is 
known as the “secularization theory” in social science.59 The popular theory argued, in 
essence, that religion in the face of enlightened scientific discovery was unnecessary – 
that “God is dead.”60 Science and rationality were the new unifiers for the Western 
world. There simply was no need of religion, or at least not of religions that had at their 
center the belief in the “supernatural.” Of course, reducing religion to beliefs and 
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customs centered around the “supernatural” to explain aspects of life that humans 
simply did not understand betrays an abiding ignorance in religion itself and of 
theological reasoning. Nonetheless, the view was common.61 Recent scholarship 
demonstrates that the secularization thesis is largely false: yes, much of the Western 
world is becoming less devotional, but religious affiliation is actually on the rise 
globally, including pockets within the United States, which despite the disfavor with 
which religion is often portrayed in the media, is still quite religious.62 Dewey goes so 
far as to suggest that religion is useful insofar as it provides human “association,” but in 
the face of new “associations” it is no longer a necessary or important element of social 
structure.63 He argues that religious people are “idealists” and implies they lack 
intellectual development, rooted instead in an “idealizing imagination.”64 Dewey’s overt 
intolerance for religion and religious thought in these essays is extremely problematic, 
for it fosters the same intolerance of which religious people are often accused. 
Moreover, it betrays an utter lack of understanding of theological reasoning and 
assumes that a secularist worldview is neutral.65 Such a position is pervasive today, 
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particularly within systems of education in the West, which often accepts the same idea: 
secularism is neutral while religion is not. Unfortunately, while secularism can be 
neutral, neutrality is not inherent in the concept, but must rather be reinforced from the 
outside.    
     Dewey views religion from a reductionist perspective, which is, perhaps, not 
surprising given his place in the philosophical paradigm of pragmatism. He argues that 
religion exists because historically it was an attempt to understand causality: “Where 
there is no insight into the cause of unusual events, belief in the supernatural is itself 
natural.”66 He goes on to say, “It [religion] gave an “explanation” of extraordinary 
occurrences while it provided techniques for utilizing supernatural forces to secure 
advantages and to protect members of the community against them when they were 
adverse.”67 Such a view is, sadly, not uncommon, but it is a narrow perspective. 
Religions usually include myths (the “explanations” of which Dewey speaks) among 
their traditions – from the ancient Greeks and their myths about the gods of Mount 
Olympus to the creation stories of the Old Testament. Myths were never meant to be 
taken literally, but neither are they untrue; rather, they are different ways of conceiving 
of and explaining experience.68 Certainly, one purpose of myths is to explain the 
happenings of nature and human events, but rarely do myths address only one level of 
human experience – they are multi-vocal stories that convey many layers of meaning. 
Moreover, the need to explain events and occurrences is merely one aspect of religion. 
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People of faith identify as such for many reasons, not the least of which is the encounter 
of God/Ultimate Reality. Dewey, however, sees the original purpose of religion as an 
attempt to “secure the favor of overruling powers,” not as one that includes seeking or 
responding to the personal experience of the divine.69 This is somewhat ironic, since 
one of Dewey’s most significant contributions to the study of educational theory is his 
emphasis upon experience. We will take up this matter in chapter three, for Dewey’s 
theory of experience is a way forward toward a more inclusive and just educational 
theory of religious liberty.70 For now, however, Dewey’s main direct contribution to the 
study of religion is dismissive at best, intolerant at worst, and problematic to say the 
least given his status in the field of education, and given that little has been done by 
scholars to confront what could easily be considered miseducation. 
     If Dewey is a proponent of the now largely outdated secularization thesis, other 
educational theorists point to additional gaps in holistic thinking regarding religion and 
education. Many scholars, such as Jane Roland Martin and Maxine Greene simply 
devote little time to the subject, although Martin makes significant contributions 
regarding educational agency that I will apply to religious liberty and education in 
chapter three.71 Greene deals heavily with religious sects as actors in the history of 
religion and public schooling, as do a number of other historians, but little is said about 
religious experience or religious liberty.72 Unlike many of her contemporaries, 
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educational scholar Nel Noddings takes religion on directly – and with questionable 
results. Noddings argues that there is a ‘well-documented shift of emphasis away from 
formal religion toward “spirituality”’ in the United States, despite statistical data to the 
contrary.73 According to the latest polls from the Pew Research Center’s Religion & 
Public Life, while the “nones” (unaffiliated, including “spiritual but not religious”) are 
on the rise, they are far from a majority, nor do they come close to outnumbering the 
religious observant.74 Whether or not the increase of the “nones” will continue is 
dependent upon a number of factors, not the least of which is immigration and what 
beliefs new citizens bring to the table. Moreover, the category of “nones” or “spiritual 
but not religious” is extremely problematic and most pollsters do not have a concrete 
definition.75 A person may legitimately be both “spiritual but not religious” and a 
person of faith – many non-church going Christians consider themselves to belong to 
this category while still claiming to be Christian. Noddings is correct, however, when 
she criticizes the lack of articulate education regarding religion in public schooling; a 
massive overhaul in public teacher training must be undertaken in order to deal fairly 
and comprehensively with religion.76 Sadly, her own writing is one such example of 
why such teacher training is so vexing. Noddings betrays a lack of academic 
background in the study of religion and treads dangerously on theological ground, even 
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while arguing for open classroom dialogue about religion.77 In an attempt to address 
what Warren Nord notes as a significant lack of education about religion in public 
schools, Noddings tackles such large concepts as monotheism, polytheism, and theodicy 
(the problem of the existence of evil in the face of omnipotent divinity).78 While the 
motivation for such discussions is about cultivating openness and critical thinking skills, 
Noddings betrays her own ignorance of religious thought. For instance, she states, “the 
insistence on a perfect, one-and-only God also leads to religious intolerance.”79 Were 
Noddings a trained theologian, she would recognize the multiple fallacies in this 
statement, not the least of which is that one may conceive of God as completely perfect 
and the entire ground of all beingness and still honor all paths to that “one-and-only” 
God, whatever form and shape they might take. Much as Madison argued that the State 
is not competent to make theological decisions, neither is the public school.80 With 
ignorance at the helm, schools may do better to teach nothing about religion at all. Yet, 
there is a more balanced approach that can be taken: namely, it is less important that 
students are schooled about religion than it is that the religious identity of students is 
protected and allowed to flourish. This is something that is sadly quite vacant from most 
educational theories. Rather than conceiving of ways in which to dialogue about issues 
that are largely the territory of parents and religious leaders, it is much more effective to 
create an environment that protects a student’s right to believe and at the same time 
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shapes students toward a respectful disposition. Public school teachers are not asked to 
become spiritual directors, ministers, or theologians, nor should they attempt it anymore 
than they should attempt to be psychologists.81 What teachers in public schools can do, 
however, is cultivate an atmosphere that is inclusive and accepting – even if it means 
defending a student’s right to think that everyone else is wrong. 
     If I have painted a negative picture of the work on religious liberty – what I would 
call more of a vacancy than anything else – within modern educational scholarship, 
there is hope within the discipline for religious liberty and the examination of religious 
pluralism within the public school system. If the majority of scholars look upon 
religious liberty and religion’s presence in the public school classroom and curriculum 
with skeptical eyes, or no eye at all, there are substantial concepts woven into 
educational philosophy that lend themselves well to a conversation about religious 
liberty and education, which, I believe, can help our conversation emerge from the 
narrowed parameters of teaching “about” religion only to substantially entertaining and 
promoting religious liberty – including emerging concepts of religious liberty – within 
the culture of public schools. In particular, Jane Roland Martin’s work on cultural 
miseducation and education as encounter are pivotal and will be applied in subsequent 
chapters as will Dewey’s theory of education as experience. Other educational thinkers, 
some of whom helped formed much of Dewey’s own philosophical background, will 
have a voice in the pages of this project, for they contribute to the development of a 
more robust commitment to religious liberty within the school community. 
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The Problem with Teaching “About” Religion 
     In the aftermath of landmark Supreme Court decisions (beginning in the 1940’s) that 
clarified – or attempted to – the proper role of religion in public schools, educators, 
administrators, and parents felt sometimes at a loss for how to interpret the decisions.82 
Some districts ignored them, others decided the safest thing to do was to evacuate any 
sign of religion from the premises.83 The Court, while restrictive of religion in the 
classroom, never argued for total exclusion. In McCollum v Board of Education, Justice 
Robert Jackson wrote: 
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth 
transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious 
influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity – both Catholic and 
Protestant – and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world’s people. One 
can hardly respect a system of education that would leave the student wholly 
ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a 
part in which he is being prepared.84  
 
Schools had a large task ahead of them to determine how best to interpret the Court’s 
decisions; how should schools determine what they could or could not do when the 
Court’s decisions themselves were largely made on a case by case basis? Is prayer 
completely banned from schools, or only if it is composed by school employees and/or 
the State?85 What about student-led religious clubs?86 If Bible reading is not allowed, 
what about teaching about the Bible?87 What of religious symbols in the school? What 
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constitutes a religious statement? What role could religious leaders play, if any? During 
the last several decades, educators and scholars have sought to address these issues, 
resulting in impressive amounts of cooperation among politicians, policy makers, and 
religious leaders.88 As impressive are the documents produced by people like Charles 
Haynes, and entities such as the First Amendment Center and the American Academy 
of Religion.89 The emphasis is primarily upon what can and cannot be done in schools 
regarding religion, and by whom, and the result has been a push in liberal education to 
take teaching about religion seriously. Scholars point to the influence of religious actors 
in society, and the dangers of not understanding other people’s religious motivations, 
including the religious motivations of other nations.90 Steven Prothero’s influential 
study on religious literacy concluded that few Americans demonstrate competency in 
the area of religious history or religious cultures, and given the pervasive presence of 
religion in America, the growth of religious diversity, and the convergence of 
globalized religious movements, Prothero and others found the results unsatisfactory.91 
Today, most liberal scholars and educators agree that religion is an important subject of 
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study within public school curriculum, as do I.92 But, I argue in these pages that 
teaching about religion is not enough, and further that teaching about religion without 
the presence of staunch attention to religious liberty has dangers of its own. While I 
doubt those who advocate including religion in the curriculum would disagree, little to 
date has been done in terms of scholarship or strategies regarding religious liberty in 
public education beyond surface statements that deem it important.93 This project 
challenges the assumption that teaching about religion will solve the problems of 
intolerance and ignorance attributed to religious illiteracy alone. 
     Teaching about anything tends to objectify it and to a certain extent this is 
unavoidable. However, restricting religion’s presence in schools to subject matter alone 
risks objectifying religious actors themselves. For example, imagine a group of 
students, most of whom identify as either Christian or “none,” but there is one Buddhist 
in the class. If, as an educator, your primary goal is to instruct your students about 
Buddhism – the history, practices, customs, etc. – how do you think your Buddhist 
student will react, especially when they are quite literally out-numbered? Some students 
may have the courage and confidence to insert an opinion, even a correction, here and 
there (which may likely be valid given the brevity with which most teachers must 
address religious traditions), but many will not. But, if religious identity is taken 
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seriously, then you are much more likely to approach the situation with the child’s 
religious experience in mind. You might ask him or her ahead of time if he/she would 
like to talk about his/her experiences, family traditions, etc. Different from Noddings’ 
suggested approach that emphasizes questioning religious beliefs and views against a 
(unacknowledged) secularist ethic, you might instead ask other students to chime in 
with things that sound familiar to their own faith or practices, or about things they find 
interesting, confusing, or even upsetting. In all likelihood, if an educator sets the tone, 
children will happily participate, particularly if you are quick to establish the parameter 
of civil discussion. At this stage, you have not only educated about a religious tradition, 
you have provided an avenue for real experience and encounter, and likely fostered the 
beginnings of interfaith dialogue and tolerance, two things needed for democracy to 
thrive.  
     Beyond the classroom, teaching about religion does not satisfactorily address the 
issues children may face outside of curriculum, in the schoolyard, the lunchroom, at 
gym class. If teachers take the religious experience of students and religious liberty in 
general seriously and attend to this aspect of children’s experience in the classroom in 
addition to teaching about religion, a tone of civility and curiosity is set beyond the 
classroom walls, influencing school culture itself.  
     There is another problem with simply teaching about religion and it is this: when one 
approaches a subject as an object from the outside, one likely imposes one’s own world 
view. Nothing is truly neutral – all human persons have a lens of perception influenced 
by culture, experience, and identity. So, whether you are a devout religious person or a 
staunch secularist – or find yourself in the vast in-between space of the two – if you 
	 32 
teach only about something, it is likely that your approach will not invite participation 
in the alternate worldview that any religion has to offer. As important as it is to have 
knowledge about religious traditions, it is vital to understand – both teacher and student 
– that there are many worldviews, and many of them are represented by religions or 
sects. The rhetoric around teaching about religion within liberal education seems to 
suggest that one can be neutral, but when any framework is not recognized, it places its 
own biases on the subject it addresses. More important than children realizing that 
religious actors exist is the realization that there are different ways of understanding 
reality itself. When religious liberty is taken seriously, a fuller understanding of how 
religious people think and understand the world around them can emerge, not as a weird 
perspective but as a legitimate way of contextualizing and operating within the world 
around us.94 This is extremely important for children to understand. 
     Through the course of the decades since the first Supreme Court decisions regarding 
schools and religion, the conversation around religion’s place in the school has taken 
many turns. Today, we often hear the polarized opinions categorized into “left” and 
“right” – as if there are only two sides to this multifaceted issue. From one politically 
liberal perspective, there is the fear of religious indoctrination if religion is allowed too 
thoroughly within the classroom walls. And, that fear is not unfounded; certainly some 
public schools have seemed to promote one religion to the exclusion of the non-
religious and of religious minorities. From the position of politically and religiously 
conservative stakeholders, they fear that their children will be formed by secular 
curriculum that lacks a similar moral center to that of their own commitments. Again, 
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the fear is justified as many public schools embrace curriculum changes that normalize 
things like reproductive rights and homosexual relationships. Those kinds of issues are 
centers for heated debates and are not so simply summed up as one side being for equal 
rights and the other for religious rights, though often it is described as such. The heart of 
the matter is usually a deeply held worldview, and despite the popular media’s tendency 
to make one or the other out to be irrational and reactionary, both perspectives (and the 
many in between) have valid points of difference that should not easily be dismissed, 
regardless of how partisan politics polarizes the public commons. Whatever “side” one 
is on, it is clear that public schooling lacks an effective solution at present to the 
problem of increasing polarization between liberal and conservative politics and the 
growth of religious diversity. Teaching about religion, though important, is not enough. 
Only an honest attempt to cultivate a school culture that fully embraces religious liberty 
and the spiritual and religious development of students will suffice.  
 
Why Now? 
     The discussion over religion’s place in the public school is more than a century and a 
half old; many excellent books and scholarly articles have been written about it, though 
few from the perspective of educators specifically dealing with the principle of religious 
liberty, and I am aware of none that argue it from a First Rights perspective. That in 
itself warrants another study. In addition to a new perspective, this project is timely due 
to changes and challenges that are both domestic and international, namely 1) the 
growth of religious diversity within the United States, diversity that is no longer simply 
sectarian but is divergent in terms of worldviews and religious commitments, 2) 
increasing polarization in American political life that is at least in part articulated on 
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religious grounds, and 3) the increasing restrictions on religion internationally and its 
implications for US foreign relations and security. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
  
Domestic Concerns: The Changing Landscape of American Religious Diversity & 
Polarization 
     It seems the one constant in American religious life is that it is always changing. 
Religious diversity is nothing new. Indeed, before European explorers first landed on 
the Eastern shores, countless religious expressions existed within First Nation 
communities.95 Europeans brought varying forms of Christianity. Judaism dates back as 
early as the 1620’s in the colonies, and Africans – free and trafficked – brought multiple 
forms of religious expressions.96 Religious diversity, which to a large degree can be 
thought of as sectarian diversity during the colonial period Protestant Christianity was 
the dominant form of religion practiced among Colonists, was largely responsible for 
the religious liberty committed to in the founding documents.97 More than a century 
before Thomas Jefferson argued for a “wall of separation” between church and state, 
religious leader Roger Williams argued for a “wall of separation” and penned many 
documents in favor of religious liberty, including “A Plea for Religious Liberty,” 
arguing that freedom of conscience and, thus, of religious belief, is a crucial part of 
peace.98 He writes, “God needeth not the help of a material sword of steel to assist the 
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sword of the Spirit in the affairs of conscience…”99 Persecuted for his own dissenting 
beliefs, Williams was exiled from the Massachusetts Bay colony in 1635.100 Rogers was 
not alone in his failure to satisfy the orthodoxy of his region. During the same era, Anne 
Hutchinson, a laywoman and midwife, defended her right to conscience when accused 
of heresy. Trial transcripts from 1637 record Hutchinson’s powerful words to the 
Boston magistrates:  
For you have no power over my body. Neither can you do me any harm, for I 
am in the hands of the eternal Jehovah my Savior. I am at his appointment. The 
bounds of my habitation are cast in Heaven. No further do I esteem of any 
mortal man than creature in his hand. I fear non but the great Jehovah, which 
hath foretold me of these things. I do verily believe that he will deliver me out of 
your hands.101 
 
The experience and activism of figures like Williams and Hutchinson, followed by the 
leadership of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and others paved the way for the 
ongoing conceptualization of religious liberty in America, but it did so not simply 
because it seemed like a good idea, but because diversity of faith and thought was 
already present, necessitating the freedom to deviate from a singular orthodoxy in order 
to promote social cohesion, unification, and peace.   
    Religious diversity continued to grow, so much so that the first World Parliament of 
Religions met in Chicago in 1890. This occasion in American history demonstrated 
both that religious diversity in American was a reality and that many religious leaders 
and laypersons supported the concept of religious tolerance, though the majority of 
Americans identified as Christian. Despite this commitment – and perhaps because of it 
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– the dominant belief among the American people up through the early parts of the 
twentieth century was that there were basic faith-based tenets that were part of the 
American ethos, tenets upon which most people could readily agree.102 That those 
beliefs happened to coincide with Protestant Christian teachings was largely overlooked 
in the dominant public conversation until the rise of Catholic immigrants forced the 
conversation to include religious diversity in a more realistic way. Indeed, with a few 
exceptions, the landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases that applied the religious liberty 
clause to the States, cementing a Jeffersonian interpretation of the “wall of separation 
between church and state” as a principle within constitutional law, revolved around the 
tensions between public schools whose philosophical and practical framework was 
largely Protestant and private Catholic schools. We will return to this conflict in chapter 
two, but for now the point I mean to highlight is that, though religious tensions persisted 
during this early period of American educational history – violently at times – it 
nevertheless was largely a tension between forms of Christianity. Even when other 
players entered the mix, such as in McCollum v Board of Education (1948) when an 
Atheist mother battled against time-release programs, the public conversation largely 
accepted that most people agreed on a few basic Christian values. Other religious – or 
non-religious – traditions existed to be sure, but they did so within a dominant Christian 
worldview.103  
     Today, the religious landscape of the United States is changing into a very different 
creature, one in which, despite a solid majority of citizens who still identify as 
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Christian, organizes itself around the concept of pluralism rather than simply embracing 
the diversity that is present from within a Christian worldview.104 Put another way, the 
US has always been religiously diverse, but the basic threads of Protestant Christianity 
helped order much of US public life. Other traditions encountered pockets of tolerance 
and intolerance within a conversation that to a large degree assumed basic Protestant 
values. Today, the landscape of American religious life not only shows that religious 
diversity is on the rise, but that the broader framework has shifted to one of diversity 
itself. James Davison Hunter argues that this reordering of American society makes 
social cohesion more challenging.105 When diversity is the social order, then how do 
citizens develop the kind of cohesion necessary to sustain a nation? One suggestion 
might be that Americans order around civic values and that is enough to ensure social 
cohesion, but the growth of globalization threatens even coherent civic values as well. 
In any case, the growth of religious diversity and the shifting framework of pluralism 
pose challenges that educators and educational systems must take seriously.  
     According to religion scholar Diana Eck, the U.S. is now home to practically every 
religion on the planet, certainly to every religious tradition identified as a “world 
religion,” including the many variations that exist within those broad faith groups.106 
Through waves of immigration over the past two centuries and the eagerness of many 
Americans to learn about religious traditions not their own, the faces of Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam, Judaism, Jainism, Baha’i, Paganism, Wicca, Orthodox 
																																																						
104 Ibid., 201. 
105 Ibid., 202–203. 
106 Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the 
World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation, 1 Reprint edition (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 2002), 4. 
	 38 
Christianity, and many others color the religious landscape. Moreover, America has 
grown her own unique faith expressions. Movements such as Mormonism, Seventh Day 
Adventist, New Age, Pentecostal, Christian Science, Scientology, and New Thought 
originated through unique American experiences and have all grown to substantial 
numbers. New waves of immigration continue to reshape American religious life, and 
by extension public life, particularly as various Mexican and South American 
expressions of Christianity – Catholic and Evangelical/Pentecostal – and Islam quickly 
grow.107 Furthermore, the trend of the so-called “nones” appears to be on the rise.108 As 
noted, “nones,” according to pollsters, are people who either identify as non-religious, 
atheist, agnostic, or “spiritual but not religious.” Such a sweeping category is inherently 
problematic as there is an obvious identity difference between someone who claims 
atheism and someone who simply does not identify with organized religion but who still 
holds sincere beliefs in Ultimate Reality/God. Because of it, the prevailing diversity and 
the justifiable movement towards inclusion and tolerance contribute to the shifting 
reality that diversity is the new framework. Is Christianity withdrawing as the dominant 
theoretical system and the U.S? Such a social transition is bound to be fraught with 
tension and strife. Indeed, while religious diversity is on the rise, we seem to be 
witnessing the growth of political polarization as well as tensions from the so-called 
																																																						
107 Street et al., “America’s Changing Religious Landscape”; 1615 L. Street et al., “Religion in 
Latin America,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, November 13, 2014, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america/; 1615 L. Street et al., “The 
Shifting Religious Identity of Latinos in the United States,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & 
Public Life Project, May 7, 2014, http://www.pewforum.org/2014/05/07/the-shifting-religious-
identity-of-latinos-in-the-united-states/. 
108 Street et al., “America’s Changing Religious Landscape.” 
	 39 
“right” and “left” grow.109 In addition to the challenges Americans face domestically as 
religious diversity increases and political polarization does as well, there are significant 
international concerns that support the need to take religious liberty seriously as we 
educate tomorrow’s citizens. 
 
International Concerns 
 Restrictions on religion are on the rise globally.110 A brief examination of global 
restrictions will help draw implications for the trends within the U.S., particularly 
because the data available points to the correlation between restrictions, persecution, 
and even terrorism. In Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke’s groundbreaking book, The 
Price of Freedom Denied, the authors explore extensive quantitative data, collected in 
the International Religious Freedom Reports, which details incidents of religious 
persecution in most countries across the globe.111 The data is far more than suggestive, 
and though the reporting of persecution is likely low, it conclusively demonstrates that 
violent religious persecution is pervasive.112 Grim and Finke note that restrictions on 
religion come from two main sources: legal restrictions and social restrictions. The two 
tend to create a cycle that leads to, and reinforces, religious persecution.113 The authors 
																																																						
109 Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion, 52–60; Samuel P. Huntington, The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); 
James Davison Hunter and Alan Wolfe, Is There a Culture War?: A Dialogue on Values and 
American Public Life (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Fowler et al., 
Religion and Politics in America, 306–309. 
110 Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion (Washington, D.C: The Pew Forum on Religion & 
Public Life, 2012), 9. 
111 Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and 
Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 11 
112 Ibid, 18-20. 
113 Ibid, 9. 
	 40 
demonstrate that religious freedom is intertwined with other freedoms, and that 
restricting religious freedoms not only leads to persecution on religious grounds, it also 
fosters an environment of social conflict in general.114 Simply put, the authors clearly 
show that religious restrictions, imposed by the state or through social pressures (the 
two usually reinforce one another), lead to persecution. 
     Clearly, religious persecution is a human rights issue. Violent persecutions are the 
stuff of collective nightmares as the tragedy of the Holocaust reminds us. Yet, there is 
another aspect of religious restrictions that is equally troublesome. Quite simply, 
excessive restrictions on religion can provide a seedbed for acts of terrorism. According 
to Chris Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover, religious persecution can stir up sympathy for 
radicals, who position themselves in an anti-state stance.115 It may seem like terrorist 
acts are religiously motivated, but it is just as likely that the acts themselves are 
political, supported by those who feel persecuted for their beliefs, as the suicide note 
left by one of the Brussel’s terrorists confirms.116 Seiple and Hoover argue that religious 
pluralism contributes to positive social capital, and that pluralism, not secularism, is the 
answer to taming religious radicalism.117 Thus, while some argue that religious 
commitments provoke violence, it seems the opposite is just as true; where religion is 
permitted to flourish alongside other religions (without imposed restrictions, but with 
the agreement to tolerate one another), an agenda of social peace is more likely to 
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A Way Forward: The American Settlement 
     As we have seen, the increase of religious diversity in the United States, the 
appearance of political polarization, and the challenges of a global world in which 
religion is both a significant player and a tenuous struggle, makes the intersection of 
religion and education a vital area of study and an area of human experience in which 
thoughtful, honest exploration should be a priority for the field of education. There are 
many approaches one could take, but I believe one model is particularly useful: The 
American Settlement. 
     Examining the historical roots of American religious freedom, Steven D. Smith, 
argues that prior to the 1940’s, the U.S. held to a set of beliefs that was committed to 
“Constitutional agnosticism and constitutional contestation,” resulting in what he calls 
the American Settlement.119 Put simply, there were generally two somewhat opposing 
stances with varying interpretations within American culture prior to the 1940’s. One, 
which Smith calls Providentialism, held to the belief that the United States is a divinely 
accountable nation with religious principles underlying constitutional rights. The other 
stance, embodied by people like Thomas Jefferson, took a more “soft” secularist 
approach, using broader religious language if any and calling for a “wall of separation” 
between church and state (not between religion and the public square). Within the 
context of Constitutional agnosticism and contestation, both positions were accepted as 
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viable arguments; one could be opposed to the other, but one did not argue that the 
other had no place within the public commons. However, through a series of Supreme 
Court decisions (and the rhetoric and logic within some of the dissents), the secularist 
stance was prioritized and eventually became the standing orthodoxy on matters of 
religion and politics.120 We will discuss these cases and what I call the privatization of 
religion in chapter two. For the time being, suffice it to say that when a single position 
becomes orthodox, anything opposed to it ceases to be a valid position and instead 
becomes illegitimate, or, to use religious language, heresy. Today the conversation 
about religion and the public commons in the United States is shaped by secularism 
rather than a commitment to contestation and civil discourse.121 It requires little stretch 
of the imagination, then, to accept the possibility that the U.S. may eventually adopt a 
more rigid version of secularism, moving from passive to assertive policy and social 
stances. Of course, the opposite could happen. With the influx of Latino/a Catholics and 
Evangelicals, Muslims, and other more religiously committed groups, it is possible that 
the American Settlement may be reborn, but most indicators suggest a growth toward 
assertive secularism, or its opposite: exclusivist religion.122 One thing is certain, the 
current rhetoric around “neutrality” is sadly misleading and lacking in substance – 
within schools and within politics. For, as Smith insightfully points out, true neutrality 
is a myth: “the fundamental difficulty is that the ostensible neutrality of the modern 
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secular state turns out to be, on closer examination, little more than a sort of political 
optical illusion.”123 An open system of contestation with civility and inclusivity as its 
grounding is a much better option and is fundamental to vibrant democracy. This 
project proposes just such an option – a “New American Settlement” in which a 
plurality of views is valid ways of seeing the world and with it the acceptance of civil 
debate and compromise as a way forward. The New American Settlement is built on the 
old foundation of openness and contestation, but embraces new concepts of the 
commons, the common good, care-centered ethics, kindness, an agency of limits, and 
the philosophy of education as relationship. These ideas will be developed throughout 
the project and woven together fully in chapter five when the New American Settlement 
is clearly articulated. 
 
Looking Ahead 
     This chapter made the case for taking religious liberty seriously in public schools. 
This platform departs somewhat from previous scholarship that emphasizes the 
importance of teaching about religion in schools in order to foster more religious 
literacy amongst students. In addition, it contextualizes the project solidly within 
educational thought, for in order for schools to change, the foundations of education 
must be open to change and those who educate teachers must themselves change, and 
thus the torch gets passed along. The remaining chapters build a framework and develop 
a working theory of the New American Settlement in public schooling. 
     Chapter two briefly examines the history of religion and public schooling – the 
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“School Question,” as it is commonly known. It demonstrates that the School Question 
has been, and remains, a substantial point of contention and debate in public 
schooling.124 It explores the common school movement as a movement imagined in part 
by religious people. It goes on to examine the landmark Supreme Court decisions that 
have helped shape the School Question – and it argues that such decisions have led to 
what I call the “privatization of religion,” which poses significant problems for religious 
liberty in public schooling. 
     Chapter three explores the contributions from Educational Studies scholars and 
philosophers that are helpful in developing a New American Settlement. In particular, I 
examine the work of Jane Roland Martin, John Dewey, and Nel Noddings, along with 
some of the less-sung but nonetheless influential educational voices of Friederich 
Froebel, Jane Addams, Booker T. Washington, Maria Montessori, Paolo Freire, Louisa 
May Alcott, and Myles Horton. Though diverse in their writings, I highlight aspects that 
contribute to the theory of cultural miseducation and the ethic of care, which are at the 
heart of New Settlement. 
     Chapter four brings another player into the conversation: religious voices. It makes 
little sense to argue that schools must take religious liberty seriously and exclude 
religious voices from the theoretical groundwork.125 Rather, I pull on the thread within 
many religious traditions, coined most recently by ecological theologians as the 
“commons.” Most arguments made to include religion seriously in the curriculum 
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assume a religious studies perspective, and while this is an important area of study, it is 
certainly not the only way to explore religion, nor does religious studies always get to 
the heart of the religious matter as it often makes religion an object of sociological 
study. As important to understanding religion and to taking religious liberty seriously is 
the exploration of theology and theological reasoning. Compelling arguments made on 
religious grounds are made theologically, including some of the most heartfelt 
statements on religious liberty. To exclude theological “talk” from the conversation is 
unsatisfying and treads dangerously into the territory of “orthodoxy” whereby, despite 
encouraging diverse voices, one position – that which categorizes religion as a mere 
subject – is normative. Theological voices make little sense in this context, but in New 
Settlement they have the opportunity to be understood as an alternative worldview to 
the secular one we have created within the American public square.126 The “commons” 
relates beautifully to educational theories of care, cooperation, and inclusivity, and I 
believe that bringing the diverse voices of religious thinkers together with educational 
thinkers will help conceptualize the New American Settlement.  
     Chapter five brings the findings of the previous chapters together and further explore 
New American Settlement with a specific intent: learning to live with religious diversity 
in public schooling. And, chapter six pulls everything together, highlighting both 
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II. The School Question & the Privatization of Religion 
  
“Education in and for a democratic society must provide the schooling required for each 
student to develop his [or her] powers and interest to their full, to find himself [or 




     Few of us have reason to think that our lives will one day be under the watchful gaze 
of a nation – YouTube videos notwithstanding – let alone that our deepest and sincerest 
beliefs will be the topic of household conversation. One can reasonably speculate that 
Vicki Frost had no such ambition or desire, yet the life and, more specifically, the 
political and religious thought of this homemaker from rural Tennessee became the 
subject of a nationwide public debate during the summer of 1986.128 What seemed like 
a small squabble turned into a dynamic legal battle, earning the popular title “Scopes 
II.”129 Briefly summarized, Frost – and other parents – objected to some of the material 
found in her children’s public school readers, material she and others describe as 
“secular humanism.” Frost, and other observant Christian parents felt that some of the 
material in the textbooks was inconsistent with their religious beliefs, and it threatened 
their ability as parents to educate their children according to their faith. Rather than 
simply removing her children from the local public school and enrolling them in a 
private religious school, Frost chose to stand in opposition to what she felt was imposed 
moral formation into secularism. To be sure, part of her decision came from her 
family’s limited income, making private school fairly unaffordable – although later she 
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did roll her children in a private religious school. To be fair to Frost, some local 
community members felt her case galvanized their own beliefs that the public school 
enforced a secularist stance that was untenable to their own faith commitments. 
Scholars would later agree that, by and large, public schools do just that.130 In some 
ways, Frost was a pawn in a much bigger battle. That was certainly the case when the 
conservative organization Concerned Women for America heard of the situation and 
backed the cause, hoping, no doubt, for a Supreme Court hearing (which was ultimately 
rejected), and the liberal People for the American Way sided with the school district, 
effectively using local people’s faces to fight a broader political battle as is so often the 
case. Frost argued that her children should be granted permission to use alternative 
reading material that would not negate her faith commitments. The school district 
refused and ultimately Frost lost the case. Today, “Scopes II” is still relevant, for, 
besides providing an example of the secularist framework of most American public 
schools (even those in religiously conservative areas) it points to an important and often 
overlooked problem: how can truly democratic public schooling be achieved in a nation 
of diverse, often polarized, citizens? The solution in Frost’s case was really no solution 
at all; in the end, she withdrew her children and lived with public derision.131 Educators 
should be troubled by the resolution, even if many agree with the dominant worldview 
of secularism promoted by the school textbooks in question. Such a solution lacks 
compassion, and it does not take the well-being of children into account; rather, it 
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upholds State authority and reinforces a kind of orthodoxy that is troublesome both on 
religious and intellectual grounds.  
     This chapter is not about Vicki Frost, but it is about the same kind of troublesome 
exclusivist framework that exists in our public school system, handed down by 
powerful policy makers and reinforced by those charged with protecting public 
education – administrators and teachers alike. In order to make a case for taking 
religious liberty seriously in schools through New American Settlement, we must first 
understand where we are and how we got here. Such is the task of this chapter, which 
will examine, albeit briefly, the history of the “School Question” – that is, the role of 
religion and public schooling. Through the course of this chapter, I seek to make two 
primary points that are both instructional and necessary to the future work of imagining 
a New American Settlement: first, that the foundations of public schooling and the 
educational philosophy regarding it involve a kind of secularist approach that is 
progressively assertive, and second, that this is in part due to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions regarding schooling and religion that have, for all practical purposes, 
privatized the latter. Both of these realities – the privatization of religion and the 
dominantly secular framework of public schools – pose significant challenges to 
diversity and religious liberty, and both trends need to be challenged on the grounds of 
ethical stability and constitutional legitimacy if we are to make headway in cultivating 





The School Question: Historical Considerations 
     Since the earliest days of state-implemented public schooling, educators, 
administrators, politicians, and community stakeholders have debated the role of 
religion in education. Perhaps it is more accurate to consider this in light of 
sectarianism, for it was less a matter of whether or not religion had a role in education 
and more a question of what features of Christianity should influence public schooling, 
as the majority of the population, particularly those in authority positions belonged to 
one branch of Christianity or another. Some historians note that as states moved away 
from state-sanctioned religious institutions during the early nineteenth century – an 
official church, in other words – the emerging public school took the symbolic place of 
the church as the institution that could provide social cohesion, with the added benefit 
of crafting citizens and workers.132 Indeed, philosophers of education like John Dewey 
sought this sort of replacement, but from within a secular worldview.133 Dewey’s 
Pedagogic Creed includes powerful final words that utilize religious language, although 
Dewey himself argued the irrelevance of religion in a scientifically enlightened culture:  
I believe, finally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training of 
individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life. I believe that every 
teacher should realize the dignity of his calling; that he is a social servant set 
apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right 
social growth. I believe that in this way the teacher always is the prophet of the 
true God and the usherer in of the true kingdom of God.134 
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Dewey’s anti-religion stance is understandable in light of his era and its glorification of 
scientific rationality; yet, his use of religious language and religious imagery is 
troublesome to say the least and it emphasizes the lived experience that religious 
language, no matter how it is used, is powerful. Moreover, religion is apparently 
difficult to remove entirely from educational considerations, even by a confirmed 
secularist such as Dewey, so it is far more appropriate to allow diverse religious 
language and beliefs to have a place within school culture than it is for secular theory to 
use religious language to secure its own agenda without competitive worldviews to 
challenge one another’s assumptions.   
      In the earliest days of the Colonies, prior to the common school movement, 
schooling was far less politically complicated and far more diverse.135 Some churches 
offered schooling as a way to live out commitments to help the disadvantaged and form 
their young members in their beliefs.136 Most formal schools were private and were 
usually only affordable for wealthy families.137 For others, schooling took place either 
informally in the home, or through apprenticeships into specific trades.138  
     Arguments for common schooling date back as early as 1779, when Thomas 
Jefferson urged Virginia to institute public schools. His plan ultimately failed, but as 
waves of new immigrants made the United States home, plans to improve social 
cohesion and to enculturate new immigrants into the American ethos (that is, the 
American ethos as articulated by those in authority positions) emerged. Education was 
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seen as a critical – if not the most critical – component of such an agenda. Some eighty-
or-so years after Jefferson’s attempts, Horace Mann, the Secretary of the State Board of 
Education of Massachusetts, successfully achieved what Jefferson did not, and the 
common school was born.139 This achievement was certainly not easy, and some of the 
staunchest activists were Christians, advocating for the common school out of a sense of 
Christian mission and duty.140 Certainly, most understood the common school as a place 
in which “common” Christian values would be instilled: “[A nonsectarian system] 
earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis of religion; it 
welcomes the religion of the Bible; and, in receiving the Bible, it allows it to do what it 
is allowed to do in no other system, – speak for itself.”141 As support for a common 
school increased, so did tension around exactly what the common school would teach 
and whose values it would represent. As with other government institutions, the 
common school tended to not only reflect the culture out of which it emerged but the 
values and commitments of the dominant cultural elites, who, at that time were usually 
Protestant Christians.142 It is no wonder, then, that the early common schools ordered 
the culture and curriculum around Protestant Christian beliefs that school leaders 
believed were simply common values: “In this age of the world, it seems to me that no 
student of history, or observer of mankind, can be hostile to the precepts and the 
doctrines of the Christian religion or opposed to any institutions which expound and 
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exemplify them.”143 With the rise of the common school movement, came political 
challenges. As Joseph Viteritti remarks,  
Once it was determined that we should all go to school together and learn from a 
standard curriculum, education became political. Because it was always 
assumed that the common curriculum would go beyond teaching the basics to 
incorporate certain fundamental values to which we should all subscribe, the 
common school created a crucible for fierce disagreement.144  
 
Today, with an even more diverse population, public schools face an enormous task if 
they seek to be both a place that unites and respects difference. 
     As Protestants reacted to other religious traditions, many of them sought to apply the 
“wall of separation” to schools. Indeed, were it not for religious stakeholders, it is likely 
that the process of secularizing schools would never have happened, and if it did it 
would have been much later, for religious people were some of the staunchest 
supporters of secularization.  In some ways, the conflicts we face today over items of 
religio-cultural stock such as prayer in school, Bible reading, and religious objects are a 
holdover from the earliest days of public schooling, a logical remnant of the past we 
would do well to understand. Theological and traditional differences (not to mention 
social and economic differences) between Protestants and Catholics came to a head in 
schooling issues.145 Bible reading may have been an acceptable practice, but whose 
Bible? Catholics and Protestants used different translations and took different positions 
on sections of sacred scripture. Many Protestants viewed the Catholic Catechism with 
suspicion and distain, and the prayer practices of the two traditions seemed incongruent 
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to many. At the heart of the argument, however, was the reality that both Protestants 
and Catholics expected that their children would receive formation through school, and 
that formation should be as a Protestant or a Catholic, respectively. Today, religious 
identity often fluctuates, and many people only loosely consider themselves adherents 
of a particular tradition; some happily move from tradition to tradition and society 
permits that largely without negative social recourse. However, people with established 
religious identities, particularly when cohesive within a community of the same, 
generally prefer to raise their children according to their own beliefs and values – 
personal and collective. What happens in a setting in which diversity of such values 
must translate into the curriculum? That is just the sort of question Protestants and 
Catholics wrestled with during the mid to late nineteenth century – and what we 
continue to wrestle with today. The battle was often heated, and it resulted in at least 
three extremely significant developments: parochial schools, the reinvigoration of 
secular thought through liberal educational theories, and the pervasive question of how 
public funds should be spent regarding schooling – the root of the privatization 
conundrum. These battles took place at the pulpit, the podium, and especially in the 
courtroom. 
     In her fascinating account of popular constitutionalism, Sarah Barringer Gordon 
examines how religious liberty cases have been argued before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and how religious actors, especially religious minorities, have helped shape 
constitutional law regarding religious liberty.146 It is ironic to see the doors one religious 
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group unintentionally opens for another, often oppositional group. For instance, in 
fighting for their own rights, members of the Salvation Army argued cases (during the 
1880s to early 1900s) that set precedent for the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who in 
turn offered up legal methodologies (1935-1940) that proved useful for the Nation of 
Islam (1950s-1970s).147 The conservative Concerned Women for America, which many 
would consider fundamentalist Christian, opened doors (1970s-1980s) that would be 
used by marriage equality advocates (1970s-present).148 To call this irony is perhaps an 
understatement. The pattern – of groups cutting trails for supposedly opposing groups 
behind them (historically speaking), however accidentally – is too consistent to be 
ignored. These legal battles helped form public opinion and law. To the chagrin of 
many, religious actors are largely responsible for ousting religion from the public 
schools, for, by fighting for their own (often minority) rights, they supported the trend 
toward government neutrality in matters of religion, disestablishment, and the (often 
unintended) process of secularization. 
     At the time, the move toward religious neutrality in schools was agreeable to the 
dominant Protestant Christian population whose values were still represented even if 
they were disguised as nonsectarian, though it was bad news for religious minorities and 
only partly good news for irreligious people who still dealt with thinly-veiled 
Protestantism. But, it seemed the process of secularization was agreeable to the 
majority. Taken to its logical conclusion, however, secularization without commitment 
to all sorts of diversity, including religious diversity, has largely resulted in secularism 
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that rejects religion as a viable public response altogether, as well as growing tension 
between conservative religious actors and liberal religious actors or non-religious 
people. Today, religious people are only beginning to see the philosophical error in 
privileging one worldview over all others – be it Protestant or secular. To be sure, the 
battle over vouchers in American schooling is largely situated within the problem of 
religious and spiritual formation in schools.149  
 
Secularization & Secularism 
   At this point, it is useful to discuss the meaning of secularization and secularism. At 
its most basic, the term “secular” is generally used to denote things that are not overtly 
religious. An institution is secular in nature, therefore it is not a religious organization, 
though it can certainly include religious concepts and structures of thought, as even 
Dewey displays in his Pedagogic Creed. A somewhat silly, yet useful example of this is 
the categorization of Christmas music. Some Christmas songs are religious – they refer 
to God and to the birth of Christ – and others are secular, for they make no such 
reference, unless one considers animated snowmen a symbol of miracles. Yet, the 
holiday is undeniably a religious one – the “mass of Christ.” It is not that the secular 
does not relate to the religious, rather it is that the secular does not claim religious 
authority, although it may still use religious language and symbols to translate meaning. 
This is a point we would do well to remember when we describe schools as secular in 
purpose.  
     The process of secularization is applicable to institutions like schools. It does not 
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mean dislocating schools of their historical roots within religious traditions (be it 
Christianity, Islam, or any other religious path), it simply means that, as a process, it 
seeks to communicate its purpose and arrange its structure outside of any particular 
organized religious body. On its own, secularization in a religiously diverse population 
appears logical as a means of inclusion; if no particular religion is represented to the 
exclusion of others, then it makes room for diversity. In practice, when taken to an 
extreme secularization can lead to the absence and intolerance of religion in the public 
square. Like all extremes, many of the results of such a stance are untenable in a 
pluralistic society with members of varying levels of religious commitment. 
Historically, American commitments to secularization might be labeled “soft” or 
“passive” secularism.150 This description refers to the variously interpreted belief that 
public institutions and practices should not be religious in nature and should not 
promote a religious position. Many religious people hold – and have held throughout 
American history – this position, including the far from orthodox Thomas Jefferson. 
They are passive secularists who agree that, in general, it is best to keep religious 
institutions out of public business, but who also recognize that personal religious 
convictions can never truly be kept out of public commitments, nor should they. Passive 
secularism occurs when the government has “a secular legal system and constitutional 
neutrality toward religions.”151 In other words, religion is not established in any official 
way, but it is also a permitted flavor within public discourse. Two main interpretations 
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within passive secularism play out – accommodationism and separationism.152 
Accommodationists argue in favor of public expression of religion, provided it avoids 
excessive entanglement and favoritism (at the expense of other religions), while 
separationists argue that religion should be permitted within the private sphere only. 
These two arguments have shaped many policy-making and judiciary decisions 
regarding religion and politics in the United States during the twentieth century.153 
     However, like anything else, separationist agendas can be taken to the extreme, 
leading to “hard secularism” or what Ahmet T. Kuru calls “assertive secularism.” 154 
Kuru’s distinction is helpful, for the differences in secularism are often felt, but rarely 
articulated. Within an assertive secularist ideology, religious organizations, sentiments, 
and expressions are strictly prohibited in the public square, particularly if the public 
square is supported by the state. Such is the case in France and Turkey, which both have 
strict policies prohibiting religion in government, including public schools and policies 
governing public behavior.155 Though historically the U.S. overall promotes passive 
secularism, the support that separationism receives through Court decisions and much 
of liberal cultural rhetoric (that, incidentally, confuses religion with a church or a 
specific religious institution) is leading to a progressively assertive secularism, felt in 
many areas of life, including public schools. This is certainly problematic for religious 
freedom. As Kuru notes, “religion-friendly passive secularism provides a more effective 
route for the integration of unconventional religious groups, including Muslims, than 
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assertive secularism, which is intolerant toward public religions.”156 As demonstrated 
by Court decisions we will discuss at length later in this chapter, and by the lack of 
religious voices in the curriculum and in textbooks, intolerance toward religion seems to 
be growing in American public schools.157 Also problematic are the school districts 
which, reacting against an increasing secularist agenda, incorporate worship and other 
religious practices in their curriculum, for they, too, articulate an exclusivist agenda, 
privileging one religion over all others. More common than religiously exclusivist 
schools, perhaps, is a middle ground, still articulated within a secularist agenda, that 
seeks to teach about religion but gives little thought to the diverse religious identity of 
students. Whatever the response, American public education articulates its purpose and 
agenda within a secular framework that is becoming increasingly assertive.158 In order 
to accommodate diversity and to promote the just treatment of students, however, the 
exclusivism of secularist framework must be challenged by the recognition that more 
than one worldview is legitimate. Unless we do that, public schools have little hope of 
meeting the needs of a diverse student-body or of being the placeholder for social unity 
their creators hoped. 
 
Privatizing Religion: School, Faith & the Supreme Court of the United States 
     Up to this point, I have argued that increasingly assertive secularism is a significant 
roadblock to cultivating public schools that not only acknowledge but honor diverse 
worldviews. The interpretation of certain U.S. Supreme Court opinions is certainly one 
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of the main reasons why this has come to pass, but it has done so through the process 
that I call the “privatization of religion” – that is, relegating religious beliefs and 
language to the domain of one’s personal life rather than religious commitment being a 
welcomed guest in public discourse. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning the First Amendment and public schools has 
supported this trend.159 When wrestling with the Establishment and Free Exercise 
clauses of the First Amendment, interpretations tend to polarize the two concepts and 
decisions have, more often than not, been decided on the basis of Establishment, often 
rejecting the public value and relevance of religious commitments.160 Understandable 
though many of these decisions may be, they are not without impact on religion and 
democratic life.161 Today, the dominant agreement seems to narrate a view in which 
religion has little or no place in the public square. Let us examine some of them in light 
of privatization.  
 
The First and Fourteenth Amendments 
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     The following is neither intended to be an exhaustive account of Supreme Court 
cases pertaining to the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (in public schools), nor 
to discuss each of the important cases (which is debatable, at any rate). Instead, it 
highlights some important precedents as well as useful lines of reasoning and insights 
(often occurring in the dissents) that help lay groundwork for the theory of the 
privatization of religion – and warn against it. Up until passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (1868), the First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise clauses 
were only a matter concerning Federal control over individual States. The amendment 
merely made it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to establish a religious sect 
as authoritative or to inhibit the free exercise of religion by the state. States could, more 
or less, determine in what ways to practice religious liberty, to make its own rules for 
issues like religion in school and policy-making.162 Even with the passage of the 14th 
Amendment, which granted the protection laid out in the Bill of Rights to all persons 
regardless of State measures, it was questionable as to whether the Federal Government 
could tread on the ground of First Amendment protection and contradict States’ rulings 
in matters of religion. However in Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), the U.S. Supreme 
Court applied the free exercise clause to the states, and then in 1947 Everson v. Board 
of Education of the Township of Ewing ruled that the establishment clause was also 
applicable to states, therefore, it was unconstitutional for States to either establish a 
religion or to inhibit the free exercise thereof.163 Thus, the Federal Government’s reach 
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in matters of religion greatly expanded. The Supreme Court decisions that came after 
this interpretation played a vital role in influencing the ways in which religion is lived 
out in public life and public expression.  
 
Either/Or dilemma of the Establishment & Free Exercise clauses 
     The interpretation of what precisely Establishment and Free Exercise means has 
shifted over time, as is obvious when reviewing Court Opinions, Dissents, and 
Concurrences.164 Setting aside, for a moment, the meanings of these ideas, however, it 
also seems that the trend has been to interpret Establishment and Free Exercise as 
complete opposites rather than as complimentary ideas of the same principle.165 In most 
cases, the Court decides whether an issue is one of Establishment or one of Free 
Exercise. But, when both ideas are clearly present, the tendency has been to highlight 
Establishment, privileging it at times to the detriment of the other.166 The dilemma 
seems valid enough; at times it does seem as though in order to protect against the 
Establishment of religion, Free Exercise must be restricted, and vice versa (though, 
usually it is not vice versa, for anti-establishment appears more important to uphold as 
an ideal than free exercise in most Court decisions). However, the validity of this way 
of seeing the two ideas is questionable. Like Thomas Berg, who notes that, “the 
Establishment Clause was a full partner with the Free Exercise Clause in the dual 
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protection of religious liberty,” I suggest that the two are complimentary pieces of a 
singular concept.167 Justice Rutledge sums this up well in his Everson Dissent when, 
remarking on the Founder’s notion of religious liberty, he says: ‘“Establishment” and 
“free exercise” were correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different facets 
of the single great and fundamental freedom.’168 Where one clause appears to be 
censured, it is questionable if the other is really being understood properly. For 
example, Justice Stewart warns against a narrow or strict interpretation of the two 
clauses. Speaking of the idea of “the separation of church and state,” he remarks, “The 
short of the matter is simply that the two relevant clauses of the First Amendment 
cannot accurately be reflected in a sterile metaphor which by its very nature may distort, 
rather than illumine, the problems of a particular case.”169 The point is that when the 
two clauses are either interpreted over and against one another, or interpreted out of 
historical and present-day contexts, decisions may become murky. Although an 
interesting task might be to examine the two clauses in light of a complimentary 
approach – much like the Daoist concept of Yin Yang where seemingly polar opposites 
are really complimentary aspects, each containing a portion of the other – it is 
nonetheless apparent in the Court’s decisions that the Establishment Clause is often 
given priority when the two appear to be conflict.  
 
From “State coercion” to “excessive entanglement” 
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     Although what “Establishment” means in the First Amendment lacks specificity 
(probably because there was no reason to clarify it since religion was to be a State 
issue), the Framers of the Constitution may have viewed Establishment as setting up a 
religious sect with political authority and control, as was the experience in many of the 
Colonies.170 By Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the grounds of interpretation 
shift to a more expansive, encompassing definition. Establishment, for both the majority 
Opinions and the Dissents, means aiding religion (a sect or religion in general), forcing 
attendance, coercion of creedal consent, providing funds for religious schools or for 
religious instruction, or participating in matters of religion. What any of these 
descriptions mean is open to interpretation as is evidenced by the Justices’ own 
deliberations. Justice Rutledge’s Dissent in Everson clarifies that, historically, the 
stringency with which Founders like Madison argued for anti-establishment was on 
behalf of protecting religious liberty.171 Coercion by the State (or Federal Government) 
is a direct threat to religious liberty – and Democracy. As argued by Justice Jackson in 
his Zorach v. Clauson (1952) Dissent, “[the school program under review] is founded 
upon a use of the State’s power of coercion, which, for me, determines its 
unconstitutionality.”172 One can see how coercive measures, when enacted by a 
powerful State government, can be understood as Establishment.173 
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     This position was later expanded further in cases like Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) to 
develop a definition of Establishment as “excessive entanglement.”174 Religious 
matters, should they become “entangled” in the State, or should the State become 
entangled in religious matters, could be considered Establishment, and therefore 
unconstitutional. Thus, situations such as teacher salary augmentation in religiously 
affiliated primary schools (Lemon) and permitting religious instruction inside school 
walls (McCollum v. Board of Education - 1948) were interpreted as “entanglement.” At 
this point, entanglement was generally understood as ways in which either public 
funding was used to support religious institutions or training, or where the compulsory 
power of the State might have aided religious institutions in obtaining students, 
participation, or support.  
 
Entanglement & Potential 
     In order to gain clarity and assess cases in light of the Establishment Clause, the 
Court developed the “Lemon Test” – so called because of the standards argued in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). The test was developed during the decision over Rhode 
Island’s 1969 Salary Supplement Act, which provided salary supplements to teachers at 
private schools, including religious schools. The Court found that the supplement was 
unconstitutional and developed a simple (perhaps overly so) test by which to determine 
whether or not something violated the Establishment clause. In brief, it states that 
legislation is only constitutional if: 1) it is specifically secular in purpose, 2) its primary 
effect “neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and 3) it avoids entanglement by way of 
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“sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity.”175 Perhaps for the first time, we had a way to measure constitutionality 
regarding Establishment, although the test has been criticized by many Justices over the 
years. The Lemon Test broadens the concept of entanglement to include the potential 
for entanglement in the future as a primary concern. Justice Douglas warns that “the 
zeal of the religious proselytizers promises to carry the day and make a shambles of the 
Establishment Clause.”176 There was no evidence suggesting proselytizing was 
happening in this case nor was it the issue at hand, yet the “promise” of it is what 
sparked fear. Whether or not that promise is a valid concern, this heads toward a more 
excessive emphasis on potential future issues than the earlier cases were willing to 
entertain. As Lemon itself asserts, “A given law might not establish a state religion, but 
nevertheless be one “respecting” that end in the sense of being a step that could lead to 
such establishment…”177 Potential becomes grounds for an unconstitutionality ruling.  
     Lemon provided future Courts a way to measure Establishment – even if the test is 
problematic.178 For example, Stone v. Graham used the test to determine that posting 
the Ten Commandments in public schools is unconstitutional because, despite 
arguments claiming it was not the school’s intention, it can be seen as privileging a 
religion.179 Stone implies that if something with religious symbolism which has no 
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clearly-defined secular purpose, it must have a specific religious one, thus it violates the 
Establishment Clause. But, as Justice Renquist remarks in his Dissent, “The fact that the 
asserted secular purpose may overlap with what some may see as a religious objective 
does not render it unconstitutional.”180   Edwards v. Aguillard used Lemon to reject 
Louisiana’s “Creationism Act,” which prohibited teaching evolution in public schools 
without the accompaniment of “creation science.”181 But, Edwards also includes a 
warning against the test in Justice Scalia’s Dissent, who, acknowledging the problems 
inherent in positioning the two Religion Clauses over and against one another, remarks,  
Abandoning Lemon’s purpose test – a test which exacerbates the tension 
between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, has no basis in the 
language or history of the Amendment, and, as today’s decision shows, has 
wonderfully flexible consequences – would be a good place to start.182 
 
Scalia also goes on to point out that “interaction with” religion and “establishment of” 
religion need not be viewed as one and the same, an important logical distinction. 
     Gradually the Court seems to have expanded its understanding of entanglement from 
clear examples of what was actually going on to what potentially might happen in the 
future. It is a small point of difference, but one important to note, for analyzing what 
might be the results of a ruling is far from a scientific, predictable practice. “Potential” 
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Religion, a Private Matter 
     Alongside the shift from a strict view of Establishment as advancing sectarian 
religious commitments to the potential for religious influence in the public square – a 
move seen through the Supreme Court cases studied thus far – the Court’s 
understanding of the role of religion has changed as well. From the assumption that 
religion was an important aspect of society – “We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”183 – comes a gradual assertion that religion is 
a private affair. Lemon states this explicitly: “The Constitution decrees that religion 
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private 
choice, and that, while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must 
be drawn.”184 Justice Douglas’ Dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder, one of the few cases in 
which Free Exercise (of religion) is prioritized, states that “religion is an individual 
experience.”185 Justice Kennedy remarks in Lee v. Weisman, that “the design of the 
Constitution is that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a 
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere, which itself is promised 
freedom to pursue that mission.”186 Justice Scalia, in a slightly crass counter argument, 
points out that, “Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion were, 
as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal avocation that can be 
indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in the privacy of one’s room. For most 
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believers, it is not that, and has never been.”187 The point is apt, even if the analogy 
leaves something to be desired. Can religion, which has generally been a corporate 
experience, be considered private? What is private, and what is public, for that matter? 
Arguably, any belief held by a person has public implications; this is the heart of Jane 
Roland Martin’s reprimand against education being reduced to mere schooling, for it 
puts anything outside of school off limits to educational critique. So, too with religious 




     Although interpreting the 14th Amendment to place the restrictions of the First 
Amendment on States as well as the Federal Government, grants the Federal 
Government additional authority, there are still questions pertaining to jurisdiction with 
which the Court has wrestled. Just because the States are not allowed to establish 
religion or prevent the Free Exercise thereof, does not necessarily imply that the Federal 
Government should be watchdog of this. In other words, a strong case could be made 
that the First Amendment implies restraint whereby the Federal Government should be 
extremely cautious of interfering with matters of the State.  
     Though it is not related directly to public schooling, the case of Employment 
Division v. Smith is an example of the shaky territory of Federal intervention. Alfred 
Leo Smith, a Native American and member of the Native American Church, was fired 




sacrament of Peyote during services. He brought suit against his employer and the 
Oregon State Supreme Court ruled in his favor. The case was referred to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, who overturned the ruling. Huston Smith, a religious scholar, was 
actively involved in the aftermath of the case, seeking to raise awareness and aid 
litigation on behalf of protection for the religious freedom of Native Americans. He 
remarks, 
That the highest court’s decision violated both the letter and the spirit of the 
Constitution – its letter, because the First Amendment forbids the federal 
government to take actions that would interfere with the free exercise of 
religion; its spirit, because the intent of the amendment was to turn religious 
issues over to the states – has already been marked, but the ethics of the case 
also warrants mention…That the U.S. Supreme Court singled out for oppressive 
action the weakest, most oppressed and demoralized segment of our society is 
travesty enough…188 
 
Whether strictly justifiable or not, this case clearly demonstrates the Federal 
Government’s self-granted ability to restrict potential State commitments to Free 
Exercise. Whereas the 14th Amendment, according to precedent, gives the rights 
guaranteed in the First Amendment to the people and not only the States, it is still worth 
considering when and where the Federal Government actually has prudent jurisdiction 
in making those decisions. Smith is clearly a case in which the Federal Court restricted 
Free Exercise, granted by the State. It is ironic that the Framers crafted the First 
Amendment to stop just this sort of infringement on liberty from happening. 
     Justice Jackson had a reputation in these kinds of cases for hesitancy on the grounds 
of jurisdiction. In general, his arguments vehemently upheld anti-establishment, but he 
also just as strongly drew attention to instances in which he felt the Court should not 
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even have a voice. A good example of this is in McCollum v. Board of Education, 
where Jackson rigorously questions the Court’s legitimacy in hearing the case (in which 
it found that religious teachers instructing on matters of religion within public schools 
was unconstitutional); he warns that should the Court wade into these kinds of “local” 
matters it might open the floodgates of litigation – and he was right.189 He goes on to 
warn against the Court becoming a “super board of education for every school district in 
the nation.”190 
 
What it means to be well-educated191 
 
     Although most of the Court’s rhetorical grounding has little to do with education – 
its primary concern being whether or not a given situation is constitutional, and the 
constitution says little explicitly about education – there are a number of cautionary 
statements that warn against the educative danger of removing all traces of religion 
from public schools. Perhaps the most notable is, once again, Justice Jackson’s 
Concurrence in McCollum v. Board of Education, no doubt quoted frequently as a 
testament to Jackson’s eloquence. He warns that there is danger to public schools 
themselves in subjecting them to frequent lawsuits because people find their curriculum 
“inconsistent with…their doctrines;” he argues that it would “leave public education in 
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shreds.”192 Jackson goes on to say that religion is imbedded in the history and culture of 
our nation and that to sanitize public schooling of religion altogether would, in a sense, 
be miseducative:  
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth 
transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious 
influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity – both Catholic and 
Protestant – and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world’s peoples. One 
can hardly respect a system of education that would leave the student wholly 
ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a 
part in which he is being prepared.193 
 
Given that Jackson condemns Establishment in his written Opinions and Dissents, this 
is fair warning, indeed. Moreover, it highlights an important point as this nation 
becomes one of the most diverse in the world: how can we expect to turn out well-
educated young adults without giving them both the factual tools and the capacity for 
empathy needed when encountering diverse religious traditions? For good or for ill, 
indeed, religion is a critical component to understanding individuals and culture, so it 
would seem that religious awareness is a valuable part of public schooling curriculum – 
a part, incidentally, permitted by the Constitution.194 Justice Stewart makes a similar 
point in Engle v. Vitale when he notes the relevance of “the history of the religious 
traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials 
of our government.” Without an understanding of religion, gained in part through 
education, we limit the capabilities of understanding these “countless practices.” 
Indeed, it is almost as if this shift toward privatization is a reordering of culture. 
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     Similar to the stance that religion is a private matter, children’s exposure to religion 
has come into question. Some Justices’ remarks have reminded the Court that anti-
establishment does not mean insulation from or protection against religious exposure 
altogether.195 There is a difference between exposure to religion and State coercive 
measures promoting religion. As Justice Stewart remarks in Abington v. Schempp, “The 
[religious exercises] become constitutionally invalid only if their administration places 
the sanction of secular authority behind one or more particular religious or irreligious 
beliefs.”196 Stewart’s position reflects a balance that most falter in – one that 
acknowledges that neither religious nor irreligious positions are truly neutral. He also 
reminds the Court that local communities differ, and so do their cultures and customs. 
This diversity necessitates a flexibility in interpreting both Clauses with which most of 
the Courts seem to grapple – at times successfully, and less so at other times. As Justice 
Jackson remarks, “Devotion to the great principle of religious liberty should not lead us 
into a rigid interpretation of the constitutional guarantee that conflicts with accepted 
habits of our people.”197 
     During the 1980’s, conservative Christians challenged the process of secularism in 
schools and brought forward a number of cases involving the legality of student-led 
religious clubs in public schools. A number of lower-level court decisions were 
overturned by the Supreme Court, thus student’s right to free exercise was upheld. In 
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1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act (EAA), which further protected the right 
of students to participate in student-led religious groups.198 Later, the Equal Access Act 
would support the rights of other student clubs, including LGBT groups, which is yet 
another example of the pendulum swing of which Gordon writes. However, despite 
these decisions, which support the free exercise of religion on the part of students, the 
Court has yet to provide a coherent argument against – or a way forward out of – 
privatization.  
 
Concluding Thoughts: Privatizing Religion 
Who makes it private? 
     Despite laying at the feet of the U.S. Supreme Court the responsibility for legal 
precedents that tend toward a movement to privatize religion, it is not the Court’s 
responsibility alone. The social obligation ultimately lies with the way in which States, 
legislators, public officials, and the rest of this country’s citizenry choose to interpret or 
enact the Court’s decisions. Just because posting a copy of the Ten Commandments in 
schools has been ruled unconstitutional (Stone v. Graham), does not mean schools have 
to rid themselves of curriculum that exposes children to, and educate them about, 
religions in general. Yet, by and large that is exactly what we have done as a society in 
what might be described as an attempt to sanitize the public square of religion. That is 
not necessarily the fault of the Supreme Court decisions (even if some of those 
decisions are less generous toward religion than some would prefer), it is the way in 
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which we interpret how those decisions should (or could) play out in public life that 
truly crafts our collective experience. 
     Illustrative of the impact of the Supreme Court decisions that contributed toward the 
privatization of religion is a rather infamous textbook case from the 1980’s. Keep in 
mind, by this time, Court decisions were widely interpreted as a call to sanitize the 
public school of religious overtones; some schools swept religion out entirely while 
others fought back from an exclusivist agenda of their own. In 1987 – just three years 
after the EAA was signed into law – a federal court in Alabama found that many of the 
state’s approved textbooks exclusively promoted secular humanism.199 In a rather brash 
move, Judge W. Brevard Hand ordered nearly four dozen books removed from 
Alabama public schools. Accused of fundamentalism, Hand nevertheless points towards 
one of the themes of this project: permitting only one orthodox worldview in schools 
simply does not adequately respond to the religious diversity of the United States. Hand 
remarks, “with these books, the State of Alabama has overstepped its mark, and must 
withdraw to perform its proper non-religious functions.”200  
     This response – the sanitization of the public square from all things overtly religious 
– is partly grounded in the notion of secularism and its presumed neutrality. More often 
than not, secularism is viewed as the alternative worldview to a religious one, and while 
there is some truth to that, with this understanding tends to come the view that religion 
is biased (which it is) and secularism is not. However, secularism is still a worldview – 
an organizing way which constructs understanding and influences conduct – and 
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therefore, by its nature, it has its own lens. Moreover, just as there is no one Christianity 
or one Buddhism, there is no one secularist view. If secular worldviews carry with them 
particular ways of navigating the world, and if religious worldviews do the same, then it 
would seem the idea of neutrality is equally available – and as easily dismissed – for 
both the secular and the religious. Only when we as citizens are willing to recognize this 
can we hope to achieve any sort of neutrality, if it is possible at all.  
     Let us examine neutrality for a moment longer. What does it really mean? Does it 
mean being objective? And, if so, objective about what? Scientists and philosophers 
alike generally agree that objectivity is a myth, that there is no such thing as a value-
neutral position.201 Human beings have inner and outer experiences (as does the entire 
cosmos) that shape them; without delving into the particularities of this shaping, it is 
important to acknowledge that value-neutrality or experience-neutrality is really not 
possible. Yet, we still seem to hold neutrality as an ideal in governing (at least in theory, 
more or – in more recent times – less). So, what is it we are really saying? To me, what 
is really being said by the ideal of “neutrality” when the Justices speak of it, is that we 
are trying to create a space in which both the individual and the collective may thrive 
according to Democratic principles, maintaining ideals and moral values generally held 
in common, but not at the expense of the good of the individual, small collective 
groups, or the collective at large. This stance suggests compromise as a tool, but also 
the cultivation of skills like empathy, vulnerability, compassion, and solidarity. 
Ironically, these are exactly the kind of things that a curriculum and school culture that 
embrace religious pluralism can foster. 
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     For better or for worse (and I would emphasize the latter), by the guidance of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions, religion is popularly viewed as a private affair, a matter of 
personal choice and conviction with little relevance for public life. Even when religion 
is acknowledged as relevant, the dominant contemporary agreement is that religion 
should be a personal matter, that there is simply too much diversity to satisfy everyone 
on religious grounds, that religion is emotional and even irrational and we should guide 
the commons through the application of rational thought.202  
     The problem is, religion is not a private matter. Certainly religious practices can be 
deeply personal, but they are no more private than we are as individuals. How much 
sense does it make to suggest that one of the most structurally vital ways of 
understanding our deepest self can be entirely separated from the ways in which we 
relate to others and to the world around us? Certainly we can agree to refrain from 
intentionally imposing certain beliefs on others, but the only way in which we can hide 
those most basic beliefs we hold about ourselves, the world, and the way life works is to 
step firmly into the territory of hypocrisy and inauthentic living. Religion matters partly 
because it functions whether we acknowledge it or not. It is a bit like asking a woman to 
forget she is a woman when discussing abortion, or a Native American to forget her or 
his heritage when recounting the history of “Western Expansion” (resulting in genocide 
of the Native Americans). Our identity is a vital part of our contribution to the public 
square; it will come out in one way or another, and religious beliefs and the way they 
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live out those beliefs are an integral part of many people’s identity.203 As religio-
political activist Jim Wallis remarks in his most recent book, “faith should be lived out 
in our public life for the common good.”204 It is best to allow religious identity to 
honestly have a seat at the table in order to mitigate unhealthy and violent outbursts 
born of frustration, marginalization, and disenfranchisement. 
     We, as citizens, as educators, as leaders, and as students need to think honestly and 
compassionately about what it means to allow religious expression to flourish within the 
bounds of the Religion Clause. It is permissible to teach about religion, even in public 
schools. But, this is not saying enough; children and teachers need the space to be 
honest about who they are, about what their ancestral story is, and schools need the 
freedom to responsibly explore what it means to be religiously diverse in their particular 
cultural situation. This opens the door for many more questions and much more work to 
be done. Perhaps Justice Jackson’s words can remind us of an important ideal to this 
end: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by world or act their faith 
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therein.”205 Privatizing religion does just that – it promulgates a false understanding of 




     One may reasonably argue that secularism is not the tone of all public schools; there 
are plenty of examples in which public schools allow religious expression to have its 
say. Yet, those are the exception within a dominant secularist framework. Moreover, 
these exceptions are all too often the opposite side of the same exclusionary coin, for 
they rarely embrace religious diversity; instead, reacting against perceived threats to the 
religious values of those who have a more powerful and represented voice, those 
schools often promote a single version of religion.206 Neither approach satisfactorily 
addresses religious diversity or the religious identity of students, and both are arguably 
in violation of constitutional law. The heart of the problem for both is the belief in – or 
reaction against – the privatization of religion, which is reinforced again and again by 
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Supreme Court decisions. Ultimately, that is the battle Vicki Frost fought – the 
assumption that her religious values and those of her children did not relate to what her 
children studied in school. Of course, Frost herself might not be any happier with a 
school structure that deeply committed to religious liberty, for that means that all 
person’s religious convictions are permitted a voice at the table. This is untenable to 
many a religious actor, which is, as we have discussed, partly why secularism has 
become the framework of public schooling. Nevertheless, in order to adhere to 
Constitutional commitments and just practices, public schools must find a way to take 
religious liberty seriously.  
     The next chapter looks at schooling from the inside out; rather than telling schools 
what they should do, it grapples with educational theory, and proposes that there are 
dynamic areas of connection within educational philosophy and thought that can easily 




















III. Making Religion a Live Option in Schools: Educational 
Foundations 
 
“But a good teacher must stand where personal and public meet, dealing with the 
thundering flow of traffic at an intersection where “weaving a web of connectedness” 
feels more like crossing a freeway on foot. As we try to connect ourselves and our 
subjects with our students, we make ourselves, as well as our subjects, vulnerable to 
indifference, judgment, ridicule.” – Parker J. Palmer207 
 
 
     There are many challenges to the kind of inclusivity demanded by the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment in schools. In addition to the parameters established by 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the difficulties in determining how those standards should 
be applied, there are myriad of other complex considerations. Some parents agree with 
teaching about religion, others do not. Some parents fear exposing their children to 
faiths other than their own, while others do not want to legitimize religions at all. Most 
teachers do not have the academic background or teacher training to take on subjects as 
potentially volatile as faith commitments.208 Rarely do teachers receive the training or 
support needed to even facilitate conversations about religion and religious issues in a 
satisfying way. Because religion contributes to – and creates – worldviews with specific 
moral and ethical commitments, religious identity is extremely complex, so value-
neutral conversations are unlikely. Teachers and parents bear the brunt of these kinds of 
conversations, but other stakeholders contribute to the complexity. Administrators often 
do not see the first-hand implications of faith commitments or of the impacts when the 
school is sanitized of religion. More often than not, school boards react to the issue of 
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religion and schooling from a political viewpoint, either attempting to shape schools 
around the values of secularism or, in some cases, of one particular religious tradition. I 
chatted recently with a colleague who taught in a public middle school in a large city. 
Her students were primarily Latino, many of whom were immigrants to the U.S. from 
Mexico, while many others were first generation Americans who struggled with English 
since it is often not spoken at home or in their local communities. Along with all the 
other aspects of their culture, many of these children have a strong Catholic identity, 
including a reverence for Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe (Our Lady of Guadalupe). 
Many of my colleague’s students wore their rosary around their necks (usually a chain 
of beads, joined at one end by a medal – often Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe – and 
culminating with a crucifix). One day, the school Principal ordered the students to cease 
wearing their rosaries; he argued that it had become a gang symbol in some areas of the 
country and such symbols were strictly prohibited. He felt justified with his position, 
and from a secularist framework, one could argue his point of view was reasonable. 
However, whether certain gang members have usurped the symbol of the rosary as a 
gang sign is a secondary issue to the primary one at hand: children with sincere faith 
commitments choosing to live out part of that commitment with a symbol (which is 
often a personal reminder of those commitments) were subjected to the arbitrary 
decision of one person who failed to understand and acknowledge the constitutional 
principle of Free Exercise. Whatever else it taught them, that moment must have had 
profound implications in the identity development of the children who were no longer 
allowed to even gently live out their faith commitments at the place that was supposed 
to be helping them form into adults and citizens: their school. This kind of situation 
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occurs with regularity across the United States.209 In 2000, Nashala Hearn, a young 
Muslim woman, challenged her Oklahoma public school’s directive to remove her hijab 
(headscarf), which administrators categorized as a hat (prohibited inside the school 
building). Ultimately the school settled the case, allowing Nashala to retain her 
headscarf during the school day.210 Besides a good example of issues students have 
between schools and Free Exercise, these situations point to an even more troubling 
one: the fundamental structure of most American public schools fails to adequately 
value the diverse religious identity of their students and their rights to First Amendment 
protection around those identities.211 
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The Deep Structure of Educational Thought 
     For a moment, let us consider the situations described above as symptoms of a 
greater problem. We have discussed the dominance of secularism within public schools 
as a system and the Supreme Court decisions that have fostered such a stance, but there 
is a level beneath these issues that is a fundamental contributing factor to the intolerance 
of diverse religious identities (either of religion at all or of religion other than one’s 
own) within schools. Jane Roland Martin might call this part of the “deep structure” of 
educational thought;212 that is, the hidden assumptions and philosophical reasoning that 
goes into the foundations of education, and the beliefs about schooling, children, and 
society. Much of the current deep structure is useful, but some is quite damaging, as 
Martin points out. It is useful to understand this way of conceptualizing education 
because it allows the logical pitfalls of current thinking around religion and schooling to 
be examined much more thoroughly and seen not merely as a surface issue but as 
symptoms of a deeper breach.  
     Martin is among the most widely celebrated contemporary American philosophers of 
education, and while she does not deal specifically with the issue of religion – in fact, 
she believes religion is an all too often divisive force213 - her work on educational 
theory is enormously useful, for she points to deeply held assumptions in Western 
education and schooling that are harmful to democracy, to children, and to justice. 
Martin observes that education, like any aspect of culture, has its own sets of values and 
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assumptions, many of which go unnoticed in the crafting of educational thought. 
Comparing education’s deep structure to the deep structure of language, Martin 
explains, 
The deep structure label is meant to suggest…that like the generative grammar 
posited by linguists, the West’s most basic beliefs about education are tacit 
rather than explicit. The label is also intended to indicate that, as the deep 
structure of language serves to generate sentences, the deep structure of 
education serves as a set of rules for generating ideas about education; that, as 
the former places limits on what can be said in a language, the latter constrains 
what can be thought about education. Thus, as the one is compatible with 
different languages, the other is compatible with different proposals regarding 
the way education should proceed.214 
 
Education’s deep structure, then, guides and directs based upon cultural values and 
objectives, which are often assumed, floating beneath the surface of observation. Martin 
argues that there are some specific deep structural assumptions that are powerfully 
constrictive and without properly understanding them they contribute to cultural 
miseducation. Martin observes two “rock-bottom dichotomies” in the deep structure of 
educational thought: the nature/culture divide and the two/sphere split.215 Both of these 
are thought models that occur because of a dualistic paradigm. The nature/culture divide 
is simple to understand: dominant Western thought conceives of the world of human 
beings and that of the rest of the biotic world as separate domains, that of “man” versus 
“nature.”216 In scientific terms, this is quite nonsensical, for human beings are among 
the billions of different biotic creatures living in a vast biosphere. Yet, this division lies 
at the heart of intellectual and practical pursuits that place humans above “the natural 
world” and contribute to faulty ethical standards that continually result in environmental 
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devastation from human-caused devaluation of the planet.217 Martin reminds us that, 
though conceptually one could argue that the nature/culture divide is value-neutral, 
practically speaking the world of culture – or “man” – is considered superior (given that 
“man” is the originator of such a conception, that is not surprising).218 Much like 
“separate, but equal,” the reality is that one is given more value than the other, however 
irrational it may be. In both racial and biotic matters, it makes no sense to argue the 
superiority of one over the other; we are all literally connected to one another and 
depend upon one another and upon the intricate web of life for our very survival. 
     The second dichotomy of which Martin speaks bears more obvious relevance for the 
topic of religious liberty, though the nature/culture split should not easily be dismissed 
as it contributes to the very foundation of dualism promoted since at least as early as 
Greek philosophy. The “two-sphere split” – Martin’s second deep structural error – 
conceives of human life in two separate domains: the public and private.219 This split is 
at the heart of the privatization of religion, though religion has certainly not always 
been fundamentally privatized, nor is it in other parts of the world or subcultures. For 
Martin, these two sphere’s are represented by the home and the professional or public 
world.220 Martin is deeply concerned with matters of gender and sexism, and she points 
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out that traditionally these two domains were also largely divided along gendered lines 
as men were the acceptable actors within the professional and public world and the 
home was left to women’s care. Of course, this is a generalization, but it is one that has 
a long documented history; one cannot reasonably argue that women and men have 
always shared equally these domains. The second point Martin makes is that, in 
addition to the dichotomy of public and private, the former has been positioned above 
the latter, making the private domain subservient to the public domain.221 Martin 
observes: 
Now it is logically possible for society or culture to be divided into two spheres 
without one of them being considered superior to the other. However, just as the 
assignment of mind to culture is thought to demonstrate its superiority over 
nature, the assignment of reason to the world of work, politics, and the 
professions is viewed as demonstrating its superiority over the world of home 
and family.222 
 
There is a certain logic to the conceptualization of these two spheres, but punctuated 
with hierarchically assigned value, the two-sphere split is troublesome because it 
devalues the home and privileges public life.  
     The two-sphere split can be thought of from another perspective that is equally 
relevant to education and schooling. Most of us would argue that there are some aspects 
of life and of our identity that are private and others that are public, but what of the 
things that are so integrated into who we are that, while they may be deeply personal, 
they are lived out publicly? For most religious persons, faith is just such a thing. One’s 
identity as a person of faith is deeply personal and is often nurtured in private – both in 
one’s own interior world and in the home (and, often, in houses of worship or within 
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faith communities, which are usually still considered private in that they are not in the 
domain of the “public” square) – but it crisscrosses the boundaries of the private/public 
dichotomy regularly because religious identity is functional; it is who one is in one’s 
inner life, and also who one is as one walks in the world. Imposing the two-sphere split 
on a religious actor is deeply problematic and pragmatically impossible. The same 
could be said for those who describe themselves as “spiritual but not religious;” such a 
category, as problematic as it is, is suggestive in itself. If one has an active, authentic 
spiritual life, it cannot help but overflow into one’s interactions with others. Indeed, 
only inauthenticity could spawn a spirituality that is left inside one’s home. Religious 
persons are all too often described as hypocritical, and this is the root of the accusation 
– that their claimed beliefs are not lived out in everyday life. To suggest, then, as the 
Court has done and many a public commentator continues to do, that religious people 
should keep their religion a private matter is impractical and lacks critical observation.  
     The two dichotomies in education’s deep structure revealed by Martin are the root of 
the narrowed perspective that education equates to mere schooling alone. When the 
cleavages of the deep structure are revealed, when humans understand themselves as 
members within the rest of the biotic world, when the home and that which is “private” 
are understood as contributing cultural stock as educational agents, then broadening the 
description of education can happen to include any potential encounter with items of 
stock. Only then can the things which are educative be examined for what they bring to 
the table, their advantages and disadvantages, their miseducative powers and their 
contributions to cultural stock. With respect to religious liberty, when the privatization 
of religion is revealed as an impossibility, then not only are schools and the ways in 
	 88 
which they treat religious actors up for examination, so too are religious actors – from 
religious leaders, to places of worship, to religious rhetoric – for their roles as 
educational agents and transmitters of cultural stock. Relegating religion to the private 
sphere harms children whose identities are partly developed through religious ties, but it 
also does religion no favor; it marginalizes it, at once dismissing its value and also 
failing to hold it accountable for the role it plays in educational or miseducational 
processes.   
      
Religion as a “Live Option” 
     Martin’s examination of education’s deep structure in general helps us notice another 
deep structural assumption held about religion specifically: religion, as Nord notes, is 
generally not considered a “live option” within schools.223 This includes areas of the 
country that defiantly oppose Supreme Court decisions and attempt to flood their 
districts with exclusivist religion – other religions are not a live option either. This is an 
assumption that undergirds common behaviors and attitudes towards religious liberty in 
schools; when religion, in all its plurality, is seen as an interloper rather than offering 
different frameworks that help religious members make sense out of life, religious 
liberty is in jeopardy. The dominance of secularism (not simply secularization as a tool 
of inclusion and cooperation, but as the primary worldview), the privatization of 
religion within and outside of Constitutional law, and the reduction of religion to a mere 
subject of study in schools points to this deep structural assumption that must be 
addressed if we are to take religious liberty seriously in schools.  
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     Warren Nord is one of the strongest voices supporting “taking religion seriously 
across the curriculum.”224 In his final book, published posthumously, Nord urges 
educators that students must not only learn about religion on the surface, they must 
learn about it with enough depth that they understand it is a “live option.”225 In other 
words, religion is not simply a set of beliefs held by other people that conflict with a 
secular worldview, but it is rather a way of orienting one’s life. All people orient their 
lives around some kind of “live option” or worldview; secularism (either passive or 
assertive) is the current dominant public option in the United States and in much of the 
West, but it is not the only legitimate option. Put another way, religions offer up 
alternative worldviews to a secular one; these are ways of understanding the world that 
are different, but no less legitimate than secularism. It is this notion – that there is but 
one legitimate worldview or “live option” – that our schools must rid themselves of if 
they are to take religious liberty seriously and make possible a New American 
Settlement. Only when the worldviews offered up by religious traditions are legitimized 
as relevant rather than marginalized as archaic, ignorant, or belonging only to a private 
sphere, can religious liberty flourish. The relevance of this idea transcends religious 
liberty as well. When only one option is legitimized in schools, there is a far greater 
opportunity for students who do not fit the “norm” to be marginalized. Moreover, 
multiple live options help students see an important truth: worldviews are just that, 
views, interpreted by finite minds. Much like Martin’s idea that the narrowing of 
education to what goes on in schools unnecessarily constricts and hides educative 
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contributions going on in other ways, so too does failing to see that people operate from 
within a worldview that is far from neutral. Failing to see that all humans function from 
a lens of interpretation allows flawed behavior and thought to remain uncontested. The 
remainder of this chapter explores contributions specific to educational studies that 
justify and unpack the deep structural assumptions concerning religion as a live option, 
and provides a rationale for changing it.  
 
What We Bring to the Table: John Dewey & Paolo Freire 
     Chapter One discussed Dewey’s direct contribution to the School Question and it 
was less than flattering since he epitomizes an exclusively secularist agenda. To be fair 
to Dewey, he did not have the past seventy years of increasingly assertive secularism or 
polarization in public schools to look back upon; were he alive today, he would, 
perhaps, support a more pluralistic approach to religion and schooling. Despite Dewey’s 
shortsightedness in this area, his importance to the field of education cannot be 
overstated, and he made a number of theoretical contributions that can offer a corrective 
to his failure to consider religion a live option. In particular, Dewey develops a theory 
of experience as the ground of education in his short, but famous, work Experience and 
Education.226 Briefly summarized, Dewey argues that education, to be truly educative 
and impactful as a means to cultivate character, must be experiential – it is not enough 
to learn facts and store them away somewhere in one’s brain.227 Dewey explains, “I 
assume that amid all uncertainties there is one permanent frame of reference: namely, 
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the organic connection between education and personal experience.”228 We must have 
an experience in order for it to stay with us and inform further development. And, we 
do have experiences all the time. Some would argue – as Dewey does in his equally 
notable work Art as Experience – that to have an experience, one must be fully present 
in the now, while others might say we do nothing but have experiences.229 Using 
Dewey’s criteria, we can also say that experiences are not created equally. Some are 
educative, others are mis-educative. The goal of schooling is, in Dewey’s mind, to help 
students have experiences that open up potential for further growth.230 Mis-educative 
experiences constrict the mind, dull the senses, and reduce the potential for the person 
to have a fuller experience of life in the future.231 Experiences that are helpful advance 
the possibility of flourishing for the one having the experience, and thus, help cultivate 
a better world for everyone else. As Dewey notes, “the trouble is not the absence of 
experiences, but their defective and wrong character – wrong and defective from the 
standpoint of connection with further experience.”232 According to Dewey, a central 
task of the teacher is to make way for the right kind of experiences, based both on the 
student’s own past development and character, and upon that which she/he needs to 
learn in order to grow.  
     Dewey goes on to spell out the idea of the continuity of experience in which he 
posits that each experience one has makes way for the next experience and becomes its 
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framework for interpretation.233 Similarly, our experiences are viewed through the lens 
of past experiences, so a task of the educator is to have enough cultivated wisdom and 
sensitivity to try to see that experiences will be helpful, and to mitigate those that will 
not. The continuity of experiences becomes a means through which one establishes 
habits and, thus, character. It is vital, then, for education to be constructed in such a way 
that not only gives students the opportunities they need to have helpful experiences 
toward their own growth, but also wise enough leaders and mentors that can help 
students see, process, and understand the kind of character they are cultivating. 
     This reasoning has implications for religious liberty in the school. The experiences a 
student has both inside and outside of school are potentially educative or mis-educative, 
according to Dewey (and streams of educational thinkers who have come after him). 
The way in which a student is treated in relation to his/her religious identity, the way 
religion itself is discussed (or not discussed as the case may be), and the extent to which 
religion (and by implication, religious actors) is seen as a live option are powerfully 
educative or miseducative. If one of the primary goals of schooling is to harness the 
quality of experiences in such a way that they educate rather than miseducate – or, put 
another way, that they contribute to growth rather than constrict it – then the religious 
identity of students and the ways in which other students are taught to respond to other 
students is a subject that should be on every educator’s agenda.  
     Dewey’s theory contributes further to taking religious liberty in schools seriously: 
students are not isolated vacuums awaiting an educators input; they already have a 
multitude of experiences that have led them to wherever they are in their current 
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development as people. In many instances, part of these experiences are religious or 
relate to their religious convictions and commitments. For the school to ignore this 
development as irrelevant or, worse still, ignorant, betrays the flaw of education’s deep 
structure with regard to religion. Regardless of the tone of the school about religion, 
regardless of its commitment to a secular framework or an exclusivist and reactive one, 
students bring with them all of their own personal experience in relation to religion. For 
educators to fail to take religion seriously as a live option interrupts Dewey’s continuity 
of experience, or along Martin’s reasoning it unnecessarily restricts education which 
leads to mis-education.  
     The revolutionary educator, Paolo Freire, is instructive at this point. Freire develops 
a “pedagogy of the oppressed” in his book of the same title.234 Freire’s primary task is 
contributing to a body of knowledge that legitimizes the struggle of marginalized people 
(although he disputes the term “marginalized”) and gives educators (formal and 
informal) insight into power dichotomies and decolonization. He argues that the current 
model of education often falls into the pattern of a “banking method;” that is, students, 
particularly those from less powerful classes and portions of society, are viewed by 
educators as repositories into which information is to be dropped.235 More often than 
not, this “information” is really a tactic to indoctrinate students into the dominant 
framework of those in power.236 Viewing students this way hardly takes their life 
experiences seriously, rejecting the continuity of experience as anything but a means for 
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students to be manipulated into a set agenda. Freire argues that educators and students 
alike must reject the banking method, otherwise injustice will continue to thrive. He 
insists that students must bring their own experiences to the table in authentic dialogue. 
He writes, “The solution is not to “integrate” them [the oppressed/students] into the 
structure of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become “beings 
for themselves.”237 Put more generally, the purpose of education is not to indoctrinate 
students into one and only one way of understanding the world; the structure of 
education itself must allow for multiple live options so that students may bring their 
own genuine experiences to the educative process that helps them continue to grow, and 
learn from one another’s differences. Freire calls this kind of educative stance a practice 
of freedom, which is apt for our discussion of religious liberty: 
Education as the practice of freedom – as opposed to education as the practice of 
domination – denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached 
to the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people. 
Authentic reflection considers neither abstract man nor the world without 
people, but people in their relations with the world.238 
 
Part of these “relations with the world” include the relationality with a person’s 
religious beliefs where other actors and processes integrate in ways that influence 
identity. It becomes a matter of justice, then, to view religion as a live option in schools. 
When a system of education establishes one framework as legitimate and positions it 
against all others, it concedes to the process of oppression of which schools have often 
been accused. But, that should not be the foundation upon which education is built – the 
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heart of education, rather, is to reveal, as Parker Palmer says, a “hidden wholeness” 
developed through educative encounters that promote growth and flourishing.239  
 
Whole Student Transformations: Jane Roland Martin’s Educational 
Metamorphoses 
     Jane Roland Martin continues to provide valuable insight as we evaluate religion as a 
live option in schools. Though Martin’s work is far too complex to summarize in brief, 
all of her theorizing supports the premise that education is about “learning to live.”240 
This implies, of course, that living is more than mere existence, and that it is not 
something one does well without conscious awareness. Life is a process of growth, of 
change, of movement – the continuity of experiences that characterize the quality of 
one’s life. Learning to live requires diligent attention, in Martin’s view, to cultural stock 
– its assets and liabilities – and to educational agency, which is why she argues for 
seeing education in broad terms so that cultural liabilities and agents who contribute to 
miseducation do not go unseen.241 Another way of saying this is that education is really 
about promoting flourishing of individuals and communities, and by extension, the rest 
of life. This concept does not reject the reality of suffering, it simply urges us to 
examine the roots of that suffering and correct them as we are able. Thus, schools, as 
institutions charged with the task of educating (even though there are plenty of other 
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educational agents outside of schools) should also be about the business of helping 
students learn to live in a way that fosters flourishing.  
     Martin identifies the process of learning to live specifically; she calls it “educational 
metamorphoses,” which are “whole person transformations.”242 Martin argues that 
people go through transitions and transformations of identity, caused by educational 
encounters, in which they become “yoked” to new items of cultural stock and, emerging 
from that, they become someone entirely new.243 Now, practically speaking, no one 
transforms so completely that no aspect of their former self remains. The butterfly still 
bears the DNA of herself as a caterpillar. But, sometimes personal transformations are 
so dramatic that it seems that an entirely new person is revealed. Even when that is not 
the case, circumstances and one’s response to them often causes deep transformations 
so that new aspects of one’s self develop or latent potentials reveal themselves. 
     Educational metamorphoses happen to everyone. Who remains entirely the same 
throughout their life?244 While most of us go through many of these transformations, 
our educationally formative years, a good portion of which are usually spent in schools, 
are opportunities for powerful educational metamorphoses. Martin asserts that the first 
educational metamorphosis often occurs at a very young age.245 Schools not only 
contribute to educational metamorphoses as educational agents, they also should be 
places in which students can safely navigate these interpersonal changes. Such 
transformations are not for the school to manipulate into place, and they will happen of 
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their own accord as students encounter other cultural stock and educational agents, but 
the obligation of educators is to allow the process to happen with the least likelihood of 
the kind of constriction of which Dewey warns.  
     With respect to religion, we must understand that students will likely have their own 
religio-educational metamorphoses. That is, most students will go through some kind of 
discernment process with regards to religion, influenced in part by their own 
interpersonal experiences and by the encounters they have with other religious (or non-
religious) actors and cultural stock (such as scripture and religious stories or myths). 
Rarely does an individual go through life without questioning the religious beliefs, or 
lack thereof, with which they were raised, and the high school and early college years 
are commonly years during which people consider themselves “seekers.” In my own 
classes on World Religions at the college level, it is typical to have at least half of my 
class going through the process of questioning their religious beliefs and identity, and 
many of them go through complete transformations during the semester (often, 
interestingly enough, back into the religion of their upbringing from which they had 
distanced themselves during High School). Transformations, for good or for ill, are 
realities. The danger concerning religion and schools is this: when religion is not a live 
option, schools risk objectifying and oppressing students who are going through an 
educational metamorphosis that is religiously oriented, or contributing to a 
miseducative metamorphoses regarding religion. Instead of helping students learn to 
live, schooling here conceived becomes a process of indoctrination, manipulating them 
into a dominant framework that does not consider religion a legitimate live option.    
 
The Challenge to Care 
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     The purpose for schooling is multifaceted. It, of course, includes learning basic skills 
that are useful to everyone such as rudimentary mathematics that allow one to complete 
everyday computations (change from the grocery store, measurements for those new 
curtains, ingredients to double a recipe, etc.), reading and writing, familiarity at least 
with history, basic sociological concepts, etc. Although Freire justifiably argues against 
the banking method of education, there will always be a bit of knowledge-depositing 
that happens through the educational process of schooling. The story hardly ends there, 
however. Historically, one of the primary reasons for creating a public school system 
was an attempt to integrate immigrants into the larger society, instilling common values 
and commitments.246 Of course, some would call this indoctrination, and their 
complaints are valid for those who determine which values are transmitted through 
public institutions and how are, to a large extent, cultural elites that have the power to 
make those decisions to a large degree. Still, there is validity in so-called citizenship 
education; certainly a positive outcome of schooling are emerging adults who are 
equipped to engage in the democratic process of American citizenry. Most educators, 
however, argue that the story does not end here; their “job” is not only to see that 
students have a competent if rudimentary skill-set, nor merely to form citizens in a 
certain image. Most teachers believe that at least part of their work is about cultivating 
good people, people with ethical and moral reasoning who will contribute in a positive 
way to our shared experiences. This, of course, does not mean that schooling is the only 
place in and through which such educative processes happen, but a school system that 
does not provide a platform for students to develop their ethical capacities is hardly 
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worthy of the name. The development of character education is a result of such a stance. 
Character education is not without its flaws, and in many circles it has fallen out of 
fashion. A viable thread of educational thought has emerged out of the same 
commitment to ethical development, however, and though educational theorists term it 
differently depending upon their own background, we might simply call it “care. 
Care-Sensitive Ethics 
     Feminist philosopher Karen Warren gives a good theoretical description of care that 
is useful when we apply it to the task of New Settlement. Warren argues that most of 
Western society is divided into up-down hierarchies (usually represented by a 
patriarchal system) whereby certain people have most of the power (usually male 
elites), and the rest (usually the majority) have little power.247 In such a system, 
violence is prevalent, disenfranchisement of members is common, and there is very 
little traction to take things like human-caused environmental destruction or racism 
seriously. This is quite similar to Martin’s observation that the deep structure of 
educational thought assumes a nature/culture divide and a two-sphere split: both 
theoretical assumptions translate practically into a social system that lacks equity and 
justice for all. Warren’s description is perhaps more inviting for the imagination: the up-
down hierarchy model clearly helps us imagine relationships that do not support the full 
autonomy of each member, whether it be society “at large” that structurally assumes 
some people are more valuable than others, or schools that support the banking model 
of education in which students have very little to say about the process. Of course, in 
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such a model, teachers often have very little say as well since the curriculum is often 
dictated by higher-ups (a useful term when discussing up-down hierarchies) who have a 
set agenda, which often has to do with emphasized test scores and other political and 
economic considerations instead of good educative practices. This kind of a system, 
perhaps unintentionally at times, encourages various forms of violence toward those in 
the “down” position, particularly when those with a slightly higher (yet still downward) 
position become frustrated with those in the “up” position. How often do kind-hearted 
teachers loose patience with children out of sheer frustration with a system in which 
they have little say? 
     Warren suggests that the solution to such systemic injustice is not switching the roles 
of members but in dismantling the structure of the system altogether by transforming 
ethical reasoning through what she calls care-sensitive ethics that promote an “ethic of 
flourishing.”248 Flourishing, for Warren, is the heart of the educative process, much like 
Martin’s “learning to live.”249 Life is about flourishing, and education should do what it 
can to encourage flourishing while correcting that which diminishes life; miseducation 
restricts one’s natural impulse toward flourishing, towards learning to live. Care-
sensitive ethics is self-descriptive; it is the position that, along with all of the other tools 
we bring to the metaphoric table of moral and ethical reasoning, care should be at the 
center. For, if humans are to be able to substantially and adequately address issues of 
dominance and injustice, and to correct such systemic problems as environmental 
degradation, sexism, racism, and all the other “isms,” then what is needed is to cultivate 
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the capacity to care. “To tell the proper moral story of the matter, attention to and 
cultivation of human capacities to care and to engage in care practices is needed. 
Providing that missing moral piece is what I think care-sensitive ethics is all about.”250  
     Care-sensitive ethics acknowledge both the human capacity to care, and the fact that, 
based on the evidence, we do not care nearly enough. It legitimizes care as an aspect of 
intelligence, not merely a warm-fuzzy feeling, but authentic and critical engagement. 
Human beings are hard-wired for empathy and care,251 and, as Warren remarks, 
“Emotional intelligence recognizes that emotions matter for rationality.”252 Thus, care 
must be an aspect of any adequate ethic.253 
     Care-sensitive ethics recognizes that context matters, that ethical universals are 
always based upon the dominant forces in any society, and given that they rarely take 
into account the marginalized. A system of care honors both ethical principles and the 
context of the lives through which they will be lived out, again emphasizing care as a 
foundational prescriptive.254 Furthermore, care-sensitive ethics are grounded in the 
discerning power of care, or as Warren calls them, “care practices.”  
Care practices are practices that either maintain, promote, or enhance the 
health (well-being, flourishing) of relevant parties, or at least do not cause 
unnecessary harm to health (well-being, flourishing) or relevant parties. 
The care-practices condition functions as a situated universal principle for 
choosing among ethical principles (in the fruit bowl) and for helping 
resolve moral conflicts.255 
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In other words, practicing the art of care helps us determine what is right, what is just, 
based on loving recognition that the “other” is not really “other” for we too are invested, 
through care and compassion, in the flourishing of the one for whom we care. 
Philosophically, much may need to be said about this (and has been said), but 
essentially such a position is the stuff of spirituality where, in quite simple terms, we are 
called and challenged to care for the other as ourselves. To cultivate this most essential 
capacity to care – our moral and ethical groundwork for dealing with systemic injustices 
– is a perhaps the deepest and most important of all educational tasks, and it quite 
naturally floats between the secular and the sacred as such an aim naturally entails what 
many would call spiritual living or learning to live. 
 
Partnership Education 
     Riane Eisler develops a model for what she calls “partnership education” based on 
similar reasoning to that of Warren.256 She argues that in order to address large-scale 
societal issues, in particular the outbreak of war, we must develop a new model of 
education.257 According to Eisler, the dominant social systems of the West are built on a 
model of domination, and so most systems of education (which includes schooling) 
educate for violence, which transmits cultural commitments and values.258 A 
partnership model, asserts Eisler, is the solution to such a situation, the guiding 
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principles of which are based on “mutual respect and caring.”259 In fact, Eisler argues 
for a “4th R” (in addition to the classic three “R’s” – reading, writing, and arithmetic) – 
the “R” of relationship.260 Partnership education acknowledges that schooling is a 
process that involves mutual participation on the part of children, teachers, and other 
school members; children are not simply repositories for knowledge, but people about 
the process of learning. Viewed as such, teachers too are people in the process of 
learning, for they too are still learning to live. Such a revamping of the educative system 
takes children’s full personhood seriously. As Eisler notes, “Partnership process makes 
it possible for children to experience relations where their voices are heard, their ideas 
are respected, and their emotional needs are understood.”261 
 
The Challenge to Care 
     Though Nel Noddings unnecessarily restricts the role of religion in schooling, she 
too argues the “challenge to care in schools.”262 Noddings notes that care is an essential, 
yet often overlooked part of education. Care includes the ability to “respond 
sensitively” to one another, and such response involves everyone in the schooling 
process: students, teachers, and schools themselves.263 Noddings writes, 
“Responsiveness is at the heart of caring and also at the heart of teaching themes of 
																																																						
259 Ibid., 19–21. 
260 Eisler, “Tomorrow’s Children: Education for a Partnership World,” 47. 
261 Eisler and Miller, Educating for a Culture of Peace, 25. 
262 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education, 
Second Edition, 2 edition (New York: Teachers College Press, 2005); Nel Noddings, Caring: A 
Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Univ of California Press, 2013). 
263 Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools, xvii–xviii. 
	 104 
care.”264 She argues that school structures often work against care, which creates the 
“challenge” of which she speaks, making it all the more important that educators take 
seriously the task of cultivating an atmosphere of care.265 She describes the process as, 
“A caring relation is, in its most basic form, a connection or encounter between two 
human beings – a carer and a recipient of care, or cared-for. In order for the relation to 
be properly called caring, both parties must contribute to it in characteristic ways.” In 
Noddings view, the capacity to care is a mark of personhood and is a transformative 
practice.266 Thus, she urges, caring is the “bedrock” of successful education.267 
Noddings notes that such a practice involves at least four discernable steps: modeling, 
dialogue, practice, and confirmation.268 Teachers and other educative leaders model 
caring, allowing children to respond in kind. Like Freire, Noddings insists that dialogue 
be open-ended, permitting children to learn to speak from their own experience, 
imagination, and uncertainty.269 Like anything that needs cultivating, care requires 
practice, thus schools must provide avenues through which children can practice care 
and sensitivity to others, and as educators, we must be prepared to be present enough 
that we respond to student’s efforts – the confirmation piece of Noddings four-part 
strategy. 
     Care is not an isolated thing, not an established protocol of how to behave. Rather, it 
is a cultivated capacity that educators and schooling must take seriously if education is 
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to support flourishing. Care is part of learning to live. Another way of speaking of this 
is the development of compassion and empathy. If the task of education is to contribute 
to cultural assets rather than cultural liabilities, as Martin argues, and to promote the 
ability for all life to flourish, as Warren reminds us, then surely the capacity to care, to 
have compassion, and to meet situations and other persons from a place of empathy is 
indeed the bedrock of good educative practices. When we feel cared for, we are much 
more likely to reveal our more authentic self because we feel safe to do so. Creativity 
leaps forward, fresh ideas emerge, and life feels full of possibilities when true care 
enfold us. For children in the process of formation, care is a vital component of 
schooling. It is also essential for teachers; how much better would teacher retention be 
if schools were places of care? Moreover, if care is at the heart of schooling, the 
nurturing felt would spill over as such modeling encouraged others (students and 
teachers) to in turn treat others with care.  
     In order to take religious liberty seriously, to treat religion more than just a subject of 
study and to honor the religious (or non-religious) identities and experiences of 
students, care must be at the center of schooling. Care allows us to see that religion is a 
live option as we come in contact with religious actors. Let us consider Noddings’ four-
part system of care in relation to religious liberty: 1) teachers and schools model 
religious liberty by acknowledging that religion is a live option; or in schools where one 
religion is exclusively represented, that other religions (or non-religions), however 
much one may disagree with it, are live options, for people are living it. Teachers model 
tolerance and interest in student’s beliefs and experiences, including unrepresented 
identities, but all from within a model of caring. One can model tolerance intellectually 
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and even interest, but there is a palpable difference when one truly cares about the 
person with whom they are engaging. 2) Teachers encourage the kind of dialogue that 
Freire urges – open-ended and rooted in the experience of students. These are not 
dialogue sessions intended to fit a school’s agenda, such as the kind Noddings urges 
when she speaks of religion and education.270 These are not sessions that intend to 
critique religious beliefs in light of more “rational” thought. Rather, they quite simply 
allow whoever may wish to come to the table, encouraging kindly responsiveness from 
whoever is present, guided by compassion and care. Here, care is transformed from 
something that can be used to justify a particular position (“we’re making them do such-
and-such because we care about their long-term well-being”) towards something much 
less controllable, and something that ultimately respects, responds, and empowers. 3) 
Noddings’ third step is practice. Practice does not simply apply to students – it is not 
only children who must practice the capacity to care enough to allow others to grow, 
discern, and flourish; teachers and other school leaders need practice as well 
(sometimes, they need it more). Practice acknowledges that we are unlikely to “get it 
right,” at least at first, but it also implies that we can get better. In pluralistic 
communities, it is unlikely that everyone will be satisfied with the way in which 
religion is discussed and included in schooling. Yet, practice leaves room for such 
dissonance, carving out spaces for change, flexibility, and improvement. 4) In relation 
to religious liberty, I would include Noddings’ fourth step – confirmation – as both the 
first and the fourth for confirmation also involves validation, which is an essential 
aspect of care and of relating to religious differences. Validating students is important in 
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any caring environment, and when dealing with potentially dramatic differences in 
worldviews brought on by the division between secularism and religion, and by 
different religions, validation is crucial in order to open up the doors for modeling and 
dialogue. This model of care also recognizes that the learning process is not a one-way 
process. That which is learned on the part of students (and teachers) by participating in 
the parts of caring is passed on to others. Not only are students validated, they then 
learn how to treat others with care. Like Martin’s notion of “circulating gifts” acquired 
through educational metamorphoses that result in learning better how to live, the gift of 
flourishing as one encounters and learns more how care can be extended to other 
people.271 In their landmark book, American Grace, Robert Putnam and David 
Campbell argue that, according to their own acquired statistical data, Americans who 
developed unintended relationships with people from differing faith traditions generally 
became more tolerant.272 For example, Christians living in a dominantly Christian 
neighborhood might become more tolerant of Judaism if someone who is Jewish moves 
in next door. Or, a person with a bias against Islam becomes more tolerant when he or 
she finds out their co-worker, whom they happen to like, is Muslim. A similar situation 
can be true of education: when religious identities are validated and schooling 
encourages care-sensitive ethics, children will likely allow the care they have for a 
fellow student of a different religious identity (or none at all) to wash away prejudices 
they may have inherited. But, more than simply the effect of “bumping” into one 
another, which may bring a certain degree of tolerance for difference, true care does far 
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more than this; it cultivates the capacity in the student to face any difference from a 
place of compassion rather than a place of fear, which so often turns to hatred.  
 
Conclusion: Educating for Live Options 
     For schooling to take religious liberty seriously, religious commitments must be 
considered “live options.” It is also true that, in order for education to live up to the task 
of equipping people with the necessary tools to learn to live or to flourish, a worldview 
that is less rigid and exclusive than the current system of increasingly assertive 
secularism is needed. Thus, multi-live options are a consequence of authentic and 
ethical educative practices, nuanced toward the flourishing of all. In a way, taking 
religious liberty seriously opens a channel through which schooling may become a 
better version of itself. Like the child who learns how to show care by the modeling she 
witnesses from parents and teachers, and who, having learned that practices it in the 
way she relates to her friends, religious liberty can be a teacher of sorts, opening up 
educative practices. When schools have to take religious liberty seriously by cultivating 
curriculum and practices that make religion a live option, they also cultivate the kind of 
responsiveness that will impact many other areas of school life, transforming the school 
in the process.  
     This chapter has examined three primary contributions from educational theory: the 
importance of the continuity of experience, educational metamorphoses, and care-
sensitive ethics and practices. The continuity of experience affirms that students must 
be accepted for who they are; their experiences thus far, and those they will have 
outside of school are all involved in who they will become. Part of a student’s 
experience may likely be religious in nature; and all but a small few will go through a 
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process of discovering themselves in relation to the rest of life. Whether one claims to 
be Atheist, “spiritual but not religious,” agnostic, or devoutly religious, pondering one’s 
place in the universe is natural. In order to best serve students, to truly put their good 
first, educators must accept them for who they are, including their religious or non-
religious identity. For education to be a just endeavor, it is not for us to view students as 
empty repositories awaiting our superior knowledge but rather as full participants in 
learning to live. This demands the acceptance that there are multiple worldviews, and 
the development of ethics that are context sensitive.273 In a secular public school 
system, acknowledging the importance of a student’s experience and identity requires 
us to allow the Muslim student to be Muslim, the Christian to be Christian, the Atheist 
to be Atheist, and recognizing that, except for the most broadly considered concepts, 
such as justice, care, and honesty, it is not up to us to determine how they should think. 
More than one live option exists as is evident by the faces looking back at us in the 
classroom. 
     As students embark on the path of learning to live, they will inevitably go through 
educational metamorphoses or whole-person transformations which occur based on 
encounters with cultural stock – some assets, others liabilities. It is not so much a 
question of if this process will happen, but how – and how we as educators will support 
our students so that the spirit of discernment will aide them in making decisions that 
will help move them forward toward flourishing. If anything prompts whole-person 
transformations, religious experience does; indeed, history is full of biographical 
accounts of dramatic religious transformations or conversions, from famous and little 
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known figures alike. In that way, religion is volatile and hardly predictable. If that is the 
case, then it is all the more important for religion to be understood as a live option. The 
student in our classroom who is going through a religiously-motivated identity 
transformation needs our understanding and our commitment to learning to live.  
     Foundational to religious liberty in schools is the ethic of care. The caring of which 
Noddings, Eisler, and Warren speak is not the kind of care that underpins forcing 
someone to become something they are not because you think it is better for them. 
Rather, it is responsive, sensitive care grounded in compassion that recognizes the 
importance of accepting and affirming the integrity of the whole person with which you 
are in relation. Care is the backbone of taking religious liberty seriously, for it motivates 
educators and students to deal with one another with compassion and empathy, 
accepting the inevitable differences between people that will surely arise. Backed with 
attentiveness to the experience of others, and to the process of growth and change we all 
go through, care harnesses the willingness and ability to consider multiple live options. 
Through modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation, teachers can take religious 
liberty seriously and craft an educative process that contributes to the flourishing of 









IV. The Sacred Commons: Religion & Educational Praxis 
 
“Behold, my friends, the spring is come; the earth has gladly received the embraces of 
the sun, and we shall soon see the results of their love! Every seed is awakened, and all 
animal life. It is through this mysterious power that we too have our being, and we 
therefore yield to our neighbors, even to our animal neighbors, the same right as 
ourselves to inhabit this vast land.”274  
– Tatanka Yotanka (Sitting Bull – Hunkpapa Sioux), 1875 
 
 
     Up to this point, I have argued the importance of taking religious liberty seriously in 
public schooling by legitimizing religion as a “live option;” in so doing I have used 
secular language and secular arguments, all the while defending religious actors. 
Chapter two examined the issue of religion and public schooling historically, 
referencing a number of landmark Supreme Court cases that demonstrate a trend toward 
privatizing religion. Chapter three brought together secular educational thought – much 
of which, incidentally, comes from committed secularists – that supports the goal of this 
project. There is something inherently problematic and troublesome, however, about a 
defense of religious liberty that does not attempt to include religious voices and 
religious thought as active contributors. Moreover, I can hardly critique current models 
in public schooling that include religion as mere subjects of curricular study, which 
risks objectifying it and its adherent, without doing things differently myself. There is a 
quandary in arguing religious liberty from strictly secular grounds for secular thought 
can really only rally around a basic sense of civic justice and pragmatism to support 
religious liberty. Arguments tend to go something like this: religious liberty is important 
in order to maintain peace between people with different backgrounds; democracy 
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demands that religious people are free to practice their religion; and if we want the 
freedom to believe the way we want, we have to defend the rights of others to do so. 
These are all defensible arguments; there is nothing particularly wrong with them. If the 
only consideration at hand was to defend religious actors’ right to free exercise from 
within a dominantly secular worldview, then those reasons – and other secular ones – 
might be enough. But, that is not the only consideration. There is something much 
deeper at hand with religious liberty than mere pragmatism. And, there must be 
something much more satisfactory to convince religious people to make room for 
people of different faiths when they feel their culture is fragmenting – an option that 
extends beyond the liberal tendency to glide over sincere religious differences. 
Arguments for religious liberty during the Colonial period were theologically grounded. 
As noted in chapter one, Roger Williams coined the phrase “soul libertie” as a way of 
getting at the religious conviction that God, by whatever name/model one uses, calls 
souls; true freedom is not in doing whatever one wants whenever one wants to, but in 
the ability to freely respond to that God-call. For religious people, such a stance is much 
more satisfying, for it reminds them that religious liberty is a foundational right of being 
a soul inhabiting Earth. Thus, this chapter is devoted to religious thought and language. 
It seeks not only to talk about what religious actors say and think, but to truly engage 
certain religious concepts in such a way that they themselves contribute to the New 
Settlement as active participants. 
     Given that most of the Earth’s human inhabitants consider themselves religious 
persons or at least have a belief in God/Ultimate Reality, academia should not so easily 
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dismiss theological rationale regarding religious liberty.275 If we wish to avoid 
objectifying religious people and religious thought, if we are truly committed to what 
religious liberty means, then theological arguments and religious language must also be 
taken seriously in the process of a New American Settlement. For all of the arguments 
made so far that are religiously neutral and secularly framed by myself and others, in 
order to achieve a New American Settlement, religious actors must also take a 
commitment to religious liberty seriously. And, to do that, we must make satisfying 
secular and religious arguments. Granted, not all religious actors will find the same 
religious arguments compelling, but the purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate 
integrative religious thought that is also constitutionally legitimate, and that can be used 
to develop a New American Settlement. The concepts herein also have another purpose: 
to provide a way for religiously diverse people to build bridges with one another and 
with our secular system of public schooling. Furthermore, an additional qualifier is 
necessary: I am not arguing against secular thought, nor am I urging public schooling to 
become a hybrid of different religious traditions. Quite the contrary. Secularization is 
useful when dealing with a diverse public of religious and non-religious people and 
secularism is a legitimate “live option;” the problem lies when any one system of 
thought – secular or a particular religion – becomes exclusive and dominates a public 
institution within a democracy. 
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     There are many examples throughout history of religiously-motivated social discord, 
hypocrisy, and violence. Some scholars, such as Karen Armstrong, note that many of 
those instances had motivations that were not religious, but they were nonetheless 
justified using religious language.276 Religion is a great scapegoat. As noted in chapters 
one and two, much of the push toward secularization in public schools came from 
religious people who either wanted their own religious views, however watered-down, 
as the framework for schooling, while others, fearing indoctrination or over-exposure 
for their children to other traditions, argued for sanitizing the public school of religion. 
Many of the latter find the only tenable option private schooling for the sanitized 
version is unsatisfying as well. As culture has shifted, the dominant Protestant ethos in 
public schooling, which satisfied the religious views of many, has been replaced by 
increasingly assertive secularism, partly due to short-sighted Christian advocacy, and 
now many mainstream Christians find public schooling increasingly troublesome 
because their own values, which once dominated public schooling, are less and less 
reflected in the secularization process. Public schooling faces a crossroads, which, for 
many reasons, includes a strong push toward a voucher system. On the surface, 
vouchers may seem as though they might solve the problem of religious tension in 
schools, but many more problems arise with the creation of vouchers.277 Without a 
cohesive and compelling argument toward the inclusion of religious liberty as a 
foundational goal of public schooling, it is likely that many religious actors will 
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continue to push against a system of education that seems increasingly committed to 
exclusive secularism, while others will support the road towards towards it, resulting in 
ever-widening cultural cleavages. The secularist tendencies are not the only problem; 
deeply troubling for many politically conservative parents is the presence of different 
religious identities in schools. For many of these citizens, a secular argument for 
including religious liberty in schools, however logical and grounded in democratic 
principles, will never be compelling enough to garner their support. Only theological 
and religious language can offer them the tools they need to willingly engage with 
people who believe differently. While we may not be able to provide that language, we 
can develop the atmosphere in which these varied ideas can be heard; that atmosphere is 
the New American Settlement. 
     Despite the inclusion in recent bestseller lists, arguments against religion from 
secularists (be they Atheist or agnostic) are simply unsatisfying to many religious 
hearers. Authors like Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris may have valid points, but they 
simply fail to understand the heart of religious experience. Far more effective to 
counteract fears and bigotries that may stem from some religious views (or, masquerade 
as such) are the voices of other religious actors who seek the heart of their faith and find 
within it the wisdom to meet fear with love, difference with willingness. Like Freire’s 
admonition against the elites crafting education for non-elites, non-religious concepts 
cannot speak fully about religious liberty. Not only does such an attempt risk 
objectifying – and by extension, oppressing – religious people (at least within a system 
like public education that holds power over students and parents by the authority of the 
State), it is impossible for secular thought to fully grasp what it means to be religious 
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and what religious liberty really means. Thus, inviting religious language and 
theological reasoning to the task of imagining New Settlement is necessary to 
accomplish our goal. New American Settlement recognizes that religions are multi-
vocal – no single interpretation of what it means to be a Christian, Muslim, Hindu (etc.) 
exists – but it also accepts that for people of faith, religious convictions are more 
compelling than secular rationale when the conversation is about religion. In order to 
find a way to take religious liberty seriously, religious actors must be included as full 
participants, not mere subjects of study. This further allows religious people to dialogue 
with one another – and to disagree and offer alternative ways of interpreting religious 
commitments. 
     The specific aim of this chapter is to bring together the religious voices and 
theological concepts that can contribute to the educational common ground discussed in 
chapter three. It is not an attempt to include specific religious practices in the 
curriculum or to blur the boundaries of establishment, such as they are. It is not even an 
attempt to include the religious principles outlined herein within the classroom 
curriculum, although, in many cases there would be little constitutionally problematic 
with that. Nor do the following pages include even an abbreviated version of all 
religious thought regarding the subject of religion and schooling (which would be not 
be feasible). Rather, this chapter highlights religious views and reasoning that can 
contribute to the foundation of New American Settlement. These pages offer a 
justification on various religious grounds to broaden the concept of religion as a “live 
option” to include religions as “live options,” to engage wisdom inherently religious 
with educational thought in such a way that compliments both, and to further contribute 
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to a foundation of religious thought that may compel religious people, however devout, 
to willingly work together for the common good. Furthermore, my hope is that this 
theorizing can help religious people more easily converse within secular frameworks 
toward a democratic solution to the religious/secular schism that plagues many aspects 
of American culture, and to that end to contribute to the realization of a New American 
Settlement.  
     Although the following pages include many religious traditions, the reader may 
rightly observe that Christian thought is somewhat more substantially represented. This 
is for two reasons. First, historically, the United States is more heavily influenced by 
Christian thought than any other tradition in terms of the sheer number of Christians 
who are and have been U.S. citizens. This is not the same thing as saying “we are a 
Christian nation;” it is merely the historical observation that Christianity, in varying 
forms, has been the dominant religious expression since the founding of the nation, and 
continues to be so.278 Thus, as Prothero points out, Christian thought and history should 
receive a large portion of both our recollection and critique as the major player it has 
been.279 Furthermore, I, myself, am a Christian, if a rather unconventional one, and 
although a significant amount of my academic training and teaching has been in the so-
called “world religions,” Christian theology dominates my own academic background. 
That being said, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and Native American traditions feature 
prominently in this section. My aim is not to give voice to every religious tradition that 
has relevance for education – that would be far beyond the scope of this project. Rather, 
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it is to highlight areas of thought – four to be specific – that can contribute the most to 
the task of New American Settlement. To that end, some religious voices are raised up; 
the exclusion of others that may also be useful is not intentional. There are no doubt 
other connections to be made, other strands of similarity to pull from. Yet, the traditions 
discussed in relation to specific concepts are strongly suggestive for the task at hand. 
Furthermore, there is a difference between crafting the foundation of New American 
Settlement and the myriad of religious voices (and non-religious ones) that will be 
heard within the practice of it. The first excludes intolerant religious thought 
intentionally because such thinking goes against the purpose of settlement – of finding a 
way toward compromise and toleration within the public square. The second is the 
reality of community and social life – differences exist. New American Settlement 
seeks to make room for those differences, lessening the rigidity of such difference 
through compromise, and it provides a platform where differences need not lead to strict 
division. Thus, in order to make room for all, the theoretical foundation of New 
American Settlement highlights religious (and secular) thought that contributes to 
mutuality and understanding.  
 
Contextualizing the Journey 
     Secular and religious language alike often speak of the common good, the idea that 
there are certain concepts and practices that benefit all people, or at least cause no 
substantial harm. It is, in fact, a democratic ideal. There would be no true democracy if 
all members simply wanted what was best for themselves. The common good speaks to 
the necessity and the ethic that we should cultivate a world in which all people can have 
a share in “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” Some distinction needs to be 
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made between a secular approach to the common good and a religious one, for religion 
makes at least one additional contribution to the commitment: the common good is only 
good insofar as it recognizes that it is ordered around God/Ultimate Reality. To that 
end, these pages speak of “the commons” as a distinct yet related category that helps 
contextualize New Settlement within religious experience. The commons contains the 
common good, and it goes beyond it. To speak of the commons is to speak of the whole 
of life – the created universe and all that exists within it. The commons is an out-
pressing of the reality of the divine, the emergence of a common community of life, 
encompassed by Ultimate Reality or as Tillich calls it, the “ground of being.”280 
Ultimate Reality is both the center and the circumference. For religious people, the 
commons is a way of speaking about the life all of existence shares in relation to the 
one life.  
     An emerging arena of theological practice and reasoning (common to Christian, First 
Nation, and Pagan traditions alike) that is illustrative of the commons is ecological 
theology, which thoroughly develops a concept of the commons to include all life, not 
simply humanity. This notion expands the ideal of the common good to include that 
which is good for the entire biosphere and all of its inhabitants. By including these 
members, similar to opening up educational thought to include multiple educational 
agents, a wider perspective of what is truly good emerges. Ecological theologian John 
Hart speaks of the commons as “sacramental.” He writes, “Sacraments are signs of the 
creating Spirit that draw people into grace-filled moments permeated by a heightened 
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awareness of divine presence and engagement with divine Being.”281 The entire cosmos 
is sacramental and as such all places provide the opportunity for divine in-breaking into 
the world. Put another way, ordinary reality is also an avenue in and through which the 
extraordinary may reveal itself. This model of God/Ultimate Reality strongly rejects the 
model that understands God as a supernatural being alone; rather the ground of being is 
here with us wherever we are because it the very essence of the commons. As Hart puts 
it, “all places are sacred because all creation is present in and to the Creator.”282 The 
celebrated feminist Christian theologian, Elizabeth Johnson, explains this model of 
Ultimate Reality another way:  
the one relational God, precisely in being utterly transcendent, not limited by 
any finite category, is capable of the most radical immanence, being intimately 
related to everything that exists. And the effect of divine drawing near and 
passing by is always to empower creatures toward life and well-being in the 
teeth of the antagonistic structures of reality.283 
 
Perceiving Ultimate Reality in this way reorients the relationality of God/humans, 
humans/humans, and humans/non-humans, affirming the sacredness of all of life and 
the radical access to divine intrusion. The commons, then, is the community of God, 
which includes all life. It includes the common good, but only insofar as it incorporates 
the natural process of flourishing within the body of God.284 And it rejects things that 
seem like they are good, but that cause harm to the broader community of God. Such a 
model of God rejects the privatization of religion as altogether preposterous.  
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     Jewish thought contributes further to the commons. Will Herberg writes, 
Once we recognize that the whole of life stands under the divine sovereignty, we 
are unable to consent to the withdrawal of any area from the ultimate concern to 
which religion bears witness. The divine imperative is see to be directly 
pertinent to every human interest, to economics and politics as much as to 
“private” morality and devotion.285 
 
Not merely arguing that one cannot reasonably keep one’s beliefs in private while 
engaging in the body politic, Herberg casts the argument of divine sovereignty – a 
belief shared by most religious traditions in one form or another. Nothing is outside the 
body of God, therefore all must come under the purview of divine authority, including 
politics. It is not only that one’s faith cannot help but be expressed in public but that 
there is nothing that should not come under the watchful eye of one’s commitment to 
the sovereignty of God. Put this way, the privatization of religion is implausible at best. 
“The concern of religion extends to social life because no area of human existence can 
be withdrawn from the judgment and mercy of God.”286 Thus, within the paradigm of 
the commons, there is a blurred line between that which is perceived as public and 
private. Practically speaking, there is a difference between the two, but theologically 
reasoned, what is done in both arenas of life is within the body of God. As such, the 
commons prompts religious actors to live out their faith commitments publically, and to 
include that which is public in theological discourse, reasoning, and discernment.  
     Joerg Rieger and Kwok Pui-lan, both Christian postcolonial theologians, examine 
the recent American Occupy movement and develop a framework that they call a 
“theology of the multitude,” which further illustrates the political spirit of the commons. 
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Borrowing from the Greek term ochlos, which appears in the New Testament to 
describe the “multitude” or crowd that followed Jesus of Nazareth, they argue that the 
ochlos were the “common people.”287 The Occupy movement reminds Christianity of 
its roots as a radical movement within Judaism that was for and by the common people. 
A theology of the multitude not only includes all, but it does so with the well-being of 
all in mind. The authors note, “the multitude is all about relationship.”288 A theology of 
the multitude acknowledges divine dependence as well as dependence upon all others – 
human and non-human.289 The commons includes individuals, of course, but as a 
multitude – the common people, each with a place in the commons. This sort of 
framework acknowledges interdependency, but it also reminds religious actors that 
there must be a commitment toward reconciliation and the acceptance of difference in 
our shared commons, many bodies within the body of God.  Noting the tension between 
the so-called Right and Left, Jim Wallis highlights the gifts both sides have to give: a 
call to personal responsibility and to social responsibility.290 He writes, “the common 
good comprises the best of both ideas – we need to be personally responsible and 
socially just.”291 In the commons, there is not only room for multi-vocal expressions of 
justice, but the demand for it. The commons requires co-mingling within our shared 
space. We are not isolated beings, capable of going it alone if only we had the 
troublemakers out of the way. Accordingly, we are, rather, relational creatures sharing 
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one body – social and cosmic. We must find a peaceful way of living out this, the truest 
expression of who we all are.  
     The commons provides a justification for further development of concepts that can 
contribute to a New American Settlement. Though many such religious concepts are 
applicable, there are three that fluidly weave together and that are somewhat universal 
among various religious expressions. The remaining pages in this chapter will explore 
the idea of inter-relationality, loving-kindness, and kenosis. Some religious traditions 
appear to emphasize one or more of these concepts more than others, but that is not a 
problem. Our purpose is to lift up these ideas as instrumental in building a New 
American Settlement. Moreover, it is important to note that these are not only concepts, 
they imply practices as well. Religion is a mixture of theory and practice, but no 
religion is authentic without an emphasis upon practical application. Like education, 
theory needs to be tested and lived out in experience, and often experience is precisely 
that which is in back of theory. Religion, authentically lived, calls us both deeper within 
and also outside of ourselves, living our innermost knowing out into ordinary 
experience, and thereby providing one of those beautiful opportunities for God-
expression.292 We, like the rest of the cosmos, are sacramental.  
 
Interrelationality  
     Interrelationship is a concept present in many religious (and non-religious) 
traditions, but it is particularly well articulated in many so-called Indigenous traditions, 
or First Nation thought. I will lean heavily on Native American/American Indian beliefs 
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and practices to bring out the richness of this idea and to give it context and 
applicability.293 It is no coincidence that such a profound concept, which is so well 
suited to a discussion on the commons and, by extension, New Settlement, is so 
beautifully conceived by people who have largely been excluded from American 
common public life. Taken seriously, interrelationality would require American life to 
cease marginalizing anyone based on race, gender, religion, etc.  
     The Lakota Nation speaks of Mitakuye Oyas’in; simplistically translated, it means 
“all my relations.”294 The phrase, used as a greeting, a farewell phrase, or a reminder, 
means far more than those three words. Mitakuye Oyas’in affirms the interconnection of 
all life. Carol Lee Sanchez puts it this way, 
Saying “all my relations” affirms this belief [that all life exists in 
interconnection] and, because it denotes familial relationship, consistently 
reminds the speaker of her or his personal connection to the universe. In addition 
to reminding the speaker of her personal relationship with all things, she is also 
reminding those nonhuman things that they are indeed related to her. This 
implies the kinds of interdependencies and interactions that take place within a 
family unit.295 
 
Mitakuye Oyas’in acknowledges one’s relationship in and with the commons. The 
familial connection implies both responsibility and care for other members, including 
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non-human members. Mitakuye Oyas’in, in a sense, extends the meaning of family, 
applying familial care to other beings and to the commons itself. 
     Daoism offers another way of approaching interrelationality through the concept of 
yin yang. Simply put, yin yang suggests that the universe is both dualistic and 
intrinsically relational. Symbolized by the circle divided by an s-shaped line, one side is 
black and one side is white. But, both sides contain a smaller circle of the opposite 
color. The implication is that, amidst the seeming division of kinds, each one contains 
aspects of the other. Wholeness takes place by uniting into a circle, but each part is 
irrevocably joined because each includes the other in their very makeup. The same can 
be said of all of us abiding in the commons; we are interrelated and connected because 
as some level we are made up of the same stuff of the universe, connected by the biotic 
processes of life that sustain us all, and by the same creative organizing structure.   
          Ecofeminist thought grounds its philosophy of care in interrelationship. This is 
both a philosophical/spiritual idea and a biological one: all of life is connected through 
an intricate web of being part of the biosphere, and therefore the fate of one impacts that 
of us all. One need only to consider imaginatively the ramifications of genetically 
modified seeds: we may feel comforted that we only purchase non-GMO foods (for 
those of us who can afford and have access to them), but what about the cheese we ate, 
produced from the milk of the cow who grazed off the field upon which GMO seeds 
blew from a neighboring field? Water poisoned in one location finds its way into the 
water supply of neighboring communities, and nuclear toxins from Japan blow onto the 
beaches of the West Coast as children delight in their newly discovered seashell, picked 
off the same beach. It may be sound like only a spiritual ideal to declare our 
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interrelatedness – sometimes translated as “oneness” – something most of us have 
trouble wrapping our minds around, and many of us completely deny, but the practical 
truth is, we share the same planet, the same atmosphere and biosphere, and there is no 
such thing as isolated activity that has no impact on anything outside of its confined 
area.  
     However, let us dabble into the loftier sounding “oneness” business for a moment. 
The heart of religious experience is the process through which we recognize our 
connection with that which is greater than ourselves, and thereby come to know 
ourselves at a deeper level than we ever imagined. The idea of oneness or 
interrelationship in this context claims that, through our diversity, there is an abiding 
unity of all that is exists, and it envelops every aspect of creation. Thus, we are 
dynamically interrelated beings, sharing interrelated beingness. Brazilian ecofeminist 
philosopher and theologian Ivone Gebara argues that:  
The notion of a free and autonomous person has been co-opted by the 
ruling classes, by colonialism, and by neocolonialism, by the capitalist free 
market, by contemporary wars, by advanced technology, by ideologies, 
and by religions utilized in promoting rivalries and eliminating poor 
peoples, especially blacks and native peoples, in order to uphold a power 
elite as it takes advantage of all the good things of the earth.”296  
 
Thus, an emphasis must be put on developing our concept of the human person as 
dynamically in relationship: 
The first thing to be affirmed in an ecofeminist perspective is the collective 
dimension of “person.” This collective dimension is not only 
anthropological but also cosmic. And in this collective dimension the most 
important thing is neither autonomy nor individuality, but relatedness.”297  
 
																																																						
296 Ivone Gebara, Longing for Running Water: Ecofeminism and Liberation (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1999), 75–76. 
297 Ibid., 83. 
	 127 
To Gebara, we are not only related to all of life, but in that relatedness a much broader 
self emerges – one whose identity extends far beyond the boundaries our 
individuality.298 
     Sallie McFague gives interrelatedness as the basis for her developed ecological ethic 
in terms of how we relate to our “house” – ecological literacy about the “oikos:”  
We evolved together with the cosmos, and we are entirely 
dependent on certain conditions on planet Earth (water, food, land, 
climate, and so on) for our continued existence and well-being. 
Suddenly we see ourselves differently: not as post-Enlightenment 
individuals who have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness, but as part of the vast network of interrelationships…299 
 
In this view, we are intrinsically – biologically and spiritually – related to one another 
and to everything in creation, and this relationship requires something of us. It demands 
attention and attentiveness to those relationships in such a way that promotes the 
flourishing of life. “If we were to accept ecological unity as the working interpretation 
for our dealing with each other and with our world, we would have two responses: 
appreciation and care.”300 Care is at the heart of the matter, and our ability to care is an 
ethical imperative, and thus a critical component of any education. Interrelationship, 
then is not simply a statement of biology, or even an epistemological position, it is an 
imperative to live with care and concern directed for one another, and that “one 
another” includes the rest of the biotic community of which we are a part.  
     Applying interrelationship to the task of a New Settlement reinforces the very need 
for Settlement: we are not only connected in terms of practical biological 
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interdependencies, but the very structure of life is interrelated. Lest one think this is a 
religious idea that bears no application outside of religion, recent scientific theories, 
such as quantum physics, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and biocentrism all point 
to the interrelatedness of all things.301 Simplistically, this is reflected in the so-called 
“butterfly effect.” Illustrated by the analogy of a butterfly moving its wings, the 
vibration of which causes movement within the atmosphere, this idea posits that even 
incremental changes in supposed isolated circumstances affect all of life.302 Put into 
theological language, Elizabeth Johnson affirms, “Reflecting its Creator, the universe 
has relationship as its fundamental code.”303 Thus, in terms of New Settlement, it is not 
just that we must agree to disagree. Interrelationship affirms that, despite our 
differences, we are all connected, and we need one another. This is a concept that 
transcends both religious institutions and is at the heart of religious experience, and it is 
also something that need not be couched in such a way that secular education excludes 
it from consideration, for interrelationality provides a broad door through which 
religious liberty can be taken seriously in public schooling. In so doing, 
interrelationality provides avenues through which all disputes that exist because of 
seemingly fundamental differences can at the very least be addressed with a 
commitment to compassion. Whatever else interrelationality says, in this particular 
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issue it calls us to come to the common table, acknowledging our common ancestry – 
our Mitakuye Oyas’in – to commit to finding common ground. 
 
Loving-Kindness 
     Of the three main religious concepts discussed in this chapter, loving-kindness 
correlates most obviously to the educational thought highlighted in chapter three. 
Loving-kindness and care are compatible, but, in a sense, loving-kindness is more 
precise. Before we delve into the distinction, let us consider the religious background of 
loving-kindness.  
     In U.S. popular culture, loving-kindness is perhaps most often associated with 
Buddhism. Interestingly, many Buddhist writers do not use the term as such, preferring 
simply “kindness,” compassion, or “affectionate love.”304 Kindness implies caring and 
generosity. Buddhist writer Geshe Kelsang Gyatso highlights, however, that kindness is 
not simply an act we participate in, but an attitude we look for in others. As a practice 
toward enlightenment, Buddhism urges adherents not only to “develop affectionate love 
for all living beings” but to “contemplate their kindness.”305 How interesting that we are 
not only called to be kind but to see the kindness of others – even when it is not readily 
visible. Such a development expands and pinpoints the educational foundations of care, 
implying that care is more than a skill that needs cultivated in us, it is something we 
seek in others. Moreover, this implies that kindness or care can be found anywhere and 
that one of our primary tasks is to look for it. Buddhist teaching takes the idea further 
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and asserts that, to find the kindness in others, we should look at all others as “our 
mothers.” Geshe asserts, “If we regard all living beings as our mothers, we will find it 
easy to develop pure love and compassion…”306 Like the arguments against using the 
term “father” to describe God in Christianity because not all fathers are caring, loving 
agents, the notion of looking at all others as mother in order to acknowledge the 
intrinsic kindness present in all beings is subject to similar criticisms. But, just as it is 
nonsensical to make equal God and fathers, the notion of mother in Buddhism points 
rather to an ideal than to the reality of many mothers. The ideal of mothering is the 
exemplification of kindness, loving care that also directs, guides, even admonishes 
when one strays. The practice of imagining that all others – even one’s peers – 
embodying in some metaphoric way the ideal of mothering and thus seeking the 
kindness in them is transformative in practice. It is a way of encountering the world that 
acknowledges its flaws while refusing the substance of them. This kind of attentiveness 
to kindness comes with the expectation of finding it, even of drawing it out in others, 
and in turn it cultivates the kindness within ourselves as we look on the other expecting 
to find goodness. Abraham Lincoln expressed a similar idea in a rather opposite way: 
“those who look for the bad in people will surely find it.” Thus, one aspect of kindness 
is the way in which we look at others and our expectations of them, which in turn 
cultivates our own character. The Qur’an says it this way: “those who act kindly in this 
world will have kindness” (39.10). 
     Buddhism contributes yet another related aspect to loving kindness in its belief in the 
bodhisattva. Bodhisattvas are beings who have achieved nirvana or oneness with all that 
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is and who, postponing their own entrance into Buddha-hood, remain engaged with 
people, helping them along the path to enlightenment.307 The commitment of the 
bodhisattva is a supreme act of loving kindness, even sacrifice, for the ultimate goal is 
not only enlightenment but the attainment of such for others. It is a committed stance to 
end the suffering of other creatures by self-denial.  
     Like Christianity and Islam, Judaism conceives of loving kindness as an essentially 
responsive act on the part of humans toward God who is the ultimate giver of love. This 
love then should spill over into the way humans encounter one another. Herberg puts it 
this way, “The ethic of Judaism finds its source and power in the perfect love of God; 
therefore it is an ethic of total responsibility” and “the perfection we are called upon to 
achieve in this life is a perfection of self-giving love…”308 Christian biblical tradition 
affirms that “whoever does not love does not know God, for God is love” (1 John 4:7). 
And, the Qur’an describes God as “One who is full of loving kindness.”309 Love is 
rooted in the divine, or the divine is love itself. The implication, thus, is that love is to 
be reciprocated; love sets the agenda of what it means to exist in relationship to the rest 
of the world and to ourselves. Elizabeth Johnson offers up a description of 
God/Ultimate Reality as “abounding in kindness.” The nature of God, and the activity 
of God abound in loving responsiveness to creation. Moreover, “in loving kindness and 
fidelity God gathers a people to share in that holiness.”310 The kindness of God extends 
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to humans who, in turn and out of the kindness that prompts even holiness, are to share 
loving kindness with the rest of life. Such a concept of God requires us to extend 
kindness to one another, including kindness in the midst of tense difference. Yet it is not 
a requirement that falls short on people unskilled at participating in kindness (as most of 
us are at one point or another – just ask the store clerk or other drivers); such kindness is 
part of our very makeup as members of God’s body – the commons – so, although we 
must cultivate it, like the Buddhist teachings on seeking kindness in others, we have 
within our nature that which is necessary to respond to kindness and to respond with it.  
     Speaking of this kind of response, Cynthia D. Moe-Lobeda, a Christian theologian 
writing on ecological and economic ethics, contributes to the concept of “neighbor-
love.”311 Such a love is utterly relational, and it also acknowledges the inherent 
differences and diversity we all encounter as individuated members of the commons. 
The root of neighbor-love is, again, God’s love, and it is foundationally active.312 The 
imagery of neighbor-love implies both relationality and difference; neighbors may bear 
similarities, but who in a neighborhood experiences life with exact sameness? In the 
classroom, neighbor-love teaches children – and teachers – to extend kindness toward 
one another, even when vast differences are present. And, in light of interrelationality, 
we can rightly claim that everyone is neighbor to everyone else.  
     In The Rebirthing of God, John Philip Newell suggests that “there is no difference 
between love and justice.”313 The kindness that flows out of love and as love is also 
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justice, it creates just systems. Therefore, where love is missing, so too is justice. This 
should give us pause. Within an exclusivist framework, abundant kindness is not fully 
represented otherwise there would be room for “the other.” How, then, can we claim to 
do justice, to engage in fairness when love and kindness are missing from the equation? 
Whether in our current system of increasingly exclusive secularism or a micro-system 
of private religious education that fails to validate other sincere beliefs, the lack of 
kindness represented speaks volumes to the level of justice present. If there is no 
satisfying difference between justice and love, then in order for social engagement to be 
just, loving-kindness must be the harmonizing frequency within which we abide.  
     What does loving kindness mean for a New American Settlement? Besides its 
relation to care, a concern expressed well by many educational thinkers, loving kindness 
creates a context within which justice may be served. The underrepresented are no 
longer so when love abides. Those who are oppressed can find their voice, and those 
who ordinarily would oppress, transformed by love, make room for dissonance. 
Kindness is a practice, to be sure, but it is also an atmosphere. Recognizing that our task 
is not only to act with care, but to seek out the kindness in others, and understanding 
that the intricacies of existence itself are abounding in kindness, we can seek solutions 
that honor religious diversity and religious identity. This, too, will transform our own 
capacity to show care. Moreover, religious actors themselves are compelled, based on 
their own beliefs demonstrated herein (beliefs that may not be articulated by all, but that 
are part of practically every religious tradition), to make the same kind of room for 
others that we are asking of committed secularists. In the classroom, loving-kindness 
need not be spoken of as an exclusively religious task – although there is nothing 
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unconstitutional about drawing attention to the concept of loving kindness in religious 
traditions – but it can be adopted in such a way that teachers and students are reminded 
that kindness both compels them to act in a certain way and is something to be sought in 




     With the understanding that the entire biotic community is relational, and that 
loving-kindness is an imperative ethic, must come a commitment to action, implications 
for how we are to live. Many eco-ethicists and eco-theologians – and simply those with 
a practical turn of mind – point to the necessity to embrace limits as a core value. It is 
simple enough. We abide within a finite planet, with finite resources – we are finite 
after all – and thus there is a point at which the system will be tapped out should our 
demands go un-tempered. Scientists point to overpopulation, overconsumption, and 
simply irresponsible consumption as tipping points for ecological devastation, so limits 
make logical sense.  First Nation members seem to have a basic understanding that one 
should only take what one needs; indeed, most religious traditions have the same 
concept. It is only being a good member of the household to consume only that which 
you need and to clean up after yourself when you have completed your task.314  
     Sallie McFague points to the principle of limits and develops a theological 
framework based on the idea of kenosis – from the Greek “to empty” – as a spiritual 
response to ecological ethics. Kenosis has roots in biblical literature, particularly in the 
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Fourth Gospel where the crucified revolutionary Jesus of Nazareth’s side is pierced, 
from which flows out water and blood (John 19:34). Theologically, the imagery 
symbolizes Jesus emptying himself out of love for his friends, and, since the Gospel is 
really about the human relationship with God, the act is symbolic for God’s emptying of 
Godself in the ultimate act of abounding care. It is akin to the idea of sacrifice, which 
McFague develops through the telling of the lives of modern day “saints,” including 
John Woolman, Simone Weil, and Dorothy Day. Through a commitment to limits by 
way of voluntary poverty, Woolman, Weil, and Day demonstrate compassionate care 
for those who are forced to go without, living in solidarity with those on the margins.315 
McFague argues that such action sets an example for an ecological ethic where, by 
going without, we demonstrate tangibly our solidarity with a planet who needs us to 
consume less.316 While we might debate about the feasibility and desirability of 
voluntary poverty, McFague makes a much needed point: that, in order for all to 
flourish, we must become aware of the ways in which we might consume less, might 
need less, so that others may live.317  
     Kenotic theology, translated into personal practices may seem overly sacrificial – 
who really wants, or even feels able to, embrace voluntary poverty? Is not life about 
flourishing? But, is that what the principle of kenosis is really about? Symbolically, 
God may pour out Godself as an act of love and care as depicted in the Fourth Gospel, 
but that is not to say that God empties Godself entirely. In fact, the idea is nonsensical, 
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for if we understand God to be (as far as is possible to “understand” God) the ground of 
being, or the animated essence of all life, and not a finite being, a white-bearded man in 
the sky, then it is philosophically and theologically preposterous to suggest God empties 
all of Godself through kenosis and there is not more Godself! Clearly, that is not what 
the imagery suggests; rather, it is more like an ever-flowing fountain of essence, poured 
out in abundance for all created things – as beingness itself. God empties Godself, but is 
not bereft of God-nature. Moreover, because the act takes place symbolically through 
the human person of Jesus, it points to the recognition of God-presence or divine 
essence in all life – that the created order is sacred and sacramental, places and 
instances through which the divine may reveal itself. Thus, modeling kenosis not only 
means sacrificing out of love as an act of care, but it is, ironically, also the way in which 
one is filled up. Thinking of ourselves as isolated egos is no way to happiness. We are 
fulfilled as we engage in dynamic, caring relationship with others, which both requests 
the willingness to limit ourselves for the sake of the other, and promises a far more 
fulfilling adventure as our ego or overly-individuated self metamorphoses into an aspect 
of all that is and all that will ever be. McFague explains the paradox of emptying this 
way: 
To empty the self is not an act of denial, but of fulfillment, for it creates space 
for God to fill one’s being. We are satisfied by nothing less than God; our 
deepest desire is to be one with God, even as Jesus was. Made in the image of 
God, our destiny is to become one with God, so that we too can say, not my will 
but Yours be done. This is not a loss, but a gain, the greatest gain.318 
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Kenosis, then, is paradoxical, for it affirms that as we sacrifice for others, as we pour 
out care and kindness, we are filled by something far more substantial – the kindness 
and freedom that abounds as a conscious member of the commons. 
     The Daoist concept of wu-wei is similar to kenosis or emptiness. Wu-wei is inaction 
or non-resistance, but not in the generally perceived Western way of non-resistance that 
seems to passively accept whatever may be happening. Wu-wei is rather similar to 
Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of nonresistance or active nonviolent-resistance 
(Satyagraha – “truth force”). The notion expresses a sense of understanding the 
perfection of universal flow, and of seeking to swim in the flow rather than in resistance 
to it. This is not the same as relenting to human injustices; rather it embarks on the path 
of release, which, as anyone who has tried it can testify, is no easy matter. Through 
releasing attachment to one’s personal self or ego, one can unify with the wisdom of life 
or Ultimate Reality. Wu-wei is the position that one should take no action that is 
contrary to nature or the natural working of life: “at the core of the ethics of 
philosophical Daoism is wu-wei, or “noninterference,” which demands that one submit 
to and move with, rather than against, natural processes and change.”319 The Daode 
Ching, Daoism’s most famous text, frequently likens this concept to that of water – its 
gentle power of erosion through non-resistant flow.  “Under heaven nothing is more soft 
and yielding than water. Yet for attacking the solid and strong, nothing is better; it has 
no equal.”320 The Dao also reinforces the idea of emptiness: “Empty yourself of 
everything. Let the mind become still.”321 Emptiness here is not the lack of anything, 
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but the resolute commitment to non-resistance and stillness, what the Tao 
conceptualizes as the truth of the universe or Ultimate Reality: “yield and overcome; 
bend and be straight; empty and be full.”322 To translate into monotheistic language, one 
must align one’s self with the Creator, and part of that will mean forgoing self-serving 
attitudes in favor of practices that support all of life.  
     Americans are perhaps more familiar with the concept of emptiness in reference to 
Buddhism than with that of Daoism or, somewhat ironically, Christian thought. The 
concepts are quite similar, however. Buddhism calls one to empty oneself as a means of 
self-renunciation that paves the way to unity with Ultimate Reality or crossing over into 
a state of enlightenment. As such, emptiness is both inactive and active, and it is the 
gateway for true freedom. To attain true liberty, one must be selfless.323Gyatso asserts, 
“Ultimate truth is emptiness. Emptiness is not nothingness, but lack of inherent 
existence. Inherent existence is mistakenly projected onto phenomena by our self-
grasping mind.”324 Emptiness can be thought of as releasing the personal identity long 
enough to realize that one’s true nature is a connected being in a collective commons. It 
is not denying one’s self that which one needs to live, but stepping back from self-
absorption so that, through abounding kindness, one sees the needs of others in relation 
to the whole. Buddhism’s goal is “liberation from suffering, but this liberation comes 
only from deep insight into the actual nature of reality, an understanding of things as 
they actually are. This is the insight into the emptiness of all things and their 
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interrelatedness through dependent origination.”325 Just as kenosis requires a sense of 
limits, so does the Buddhist concept of emptiness, not as an act of martyrdom, but as a 
sensible response to the interrelation of all things and the needs of others, needs 
underscored by a commitment to abounding kindness. Through the practice of 
emptiness/kenosis/nonresistance, one can attain true soul liberty. 
     Part of a New American Settlement is a healthy attempt at kenosis by whatever term 
one wishes to use. Emptiness gives traction to the democratic imperative of 
compromise. When we realize that, in order for others to flourish and for peace to be 
present in the commons of human social life, we must be willing to place limits on 
ourselves; this plays out practically in the art of compromise. Such limits do not negate 
freedom; rather, as interconnected relational beings, the more the so-called other 
flourishes, the more I myself flourish. Within a democratic structure, true freedom is 
both the ability for the individual to live according to his or her conscience, and the 
willingness of the individual to give of themselves that others may also have the 
opportunity to flourish, for we are connected members of the commons. Within the 
commons, as one person flourishes so do all in some way, just as the opposite is also 
true. Religious liberty is partly about allowing the individual to live according to his or 
her conscience, but it is just as much about cultivating the capacity to give forward 
abounding kindness so that others may do the same. Separated from theological 
language, religious liberty sounds merely like any other “right;” rooted within 
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theological conceptions, religious liberty is also an obligation to live in such a way that 
supports the flourishing of others in the commons. 
 
Conclusion 
     In a New American Settlement, not all will agree. That is a given. But, the concepts 
we have explored give us a framework through which New Settlement can take place in 
spite of differences. Indeed, if differences were not present, we would likely not need 
any of these principles or their correlative practices. Contextualizing life within the 
commons reminds religious actors, and even the “spiritual but not religious” that we 
share in existence – an existence that is within the body of God. Our interrelationality 
with all of life contributes to a commitment to see that everything we do effects 
everything else. Hard-heartedness and prejudice, however seemingly justified, do 
nothing but degrade the whole, including the one who holds such views. This is not 
only true of people who hold overtly bigoted attitudes, it is true of those of us who 
refuse to see the fear that is under the surface of apparent hatred or blame. The shared 
religious principle that life is abounding in kindness, that God/Ultimate Reality is love, 
and the understanding that we must actively seek to give and to see love everywhere 
emboldens us to imagine a New American Settlement replete with differences and to 
respond to apparent intolerance (which may, in some cases, really be difference in 
belief) with compassion rather than anger, resentment or hatred. Kindness is more than 
care, which can be reduced to a set of activities (though it certainly is not always so); 
kindness is the nature of things, of you and me however hard we try to hide it. And, it 
should be the way we go about doing justice, for justice without love is no justice at all. 
Kenosis reminds us that, for all the abundance and flourishing possible in the commons, 
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we must harness our ego and check it at the door if we want the best possible 
experience. Kenosis is also suggestive in terms of personal rights; sometimes, to do the 
right thing by the commons, we must willingly limit our own selves so that others might 
have room.  
     Once again, the concepts highlighted in this chapter are not universally taught among 
religious leaders, though they are present within the teachings of most religions to some 
degree. Not all believers will agree with these ideas, and many, if they do, will 
articulate them differently. Exclusivist religious actors will likely find some of these 
ideas incompatible with their own faith life. On the other hand, many of these ideas also 
float in the realms of secular thought – they do not belong to religion alone, although 
the way in which I have engaged them highlights their religious orientation. 
Furthermore, in advancing these concepts, I do not seek to foist them upon public 
schools as religious ideas to promulgate within the classroom. Rather, these are 
illustrative concepts that can help build a framework of New American Settlement that 
public educators can use. Because these concepts are both religious and applicable 
within a secular framework – they are not exclusively religious – they also help build a 
settlement concept that is inclusive of the variety of religious and non-religious voices 
that make up the American commons. How precisely do these concepts relate to public 
schooling within a New American Settlement? This is the topic of the next chapter 
which will develop a weaving of secular educational thought and translate these 
religious concepts in such a way that the two areas may participate in weaving a 
foundation for New American Settlement. 
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V. The New American Settlement 
 
“And is this power benevolent or malevolent? I see it as purely benevolent. For I can 
see that in the midst of death life persists, in the midst of untruth truth persists, in the 
midst of darkness light persists.” – Mahatma Gandhi326 
 
 
     It is unlikely that scholars shall ever grow tired of looking back on American history 
and attempting to put it into some sort of relatable context. As time marches on and 
sensibilities change, society reimagines itself and new issues arise; those who recollect 
on the past see the ghosts from whence these new experiences came. Indeed, without a 
sense of our past mistakes and glories – as individuals and as societies – we tend to 
make the same mistakes over and over again. History is included as a source of study in 
schools in part for this very reason; youth, with little reference point to the past, need a 
broader perspective in order to relate to the world. They look forward, and they should, 
but the past, rightly conceived, is a powerful teacher and guide into the future. As 
important are the different vantage points one takes as one looks into the past. We often 
hear remarks that history is told from the perspective of the winner, and while there is 
some truth to that, such a view is far too simplistic, for history is told from whatever 
vantage point upon which the teller is standing. Fortunately, this makes way for myriad 
ways of relating history; some of it is surely less reliable than others, but the multivocal 
quality of relating to and characterizing history at least allows for seeing errors, much 
like Martin’s multiple educational agency does for education.327 In his recent book, The 
Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom, legal scholar and historian Steven D. 
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Smith contributes to the telling of American religious history in a unique way that helps 
clarify the pathways of history and trends of religious liberty in the United States. It is 
from his creative framework that this present project takes shape. We have discussed 
this in brief; now let us examine it more thoroughly, for in order to have a “New 
Settlement” – applicable to public schools – there must be an “Old Settlement.” 
 
The Old Settlement 
     Smith presents a history of religious engagement in the United States that he calls 
the “American settlement;” it refers, roughly, to the time period that includes the 
colonial era and the development of the American Republic, up through to the first U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that began deciding the constitutionality of religion in various 
aspects of public life (particularly public schools) during the 1940s.328 Thus, the 
American settlement spans more than 150 years. Acknowledging that there are many 
exceptions to the rule and that no telling of history can fit everything into a nice, neat 
model, Smith’s settlement is helpful in order to look back upon American religious 
differences, and to help us, then, look forward – to learn from our strengths and 
weaknesses. Indeed, Smith notes the “inelegance” of American settlement and argues 
that this is part of why most scholars have not seen it.329  
     Acknowledging the religious diversity present during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries in America, Smith argues that, among those who had a voice in the 
ways in which the Constitution would be written and interpreted (which obviously did 
not include First Nation peoples, people of color, or most women), there were two 
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general perspectives regarding the role of religion in public life, what he calls 
“providential” and “secular.”330 The terms, particularly the latter, have different 
meanings today, and both terms deserve clarification, which Smith gives at length. The 
providential view comes from the sense that God is in back of the plan for America; 
“Divine Providence” was a common way of referring to God and was particularly 
suggestive in terms of God’s activity in the world. Thus, John Adams asserted that 
America is part of “a grand scheme and design of Providence.”331 Providentialists 
believed in part of the pragmatic value of religion in public life and in the overarching 
biblical narrative (for nearly all, according to historical study, were Christian). For 
many Christians of the colonial period and the early Republic, America was a new 
promised land, a chance to live out God’s kingdom on earth, a return to the garden (Gen 
2:8-16) .332 It was inconceivable, as such, that Christianity should be a matter of private 
living, for the obligations of such a destiny were both personal and civic. Some 
providentialists spoke of this commitment in more practical terms, arguing that religion 
was a necessary backbone of moral and social order. George Washington’s farewell 
address includes these words: “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political 
prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports…And let us with caution 
indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion.”333 This basic 
understanding of religion’s necessary role in public life was in back of the philosophies 
of Washington, Adams, Joseph Story, and other providentialist leaders. As Smith puts 
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it, “Providence runs to “the People of the United States” as a body or nation, not just to 
private individuals who happen to be pious.”334 Today, arguments abound for living out 
one’s personal faith publicly from many quarters, but that is a moderate commitment 
compared to providentialists who firmly believed that the only way to have a just 
republic was to incorporate broad Christian commitments and practices into public and 
political life – including government.335  
     Secularists and providentialists were not nearly as politically polarized as today’s 
“religious Right” and modern secularists. During the founding of the U.S., secularists 
were generally somewhat religious even if unconventionally so. It is useful to note that 
the rise of today’s “new Atheism” owes itself to the scientific revolution and to the 
assumption on the part of some that religion’s primary purpose was to offer 
explanations of how life works; they argue that science can do a better job of explaining 
life’s questions.336 This is a rather naïve view of religion, as chapter one explains. 
Nevertheless, during the founding years of the American Republic, science was far from 
an authority for most people, and most also had at least a loose faith commitment, a 
framework that included some sort of concept of God/Ultimate Reality.337 Thomas 
Jefferson, one of the most famous of the secularists, held unconventional religious 
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beliefs to be sure, but they did not reject the sense of a higher authority or Ultimate 
Reality: “For I have sworn on the altar of God eternal hostility against every form of 
tyranny over the mind of man.”338 Rather, Jefferson and others, including Madison, 
urged government to take no part in sectarian religion. Secularist positions at this time 
accepted the reality of religion and also that of sectarian diversity; politically, they 
argued that government and the church should be separate.339 Up until that point, most 
of Europe had an official church which both received support from and sanctioned 
government. The newly emerging United States, with varying represented cultures and 
sects of Christianity (and small pockets of other faith traditions), needed a solution that 
would easily provide unification among the colonies. Agreeing on separation between 
church and state in the form of non-establishment and free exercise was logical; sects 
were free of one another, able to go about their work in whatever ways they chose to do 
so, and none was exclusively represented by federal government in a tacit way.340 
Implicit, however, were basic tenets of Christianity as the dominant social construct of 
the founding elites.341 So, although providentialists and secularists during this period 
differed – often staunchly – in their approach to religion’s role in government and in the 
public commons, there was a familiarity with one another’s worldview, largely shared 
																																																						
338 Edwin S. Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God: A Religious Biography of Thomas Jefferson, 
2nd edition (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996), 143, 181. 
339 Smith, The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom, 2014, 93–94. 
340 Ibid., 48–57; Meyerson, Endowed by Our Creator, 166. 
341 Mark D. McGarvie, “Disestablishing Religion and Protecting Religious Liberty in State 
Laws and Constitutions (1776-1833),” in No Establishment of Religion: America’s Original 
Contribution to Religious Liberty, ed. T. Jeremy Gunn and John Witte, Jr. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 71–73. 
	 147 
by both positions.342 Perhaps because of this, the American settlement could develop 
and thrive.  
     Smith argues that providentialists and secularists, however divided, found middle 
ground in the principle of contestation.343 Both positions agreed on a soft constitutional 
framework; that is, the constitution should be interpreted with flexibility rather than a 
more rigid approach.344 Similar to the notion of a living document which can be applied 
more fluidly as culture changes, a soft constitutional approach made room for multiple 
ways of understanding the heart of the Constitution which is more a than a mere 
document – it is a set of personal and social commitments. As such, a general rule of 
openness and contestation emerged.345 This kind of open engagement acknowledged at 
least two principles: that compromise is the heart of a democratic solution, and that 
there is more than one legitimate way to understand life and to interpret our 
constitutional commitments. To use religious language, the American settlement agreed 
that there was more than one valid orthodoxy. Perhaps it did not go so far as to state that 
there is no orthodoxy – obviously some worldviews were off the table, like the many 
First Nation traditions – but neither secularists nor providentialists understood 
themselves as the only valid contender for legitimate constitutional interpretation.346 
Thus, as Smith notes, a system of openness and contestation existed during the founding 
of the nation and up through at least the turn of the twentieth century, even if there were 
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notable anomalies. Smith readily acknowledges that the settlement was imperfect; there 
were instances of violence regarding religion to be sure, but those events did not 
dominate the religious landscape in America, which would include the landmark 
interfaith event in 1893, the Parliament of the World’s Religions, surely a symbol of 
settlement.347 It is also significant to point out that Smith only argues settlement as it 
pertains to religion and not to other social issues. 
     For religion in public life, the American settlement worked; it gave voice to those 
who believed that America should be lived out as the “city on the hill,” the biblical 
promise of the new Eden, and it gave equal position to those who argued the value of 
the “wall of separation” and constitutional neutrality and agnosticism.348 While some 
worldviews were underrepresented (or unrepresented), the majority of opinions on 
religion’s role in public life were legitimized in the public eye and in and through policy 
making. The principle of contestation ensured representation of both positions, and the 
result was fairly low religious extremism. In fact, fundamentalist Christianity only 
seriously emerged during the 1920’s as the settlement fell into steep decline.349  
 
The New Settlement 
     However appealing a return to the American settlement, it is unrealistic for a number 
of reasons. Although Christianity is still the dominant form of religiosity in the United 
States, it appears to be incrementally declining as such	and the rise of the “nones” is 
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steadily increasing, along with Islam and other religious traditions.350 As chapter one 
discussed, Christianity is no longer the dominant framework of American life, however 
prevalent it may be as a religious commitment; rather, a combination of pluralism and 
secularism has overcome the Christian framework of the public square. Thus, unlike the 
original settlement, which, however multi-vocal, generally came from a Christian 
worldview, American society no longer has that common feature.351 The Old settlement 
is not possible. Furthermore, the categories of providentialists and secularists have 
dramatically altered. The American religious landscape has intensely changed; the 
differences it includes are no longer largely sectarian (i.e. different sects of one tradition 
– Christianity), but multi-religious. New religions have made their home in America, 
and the retrieval of traditions present during the earliest Colonial days by scholars and 
activists has resulted in an even more diverse and legitimized religious commons. As 
such, mainstream and liberal religious actors are generally more accepting of religious 
traditions different from their own. Moreover, the religious mind, if you will, has 
shifted and rarely do mainstream religious actors speak of the “city on the hill” as a 
literal manifestation. In recent decades, moderate and liberal religious American’s 
increasingly identify with an apologetic interpretation of American history as a colonial 
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force and less with America as God’s chosen nation. That is not to say those ideas are 
dead; some still hold to them, but such rhetoric is simply not as accepted in the public 
square, for better or for worse. The flavor of religiosity in the United States has 
marinated to include more sensitivity to religious diversity and, at the same time, more 
acceptance for scientific explanations and reasoning.352 In turn, fundamentalist 
Christian voices have become more staunch and fearful, incorporating anti-Muslim 
rhetoric with increasing frequency and often intolerant of religious diversity. Karen 
Armstrong notes, however, that such a stance is born of the fear of annihilation, and it is 
likely a founded fear as pluralism and secularism come to dominate.353 The face of 
providentialist has not been the only thing to change; secularists have changed 
dramatically as well. In fact, it may be more appropriate to observe that the old 
secularists have more in common with today’s mainstream and liberal religious actors 
than do modern secularists because the “old settlement” secularists were still often 
Christians. Today, secularism is heavily influenced by agnosticism and Atheism. 
Secularist arguments include a much wider range, from the belief that religion is evil 
and should be destroyed (according to the popular “new Atheists” such as Richard 
Dawkins and Sam Harris) or a more agnostically secularist approach that argues a 
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harder degree of rigidness in terms of the separation of church and state, but is not 
necessarily anti-religion and might even include religious arguments.354 Moreover, the 
emphasis of the argument for separation has changed from the Old settlement’s desire 
for equal protection for government and for religion to the less inclusive argument for 
protection of the government from religion. We have discussed a number of times the 
dominance of secularism, so I shall not go into more detail here. Suffice it to say that 
the secularists of the “old settlement” were usually also religious people, while many 
secularists today are not, and the debate in the old settlement which was centered on 
religion’s role in government has broadened to that of religion’s role in public life. Yet, 
despite the inescapable differences American’s now face that the old settlement did not, 
we are still grounded in a living Constitution that holds us to the commitment of a 
democratic solution to living with one another. Democracy in the American experiment 
is not a claim to rigid orthodoxy, but the process of myriad different actors figuring out 
how to live together so that all have access to the promise of “life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.” Thus, while returning to the old settlement is impractical, there is 
room for a “New American settlement.” 
     The New American settlement (henceforth “NAS”), is premised on the same 
grounds as the Old settlement: namely, that a democratic solution to political and social 
difference is not only possible, it is necessary in order for the United States to be a just 
place in which its citizenry can at least work toward equity, life, liberty and happiness, 
and, from a religious viewpoint, for life to flourish. There is no justice or liberty in rigid 
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orthodoxy when diversity exists, so more than one plausible worldview must be 
legitimate. This is true whether a religion, such as Christianity or Islam, provides the 
orthodox position, or when secularism does so. While there are different players on a 
changed field, NAS is also framed by the principles of openness and contestation. This 
means that more than one view is welcome at the table of public discourse. One might 
protest at this point: what about radical views of hatred, such as racial bigotry? But, by 
establishing the atmosphere of openness and contestation it, by design, places limits 
upon all rigidity, including marginal voices that are anti-democratic. Fear of radicalized 
voices often marginalizes them, but they only gain power that way. In a system of 
openness, you necessarily agree to being open yourself. In a system of contestation, you 
not only protect your right to contest, but that of others as well. Recalling chapter 
three’s search for a way to include multiple “live options,” openness and contestation 
admit just that – there are many live options, not just one, whether it be religious 
fundamentalism or secularism. Granted, some live options may be radically better than 
others in terms of how they function within democracy, but a system of openness and 
contestation allows this to be brought to light in a way that may lead toward 
compromise, even healing. We have seen where rigid orthodoxy and the reactions 
against it have led. As I am writing this, America is in the midst of a heated political 
debate as contenders for the primary presidential nomination vie against one another. 
Any sensible conversation is all but drowned out by hatred and violent language; a 
nation divided takes on new meaning as American’s defame one another and party 
leaders turn out rhetoric that they think mirror their constituents’ views, some of which 
is shockingly bigoted and ignorant. Polarization has not served us well; it certainly has 
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not served the commons well. It is time to cease pointing fingers at one another and to 
search for a more democratic solution; NAS can do just that.  
     The next section explores a weaving of themes from chapters three and four in order 
to build a conceptual framework for NAS. It includes both secular educational and 
religious themes. Following that, the remainder of the chapter will examine what such a 
framework looks like in schools and how NAS might play out in real life situations 
encountered by teachers and students. Furthermore, such a process is suggestive of 
another purpose behind education: relationship. If John Dewey argues that education is 
rooted in experience, and Jane Roland Martin argues that education is about encounter, 
a result of NAS is the suggestion that education occurs in and through relationship. 
Such a subject will be developed more thoroughly in the final chapter. It is also 
important to note that even though I suggest that NAS is applicable to all public life and 
religious engagement, the remainder of this chapter will explore it within educational 
parameters, and within schooling in particular. This is for two reasons: first, this project 
is about education and the situation of religious diversity within schools, and second, as 
the “laboratory of democracy” NAS in public schools provides a test case for NAS in 
broader public life, for schools mirror much of what goes on in broader society. Though 
schools are not required to collect religious data on its students, so it is impossible to 
know precisely how religious diversity plays out in public schools, as religious diversity 
grows in the U.S. schools will, but correlation, experience much of this diversity. Even 
where they do not directly see such diversity reflected in their student-body (because of 
private religious schools that may provide schooling for many religious groups), the 
	 154 
children who attend public schools are still impacted by growing religious diversity 
through out-of-school encounters and the media. 
 
The Commons of the New American Settlement 
     Chapter four explored the concept of the commons from within a framework of 
religious thought; indeed, it proposed that the commons is a broader concept than that 
of the common good. In NAS, the commons as a conceptual tool is essential, though it 
need not be cast in religious terms or language. Borrowing from religious thought, 
however, NAS conceives of a commons that includes everyone. The common good can 
marginalize some people relative to whatever particular worldview is dominant – i.e. 
secularism, Protestant Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. The commons 
recognizes that all people – and the rest of the biotic world – exist in relation to the rest 
of the world, that all have needs, that diversity and unity are both present. Much like the 
importance of biodiversity for a healthy forest, human communities need diversity in 
order to thrive. The commons is also suggestive for the quandary between individual 
rights and community rights; today, religious liberty (usually understood in terms of a 
community of religious people) is frequently pitted against individual freedoms (such as 
the issue of abortion and of gay marriage).355 The commons, however, acknowledges 
that liberty is a hybrid process for communities and individuals, and it also exists within 
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communities and within individuals. There is little either/or in the commons; rather 
there is the dynamic paradox of both/and.  
     The commons further contributes to the understanding that everything impacts 
everyone, however subtly. Those who are marginalized or oppressed are harmed, but in 
the commons everyone is impacted negatively by the harm brought to any member. 
NAS, then, incorporates such a sense of inclusivity – that not only are all included, but 
everyone’s flourishing contributes to that of everyone else, as does its opposite. Played 
out in schools, the NAS commons radically incorporates all children, teachers, and 
other people within the school culture as contributing members; their behavior and the 
way in which they are treated impacts everyone else. NAS, then, affirms the necessity 
of acknowledging all as members who contribute to the whole, for better or for worse. 
The commons broadens the concept of school culture so that, as Martin describes, the 
missing educational agents are no longer missing. They are free to be appreciated and 
critiqued for the way in which they inform, and form, education.  
     Like Martin’s theory of educational metamorphoses by way of cultural encounters 
described at length in chapter three, the NAS commons includes the process of 
metamorphoses and the cultural encounters that prompt them, incorporating them as 
legitimate components of education. Student transformations are validated within the 
NAS commons, and as such there is room for the gentle prompt to evaluate such 
transformations as either educational or miseducational. The NAS commons also 
acknowledges fully a student’s experience in and out of the classroom, and permits the 
process of full continuity of experience so that the educative process can contribute to 
growth rather than inhibiting it (Dewey). 
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Relationship 
     At the heart of the NAS commons is the nature of human interaction – namely, 
relationship. Relationships are the backbone, the unending reality of the commons. 
Indeed, relationship is the foundation of education, for learning takes place not only 
through encounters (Martin) or experience (Dewey) but through relationality with both 
cultural stock and other agents. In NAS, relationship is rooted in the concept of 
interrelationality, discussed in depth in chapter four. This broadens the idea of 
relationship to include not only direct relations – with teachers, other students, and 
items of cultural stock – but with everyone and everything in the commons. We might 
think of this as relational educational encounter, direct and indirect. We are not only 
directly impacted by that which we encounter, but our relationality with that encounter 
informs and forms us as learners. Martin argues that educational encounters happen as 
we are “yoked” with items of cultural stock; a relational educational encounter implies 
that the process of yoking is more subtle and less clinical.356 It is a circular, fluid 
process of being in relation to whatever or whomever we encounter. The stock and the 
process of relating to that stock create an educational transition or learning experience, 
however subtle. In the NAS commons, all aspects of life have relationship potential 
because all exist within the commons, thus all things are potentially educational.  
     Within schools, relationship implies a number of things. First, it suggests that all 
within a school culture are in relationship, be they agnostic, Atheist, Christian, “spiritual 
but not religious,” Muslim, Jewish, etc. As any and all of these persons go through 
educational metamorphoses, it influences to some degree all others within the system as 
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relational beings. When religion or religious diversity are marginalized, those 
relationships still exist, but they cannot be developed in a healthy, positive way. NAS 
relationship also suggests that when something harmful happens to a student based on 
his or her religious identity – like singling someone out for wearing a rosary or for 
refusing the pledge of allegiance on religious grounds (Minersville School District v. 
Gobitis) – it is not only the individual who is harmed, but the whole community, made 
up of individual members.357 NAS relationship also implies that educators have an 
obligation to establish a balanced way of relating to (relationship again!) religion and 
religious actors. There are no fringe members in the commons or in relationship – 
everyone matters. And, everyone has something to teach and to learn from everyone 
else. Relationship provides a link to the concept of openness: it is not only good sense 
to be open to other ideas, it is part of how relationship happens. Openness is an aspect 
of what it means to be relational creatures. NAS relationship, then, implies that for the 
good of all, kindness and care must be invoked as part of the educational framework. 
 
Abounding Kindness 
     The New American Settlement is only possible when kindness abounds. As chapter 
three discussed, care has long been an aspect of good educational thought. It goes back 
much further than modern American educational theory – not doubt including the 
earliest forms of educational thought – and it is present in the ethos of many 
methodologies and influential educational theory, from Maria Montessori’s Casa dei 
Bambini, to Frederick Froebel’s kindergarten movement, from Booker T. Washington’s 
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work culminating in the Tuskegee Institute to Louisa May Alcott’s fictitious Little 
Women.358 Educational concepts of care occasionally reinforce systems of domination 
as the one with power enforces something upon the one with less power out of “caring 
for” them. Chapter four argued that kindness, well developed by a number of religious 
thinkers, readily observes contextual ethics and lessens the possibility that care can 
become a servant of domination, for kindness implies selflessness and love of another 
while acknowledging the freedom and full agency of the other as a member of the 
commons.  
     In their article on former school offenders, Haney, Thomas, and Vaughn present 
research supporting “restorative school practices.”359 These practices are intended to re-
integrate student offenders and victims, or, better still, prevent such offenses. As such, 
the researchers attempt to discover the ways in which schools and teachers may have 
contributed to the problem. Through personal interviews and interactions, the 
researchers discovered that, by and large, these students felt invisible and lacked a sense 
of cohesive belonging as members of the school. They write, “no restorative process 
can “re”integrate a victim or offender back into the classroom culture of which s/he 
never felt a part.360 They found that invisibility “manifesting itself as shutting down, 
acting out, or quitting school” was the substance of the problem and they call educators 
to the task of creating “teacher-led dialogical sessions” in order to cultivate an 
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atmosphere where students feel seen and a sense of belonging can grow.361 Students 
need not be offenders or victims of bullying or violence to feel disenfranchised or 
lacking in school membership. All that is really required is the feeling of difference. 
Logically, everyone is different despite the similarities one shares with others, but 
categorical differences based on race, gender, religious identity, etc., particularly when 
one is among a small minority within a school, are vulnerable to a sense of invisibility 
when teachers and other students do not extend the invitation of membership. In terms 
of religious identity, like the offenders in the above research, students who feel 
disenfranchised may fall victim to bullying because of their religious or non-religious 
beliefs, or they may act out, displaying evidence of intolerance (religious or non-
religious) themselves. The point that Haney, Thomas, and Vaughn make, though, is 
that, regardless of the offense, the problem stems, at least in part, from the lack of 
membership that these students felt. What is needed is a welcoming school 
environment; rules and boundaries are necessary, of course, but from within the context 
of membership. In order to establish this kind of atmosphere – indeed, to see that it is 
needed in the first place – extensive kindness that leads us to extending ourselves in 
order to serve the other is essential.  
     The kind of care the NAS proposes must be one that “abounds” with kindness, to use 
Elizabeth Johnson’s imagery. Abounding kindness quells tempers, it replaces fear with 
compassion, and in so doing it makes room for acceptance of difference and 
conversation with an eye toward compromise. Kindness is a practice, not just a 
principle. And, applied to the principle of contestation, it can be the lynchpin upon 
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which NAS can thrive. Kindness paves the way for civil contestation and makes 
openness to other people and ideas safe. As educators, seeking both to be kind and to 
see the kindness in others can transform difficult situations regarding diversity into 
educational moments through which the commons itself can transform. Abounding in 
kindness, humans can even be convinced to put the other first.  
 
Kenotic Mutuality 
     A final aspect of NAS comes out of the principle of kenosis or limits, as discussed in 
chapter four. Here conceived, kenosis is not an exclusively religious concept, though 
clearly it has religious roots. But, practically speaking, it is the willingness to put 
someone else – or a whole bunch of people – before yourself. If we accept the context 
of the commons, and the direct correlation that we are all connected within the 
commons – in other words, we are in relationship with one another either directly or 
indirectly – and that kindness must abound for the NAS to take root, then what we 
might call kenotic mutuality is also a necessity and a natural result of the three other 
concepts applied to everyday life. Kenotic – from the Greek “an emptying” – mutuality 
upholds the value of members within the commons – in this case, students, teachers, or 
other members of the school community – and urges members to be willing to engage 
in a practice of sharing and making room for other members in terms of permitting 
alternative ideas and worldviews. It is a selfless act of allowing others the time and 
space to honestly be themselves, but it also acknowledges that all members should have 
that opportunity, and in that spirit it enlivens the idea of contestation, allowing for 
disagreement to take place from within a context of civility. Here, we are not using the 
term to describe a religious concept; rather, we are borrowing from a religious concept 
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in order to suggest more than just compromise which sometimes, in reality, feels like 
one party simply gave in to the another. Kenotic mutuality suggests processing 
difference in such a way that, in the end, all members receive the mutual benefit of 
participating in a process where everyone counts, even when compromise necessitates 
some restrictions. A commitment to abounding kindness via our place in the commons 
means that in a situation of diversity we must make room for everyone. Kenotic 
mutuality also implies that other people must, at times, limit themselves. If everything is 
on the table, not all of it will be acceptable contributors in a shared common space. 
Willingness to mutually give of ourselves, even limit ourselves, allows contestation and 
openness to result in compromises and applicable solutions.  
     Jeremy Rifkin presents an impressive amount of data suggesting that human beings 
are predisposed or “hardwired” toward empathy.362 That this predisposition is not 
readily displayed throughout much of human history is not in question, but, he argues, 
one of humankind’s most basic capacities – however under-or-undeveloped – is the 
ability to be empathic.363 Rifkin urges us to take this capacity seriously, for it is what is 
needed to respond sustainably and ethically to the many urgent issues that vex our 
world, particularly ecological destruction and wars. “The empathic predisposition that is 
built into our biology is not a fail-safe mechanism that allows us to perfect our 
humanity. Rather, it is an opportunity to increasingly bond the human race into a single 
extended family…”364 This may sound grandiose, but on a smaller, more personal scale 
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the capacity to act out of empathy is essential for positive, healing human interactions. 
Empathy, according to the sociologist Brené Brown, is a result of one’s willingness to 
be vulnerable.365 In the classroom, Vaughn and Krutka write, “It was the willingness to 
be raw that led to civil, if not healing conversations,” urging teachers to embrace 
vulnerability in themselves so that they may do so with their students.366 Empathy and 
vulnerability are another way of talking about kenotic mutuality. Kenosis is more than 
limiting one’s self, although at times it requires that, but it is embracing self-limits and, 
at the same time, opening oneself up in such a way that one has the capacity to share out 
of one’s self, exposing one’s self and, in so doing, extending compassionate care to the 
other. 
     In the classroom that encounters religious difference, this idea extends to students 
and to teachers. Kenotic mutuality instructs teachers that, though they may find flaws in 
the beliefs of others, it is not up to them to correct these beliefs. Rather, it is their 
responsibility to format their curriculum and classroom time in such a way that students 
feel validated as people, that students understand they are expected to participate in 
kindness, looking for the best in themselves and in others, as ideas emerge in civil 
dialogue. Demonstrating kenotic mutuality, teachers also convey such an ethic to 
students as they encounter differences both within and outside of the classroom. After 
all, education is not only about what happens during the school day. Far more important 
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is the cultivated capacity within students to be able to interact in the rest of their lives 
from a place of kindness and flourishing. 
     In sum, the New American Settlement is a combination of old and new. It situates 
itself in a pluralistic society, committed to openness and to the principle of contestation, 
but with new parameters of engagement. The NAS incorporates the understanding that 
1) we all live and exist within a shared commons, which includes great diversity, that 2) 
the commons is a process of being in relationship with others, either directly or 
indirectly, that 3) abounding kindness coupled with a commitment to 4) kenotic 
mutuality must be the makeup of such an arrangement in order for democracy and life 
itself to flourish. There will, of course, be objectors to these ideas, but taken as a whole, 
this conceptual framework allows for actors from many perspectives to participate in 
dialogue in a rigorous and satisfying way without any of them renouncing their own 
worldview. It provides, in essence, a new set of rule, boundaries, and advantages for 
contestation within a democratic system.  
 
Whispers of New American Settlement: Interfaith & Multicultural Initiatives 
     To say that American public schools need a New Settlement is not to suggest that 
efforts at building bridges between people of different faiths has not been successfully 
tried. For the most part, such experiments are labeled as “interfaith” – a movement in 
many parts of the world, including pockets all across the United States to foster 
dialogue and understanding between people from different faith traditions (though less 
geared toward cooperation between religious people and those who are not). 
Organizations such as the Interfaith Alliance attend to these tasks, and most large cities 
have several non-profit groups working on interfaith issues. This is relevant, important 
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work, but it lacks traction across some sectors of society and tends to be the pet project 
of well-educated, relatively affluent people, the majority of whom are older adults. 
Nonetheless, interfaith organizations are not without influence and the quells of 
interfaith studies in higher education is beginning to take shape across the country, 
largely due to efforts of the Obama administration, which has called for more work to 
be done in interfaith relations, especially among young people.367 Why do we need a 
NAS if we already have a vibrant interfaith initiative beginning across the country? This 
section explores that idea alongside the reality of interfaith work, what I call “whispers” 
of NAS. Interfaith work, as well as other multicultural/pluralism initiatives like the 
Institute of Cultural Affairs, the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation, and 
the United World Colleges, are valuable to be sure, but NAS can contribute missing 
components or additional theoretical and practical support that will be discussed at 
length in this section.   
     Though many people – scholars, religious leaders, and laypersons alike – have and 
continue to address the issue of religion in public life and schools in particular in a 
variety of ways, one movement that has received a great deal of press and positive 
notoriety is the Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC), an organization founded and led, along 
with others, by American Muslim Eboo Patel. IFYC has recently expanded its mission 
to include the development of college curriculum and a network of university programs 
across the country, incorporating a strong educational component in what was originally 
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conceived of as a youth movement.368 It thus merits examination and exploration from 
an educational standpoint as it gains impact and traction on the American educational 
landscape. 
     Patel recounts the gradual creation of the IFYC in his book Acts of Faith: The Story 
of an American Muslim, the Struggle for the Soul of a Generation, as, similar to the 
Civil Rights movement, a group and community effort of colleagues, friends, and 
committed activists.369 Patel is the primary spokesperson and president of IFYC, 
traveling worldwide addressing audiences about the organization and the need for a 
youth-based movement of religious pluralism as a means to reduce the cultural 
liabilities of religious intolerance, though he uses different language.  IFYC grew in part 
out of Patel’s intellectual journey; as a student at the University of Illinois (Champaign-
Urbana) in the mid-1990’s, he found himself swept away with the multicultural 
movement. He studied racism and was particularly taken with identity politics and 
radical thought found in such thinkers as Howard Zinn, H. Rap Brown, Huey Newton, 
and early Malcom X. Although privileged in terms of class structure, Patel struggled 
with racial discrimination and found personal power in his university days as he 
adopted the rhetoric of some of the more militant black theorists. He uses himself as an 
example of the kids he is trying to reach, saying that he might have taken the path of 
violence, wrought from anger and frustration, had he not recognized in a moment of 
clarity that his feelings and those of many who acted out violently in rebellion were 
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frighteningly similar.370 What actually turned Patel toward non-violent social activism 
was the combination of his own Muslim roots that emphasized service to others, and 
happening upon the writings and outreach of people like Dorothy Day and the Catholic 
Worker movement. Encountering loving, religiously rooted activism set him on a 
different course, one that would lead him into the arena of Interfaith cooperation.  
     The IFYC took shape as a discontented response on Patel’s part (and other 
instrumental leaders) to the dominance of older voices in the Interfaith dialogue 
movement. He reminisces about attending conferences at which he was by far the 
youngest person. He was dismayed that the older attendees seemed content to dialogue, 
but he and his friends wanted to do something, a common theme he finds among the 
youth with whom he works.371 In response, Patel sought to create a youth-centered 
movement of Interfaith cooperation. This impetus was further solidified when, in his 
research, he discovered that most terrorist organizations that use religious fervor as a 
tool are dominated by youth and led by older, masterful “teachers.” The IFYC 
developed as a means and method of countering both the reality that older people are 
the guiding voices of Interfaith dialogue, and the danger of and to youth who encounter 
dynamic leaders of hatred without balancing voices of tolerance and reason. Patel states 
that the IFYC is simply about “young people building religious pluralism.”372 Patel tells 
the story of having an audience with the Dalai Lama. His Holiness was, as one might 
expect, very supportive of the concept of an interfaith youth initiative; he is a leading 
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advocate for religious tolerance and diversity. Near the end of the meeting, the Dalai 
Lama pointed to Patel’s friend, Kevin, a Jewish man and said, “Jew.” He then pointed at 
Patel – “Muslim.” He pointed to himself and his secretary and said, “Buddhists. This is 
interfaith. Now we have to serve others. But we [pointing to himself and his 
companion] are not young. Can we still join?” A very good question. It is significant to 
note that the IFYC is not only focused upon educating youth, it is almost exclusively 
youth-based and led by young Gen X’s and Millennials.  
     The IFYC has three “pillars” or tenets: 1) intercultural encounters, 2) social action, 
and 3) interfaith reflection.373 The movement was founded on diversity. At their first 
formal gathering to brainstorm what the movement would be like, they framed a basic 
notion that an effective movement would include youth from diverse faith backgrounds 
in the context of service to others. The Parliament of World Religions was meeting in 
Cape Town that year (1999) and had spoken of wanting more youth participation; they 
anticipated a large crowd of young people, but needed someone to organize it. So, the 
brainstormers of IFYC volunteered for the task and flew to South Africa to organize 
service and art projects with the youth attending the Parliament. That initial group of 
young leaders became the beginning of IFYC, and a number of subsequent projects – all 
aimed in one way or another as “service” – took place in various parts of the world with 
Patel acting as chief organizer. Eventually, Patel relocated to his own Chicago and the 
intercultural encounters continued thanks in part to Chicago’s enormous diversity, and 
through the group’s efforts across the globe to serve as a resource for others doing 
similar work. 
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     The second pillar highlights that a hallmark of the IFYC is their commitment to 
“social action” or service – often referred to as service learning. The idea is that 
gathering together young people of different faiths under the auspices of a common 
project for the betterment of the community fosters understanding of religious 
differences in the process. The third pillar blends the other two together in a meaningful 
way through Interfaith reflection. IFYC created the Chicago Youth Council – a group of 
young people who come together to discuss their own religious beliefs and ideas with 
one another in a framework of pluralistic hospitality. The IFYC lifts up what they call 
shared values – values that most (if not all) religious traditions share in their fullest 
expression. Patel highlights hospitality, cooperation, compassion, and mercy.374 No 
doubt others could be added – like love, the embryo of all of them. A question that 
arises along this line, however, is what exactly is meant by these shared values? Surely, 
differences in these values exist between religions since even people of the same faith 
interpret these values differently, let alone respond differently to how one thinks they 
should be lived out. 
     IFYC is certainly not the only attempt at youth interfaith engagement, but it is 
perhaps the most visible one and, due to the college program initiative, it will likely 
become the most represented organization around youth and interfaith understanding. 
Thus, examining IFYC against the background proposed for NAS is valuable, and much 
of it can be applied to other organizations. First, it is important to note that IFYC, for all 
its focus on youth and its youthful administration, does not include younger children as 
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a core age group. For the most part, IFYC members are high school and college age.375 
NAS, on the other hand, is applicable across age groups and should include younger 
students in its theoretical and practical framework. Indeed, IFYC’s message is highly 
motivating, but it has not as yet developed a thorough educational philosophy, such as 
the kind developed around NAS, and this kind of educational theory is vital to cross-
cultural and long-term traction. Like most interfaith initiatives, IFYC focuses on 
religious diversity – to be expected – but with few explicit plans that are sensitive to 
diversity in class, race, and gender and the ways in which these identity categories 
interact.376 The reality of both public schools and the public square is that enormous 
diversity exists in the midst of religious diversity. Most interfaith efforts’ appeal is 
generally concentrated among those who are somewhat affluent (and among Christians 
at least, most of the interfaith representation is white). The disenfranchisement of the 
wealthy is something we usually do not speak of for logical reasons, so interfaith efforts 
are stymied as those who already agree with one another come together to…agree with 
one another.  
     The most problematic component of interfaith movements, including IFYC, however 
is that it lacks a coherent commitment to the principle of contestation – indeed, it 
usually avoids it – and therefore it may be alienating to religious conservatives and 
secularists alike. This may work for much of interfaith dialogue in a less structured 
setting, but it cannot address the needs within public schools. Much of the time 
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interfaith initiatives focus upon the similarities between religious traditions to the 
exclusion of acknowledging the important differences. In the attempt to create harmony, 
they fail to legitimize notes of discord – contestation – that are naturally occurring. As 
we have discussed, NAS holds as a fundamental the principle of openness and 
contestation – not just openness about what we already agree on, but openness and 
dialogue around that which we disagree, and may likely always will differ. In order for 
interfaith work to cross the boundaries beyond Liberal or Prophetic religionists, the 
principle of contestation is a requirement. This is the primary reason why the interfaith 
movement is not currently enough to satisfy the bridges that need to be built between 
polarized American culture. Too often interfaith efforts give little attention to, or deny 
altogether, open contestation; because of this they may contribute further to the problem 
around religion in schools as some groups openly support secularism as the framework 
of schooling and the privatization of religion in the public commons, inadvertently 
stifling religious liberty in the process. Without the principle of contestation – the 
process of contesting one another’s ideas – interfaith movements tend to be about 
creating sameness, which only contributes further to the culture wars faced in the 
United States. NAS is not about cultivating sameness but rather a process that 
legitimizes difference and permits disagreement, even discord, in order to come to 
democratic compromise.  
 
Applying New Settlement within Public Schools: an imaginary approach 
Specific Concerns 
     I have argued that the United States needs a New Settlement, and that public schools 
are an ideal place to begin to develop and apply NAS. But how do we begin? The 
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following pages are not intended to be exhaustive of the ways NAS can work, but they 
seek to provide an outline of practical possibilities. Because NAS has not been tried as 
such, beyond the “whisperings” discussed above, there is no hard data on its proposed 
success. Thus, I have created imaginary vignettes based on real life situations in schools 
(all of which we have discussed in other chapters) that demonstrate how NAS might be 
applied. The possibilities are endless, so the vignettes are not intended to be exhaustive 
either; rather, they offer applicability demonstrations of real life situations with all the 
mess that goes with them.  
Teacher training 
     In all three sub-sections of American public schooling, teacher training is a 
significant issue. In addition to many states pushing to deprofessionalize teaching by 
eliminating certification, the plain fact is that few teachers in public schools, including 
those in colleges outside of the religious studies department, have any serious training 
in religion or religious diversity and the myriad of issues that go along with them.377 
What little training that some of them have often creates more problems than help, as 
Noddings aptly demonstrates when she attempts to tackle the weighty subject of how to 
teach religion in public schools with from a perspective of criticism.378 As a scholar of 
religion, I have witnessed many conversations with public school teachers who have 
very little religion training themselves, discussing how they teach about the subject. 
They are all too often grossly in error, particularly when they attempt to pull out strands 
of similarity between religions, which end up mistakenly interpreting creeds, beliefs, 
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and conduct in an attempt to create sameness. Clearly, better education for our public 
school teachers is needed in order for them to be able to convey more appropriately the 
depth, richness, and diversity in the various world faiths. Much of this issue, however, 
can be addressed by professional organizations producing teaching resources developed 
by scholars in the field of religion. Videos, articles, and interviews with religious actors 
and religious scholars are good substitutes for teachers with little or no training in 
religion; some exist, more are needed.  
     More important to NAS than teachers receiving sufficient training in religion is the 
development among teachers to address and model the core principles of NAS. This 
task is much less specialized, and the simple truth is, such development will make better 
teachers of us all. Taking seriously a commitment to openness and contestation allows 
for differences to come out without them being seen as a threat, and without fear of 
religion being somehow unconstitutionally included in classroom curriculum. As 
teachers understand the commons and are given language that helps them convey such 
an understanding to students, the principle of relationship naturally arises and only 
needs to be nurtured. Kindness is both principle and practice, and it is something that 
should be easy for teachers to cultivate; if a teacher is unable to practice kindness, he or 
she would do well to consider another profession. As they practice, they can strive to 
see and bring out the kindness in their students and to model such a practice, helping 
students learn the art of reflecting and acknowledging the kindness in others. From 
there, the concept of kenotic mutuality is a small step, once again requiring practice on 
the part of the teacher and modeling to her or his students. The main principles that 
ground NAS can easily be addressed in a basic teacher’s course and they can easily be 
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incorporated in a number of other teacher training college courses, such as classes like 
“school and society” and educational pluralism or diversity training. Moreover, 
workshops available as continuing education to teachers could easily address these main 
principles and give excellent ideas for how to practice them in a fraction of the time 
than a world religion’s course could only be introduced. With these principles at the 
helm, teachers will be less concerned with creating sameness or offering critiques of 
specific religions and more committed to how their students relate to one another and 
the attitudes with which they convey their own beliefs, whatever they may be. And, 
while I completely support efforts to introduce courses in world religions in schools – 
provided they are taught by experts or utilize teaching materials produced by said 
experts – the development of teacher training in these foundational principles of NAS 
will do far more to promote a more harmonious school and public commons. 
 
Textbooks & resources 
    For all practical purposes, textbooks largely overlook religion, as a number of studies 
spanning the past several decades indicate.379 It is not only that textbooks need more 
information, such as sections on the major world traditions, but they often ignore 
religious motivations and actors in the retelling of historical events.380 This clearly 
needs changed, and textbook publishers, which adhere to the increasingly assertive 
secularist approach to public education, should also be encouraged to embrace NAS. 
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This would mean that textbooks would become less about the banking model of 
education – inputting mere information – and more about discussion and dialogue 
around diversity.  
     In the meantime, there are a number of good resources available on religious history 
in the United States, religious diversity, pluralism, and other issues around religion in 
the public commons that can be used as supplements by teachers in the classroom. 
Many more could be produced and need to be, embracing NAS. Indeed, teaching 
students about NAS and its main principles would help any discussion of religion in the 
classroom. Funding for supplementary materials should become a serious commitment 
from faith groups and interfaith networks alike so that teachers have the resources they 
need and so that such resources are acts of NAS themselves instead of only a few voices 
represented for a specific intent.381 
 
Special Courses 
     While most public schools in the United States fail to take religion seriously as a 
subject, there are a few pilot courses that offer education on world religions, such as one 
located in Modesto, California. The course has been extremely successful in bridging 
the gaps of religious differences, according to many first-hand interviews with parents 
and teachers.382 Courses like this one are important, but they too should be taught within 
a NAS framework so as not to alienate both conservative and secular actors, or to 
promote a specific ideology. In reality, school districts need to make these decisions 
themselves based on the culture of the area and the kinds of diversity present within the 
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community. Too often, world religions classes are taught with a bias either for or 
against Christianity. Often professors of world religions classes assume that everyone in 
the room is Christian – or that they do not need additional information about it. They 
might exclude it as a topic because all other religions are compared to it (which is what 
a “comparative religions” course usually does), or because they do not want a heated 
debate from the Christians in the room. Privileging or marginalizing Christianity – or 
any religion for that matter – is unhelpful and betrays biases, and it certainly does not fit 
the parameters of NAS, which seeks to bring all parties to the table. If world religions 
are to be taught as a course, Christian thought must be given the same examination as 
any other tradition, and the principles of NAS must be included, which likely means 
inviting guests from various traditions to participate or present and dialogue with 
students.  
      There is a problem inherent with specialty courses like world religions, however, 
and that is, again, teacher capability. How many American public school teachers are 
trained to teach such a class? As a former professor of world religions, I can speak 
readily to the fact that it is a complicated and complex course. On the one hand, you are 
merely introducing each religion, but getting these introductions factually correct and 
putting them in dialogue with the other religions without trying to create sameness 
where there may not be any is an art form and requires expertise in the area. The only 
successful kind of specialty course will be one that is either taught by an expert under 
an adjunct arrangement (except in some private schools, which may be able to afford a 




     While teaching about religion poses a myriad of problems in schools with regard to 
teacher training and resources, interacting with different religions is less problematic if 
NAS is the framework through which such interactions take place. With the parameters 
of openness and contestation, the commons, relationship, kindness, and kenotic 
mutuality clearly established, teachers with little training in the field of religion can help 
students of practically any age interact with religious difference. This can occur in at 
least two ways in most public schools: through service and through dialogue.  
     Many schools participate in the growing educational practice of service-learning. 
Somewhat obviously, service-learning is a way in which students learn through service. 
In general, teachers arrange with outside community partners (such as an organization 
like Habitat for Humanity or a local food bank) for students to come participate in a 
project like building a house for a family in need or serving meals at a local soup 
kitchen, and through interacting with the people they serve as well as the community 
partners with whom they work (and, hopefully, plenty of dialogue with their teachers), 
students learn in a concrete, dynamic way what mere textbooks could never convey. 
Service-learning may not be appropriate for younger students, depending upon the 
project, although service-learning need not be outside of the school. Projects such as 
edible gardens at schools may be perfectly appropriate and equally service-oriented. 
Service-learning with regard to religious diversity is slightly more tenuous in public 
schools, although college-level service-learning projects with religious partners should 
pose few problems. In order for service-learning to work in public schools in matters of 
religion, the community partner should be working on behalf of the greater community, 
not to support a particular religion. For instance, public schools would do well to avoid 
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partnerships in which students help build something for a religious body, but 
participating with religious actors to help serve those in poverty should pose few 
problems. Better still, public schools and interfaith groups can provide service-learning 
opportunities that aid the general public in no overtly religious ways; this would allow 
students the opportunity to see religious actors in action and to ask questions, but 
parents need not fear their children specifically aiding a particular religious tradition. 
Service-learning provides an excellent opportunity for reflection. In the many service-
learning projects I have worked with my own students, they readily reflect on how their 
own values contribute to the particular project; I have yet to see any students convert! 
     More feasible than service-learning is an emphasis on dialogue. Here, as mentioned 
elsewhere, it is Freire’s model of dialogue that is most appropriate, where students 
themselves provide the fodder for the discussion and teachers mediate it according to 
NAS principles. This, of course, requires teacher training and integration of these 
principles. Students of any age can easily participate to some degree and dialogues can 
be planned or happen naturally in the course of classroom activities.  
     David Bohm offers insight to the practical application of dialogue, what is now often 
referred to as “Bohm Dialogue.” He cautions us that dialogue is not a discussion or 
debate with an predesigned outcome.383 Dialogue is a process through which people 
with differing opinions and approaches can come to some sort of workable solution 
with one another. He writes, “It enables inquiry into, and understanding of, the sorts of 
processes that fragment and interfere with real communication between individuals, 
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nations and even different parts of the same organization.”384 Bohm asserts that many of 
our human-driven conflict arise out of hidden assumptions and thought patterns – ideas 
about which we may be unaware.385 Dialogue allows us to converse with one another 
and, done correctly (that is, without coercive measures and without allowing frustration 
to block the flow of dialogue) we have the potential to see our own assumptions, many 
of which may be faulty. At the same time, a mirroring process occurs during dialogue in 
which we mirror to others their conveyed thoughts and feelings and they do the same 
for us.386 Of course, human beings can never be a perfect mirror – we are not neutral 
pieces of reflective glass – but, through the course of dialogue, Bohm argues that 
thought patterns which cause division and dissention can be seen and thus contested, 
resulting in, at the very least, amiability within organizations and groups. The process of 
dialogue can help the process of contestation. Bohm argues that one of the first 
processes within dialogue is to suspend thought.387 That is, one must be willing in a 
dialogue to suspend one’s own opinions long enough to actually hear what other people 
are saying rather than simply defending one’s own position. This kind of suspension is a 
practical result of kenotic mutuality. In an act of self-emptying or self-limiting, one 
suspends one’s own position. Suspension is not a permanent condition; rather, it provide 
a pause in order to allow other people room to participate in dialogue. This pause also 
allows us to have the space in which for realizations to occur at a personal level; we 
have given ourselves time to process our feelings, our assumptions, to see differences 
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and how they may be less problematic than we thought, or how they may be coming 
from a different place than we originally imagined. This pause time is vital to satisfying 
compromise; it provides a model of contestation that does not have to spiral into angry 
debate and thus is a practical application of kenotic mutuality.  
 
About Age Groups 
     Obviously there is difference in the way in which NAS can be advanced within 
primary and secondary schools, high schools and colleges. But, that it can be developed 
in each level of public schooling is an important contribution to its validity. Younger 
students are certainly not ready for a world religions course; that is likely better 
reserved for high school students, or possibly late middle-schoolers. But, the basic 
concepts of NAS – the commons, relationship, kindness, kenotic mutuality, and 
openness/contestation – may be readily included in curriculum geared for young 
children. Teaching this age group about the value of everyone in the commons and the 
need for kindness and selflessness are surely the backbone of any good moral education.  
     For older students in middle school and high school, attention to the main concepts 
of NAS is still vital, but it can be achieved with more depth as student reasoning 
develops. By this age, students should be able to participate in service-learning projects 
off school campuses, and formal dialogue sessions can be frequent. This is also an age 
where specialty courses can be part of the school curriculum, and school projects geared 
toward understanding differences can be effective.  
     For college students, the simple answer to the problem of religious diversity and 
public interaction may seem to be to take a course offered in the religious studies 
department, such as world religions, or even a class on religion and politics, frequently 
	 180 
available through political science departments as electives. Some schools require a 
multi-cultural component, and classes like world religions fit this requirement well. But, 
there is still more that needs developed during the college years. By this time, students 
are now generally able to vote and to participate as full citizens even while continuing 
their educational process. It is not enough to take a class about different religions. NAS 
should still be part of the school culture. In order to do this, schools must make NAS 
part of their campus commitment, just as they take education regarding race and gender 
differences seriously. When NAS becomes a part of the overarching commitment of a 
college, then faculty are given the motivation and the support they need to address 
issues as they arise in their classes. While interfaith groups on campuses and religious 
studies departments are an important player, NAS should be integrated into the structure 
of colleges themselves, otherwise the standard of secularism as the dominant cultural 
framework will remain largely unchallenged.  
 
A Special Word About Non-Religious Students 
     NAS is not a suggestion that all people are or should be religious. Rather, it takes 
diversity of religion and non-religion into account and promotes a framework that can 
be inclusive of all students – and teachers, whatever their beliefs may be. All people 
have beliefs; some are religious, some are not, many are a blend of both. All have a seat 
at the table, a place in the commons. NAS does not promote religion above non-






How the New American Settlement Might have Worked 
     I have touched on many of the ways in which NAS may be applied; no doubt there 
are many questions that will arise, which is delightful. For as those questions get raised, 
NAS may become a reality and not just a theory with demonstrated feasibility. In order 
to make NAS even more tangible, however, let us consider a few of the real life cases 
discussed in other chapters and see how they might have been handled if NAS was a 
reality. This is a purely imaginative process, but it bears examination and hopefully 
demonstrates further the applicability and need for NAS. In order to do so, we will 
consider the cases of Nashala Hearn (the young woman from Seminole, Oklahoma who 
was denied the right to wear the hijab), Vicki Frost (the mother who became the poster 
child for Scopes II), Vashti & James McCollum (the mother and son in the landmark 
Supreme Court case McCollum v Board of Education), and the unnamed boy who was 
denied the right to wear his rosary to school. These are not exhaustive accounts, but 
they represent how things might have been different if NAS was a reality during the 
time these events took place. 
 
Vashti and James McCollum (1945) 
     The McCollum case centered around the division between secular and religious life. 
Vashti was an Atheist and raised her as one. But, the public schools during that period 
included a released-time program to accommodate religious education. Most people 
were amiable to released-time, and education was provided for Protestants, Catholics, 
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and in some areas Jews.388 In some districts, schools actually released students to attend 
classes held at places of worship, but in the McCollum’s case, released-time brought 
religious instruction inside the public school. James was encouraged to attend by 
teachers despite the protestations of his mother. He refused and had to spend the time 
sitting in the hallway awaiting the religious instruction’s end, rather than being allowed 
to go home or to attend some other kind of course.389 James felt ostracized and fell 
victim to bullying according to his testimony.390 Eventually, Vashti McCollum filed suit 
against the school district, which felt religious instruction was an important part of 
guarding against immorality. The case went on to the U.S. Supreme Court, which found 
against the school district – released-time instruction on school grounds was not 
permissible according to the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment. How might 
things have changed had NAS been in place during this time? Historically speaking, this 
period marked the stark decline of the Old settlement, so NAS is historically 
implausible, but the situation itself is instructive. The legality of the case is not under 
question here; the Court, I believe, decided fairly. But, the educational practices are of 
deep concern.  
     The McCollum’s were among only a few religious or non-religious minorities – all 
of the children in James’ class attended the religious education classes.391 Taking 
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religious liberty and religious diversity seriously in a school that has a great deal of 
diversity is, in some ways, easier than doing so in a school with general religious 
cohesion. In a sense, the school with great diversity demands a response, and too easily 
a tiny minority is easy to overlook, however concerned educators are with student well-
being. In the case of James McCollum, NAS may not have made a difference in the 
legal outcome, but it certainly would have changed James’ experience. To start, the 
commons reminds us that all students and their experiences and identities are part of the 
school commons, thus James’ identity, which he readily revealed, would be 
acknowledged as valuable even if only because James himself was valuable as a 
member of the commons. A strong sense of relationship would have curtailed the 
solution of ostracizing the boy because he held different beliefs. Both teachers and the 
other students, grounded in what it means to be in relationship, would see that James 
mattered, and that there was something very wrong in excluding him entirely. The 
administration of the school, taking relationship seriously, perhaps could have found 
another solution within the parameters of the curriculum so that James did not feel 
marginalized, or the instructors could have carved out a dialogue period where James 
could participate. Where kindness is the general atmosphere, bullying is not permitted, 
and, at the same time, such kindness might have encouraged James to participate in 
dialoging about his own views and that of his family’s rather than feeling bullied and 
putting up a wall of defense, understandable in the situation. Teachers might have 
reached out to Vashti, not in an attempt to convince her to change her mind or to 
admonish her, but in order to try to find a solution to a problem they likely did not 
realize existed, and in a way that would not only allow them to acknowledge the 
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majority beliefs in their community, but that responsibly included dissident voices. And, 
Vashti, with that kind of outreach, may have opted to allow James to dialogue with 
others rather than insisting he not participate at all in religious activities. The give and 
take, but mostly give, present in NAS would surely have led to a more desirable 
atmosphere within the school even if the legality of the situation was still challenged. 
Rather than fear and anger being the general mood of the community over the situation, 
the agreement to openness and contestation would surely have made for better 
education and better community relationships.  
 
Vicki Frost (1986) 
     If NAS would not have made any substantial legal changes to McCollum v Board of 
Education, so-called “Scopes II” would, I believe, have turned out much differently had 
NAS been in place. In fact, the issue may never have gone to court. Vicki Frost was 
only one parent in the situation, but she became the face for Scopes II and so it is to her 
we will refer. Frost’s primary objection was over the readers used in her public school, 
which, she argued, presented a secular humanist viewpoint instead of her own Christian 
faith.392 In reality, the primary objection was more about the exclusivist viewpoint of 
secular humanism and less about secular humanism as a live option, even though Frost 
disagreed with it. Frost, and other concerned parents, went before the schoolboard 
asking for alternative readers that did not reflect and exclusively secular humanist 
perspective and were denied. Eventually, the tension between the parents and the 
teachers and school administrators grew so contentious that the issue was taken to court, 
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but only after the school had evicted Frost from their premises by police force for 
attempting to remove her child from class.393 Had NAS been in place, most of this 
would probably not have happened. Again, the principle of the commons and of 
relationship would have included Frost’s views as valid, however irritating the 
schoolboard found them. Surely, alongside the principles of kindness and kenotic 
mutuality, an alternative reader could have been arranged; the State had already 
approved a number of them – Frost was asking for one of the other approved 
readings.394 NAS would leave little room for the stubbornness of the schoolboard 
leaders. Moreover, NAS would have compelled the teachers and school principle to 
have compassion and to offer reasonable alternatives to Frost and her children, rather 
than the attitude of, to borrow the colloquial saying, “my way or the highway.” Beyond 
the specific issue of the reader, Frost and her family felt completely ostracized within 
her community and they were related to with a great deal of recrimination and anger. 
There was little give to be found; but, with kindness and kenotic mutuality at the helm, 
such stubbornness could be worked out and a compromise – the heart of democracy – 
could be found, saving the school district money, the community fragmentation, and the 
Frost family pain and suffering.  
 
Nashala Hearn (2004) 
     Nashala Hearn, a Muslim convert, living in Seminole, Oklahoma and attending 
public school, is a recent example of the problem our public schools face.395 Hearn wore 
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her hijab or headscarf as a symbol of her faith.396 Her public school denounced it, 
arguing that it was considered a hat by the dress code and that, therefore, she was in 
violation. She challenged the order and a lawsuit was filed on her behalf; the school 
settled outside of court. Like most Oklahoma communities, Seminole is dominantly 
Christian and tends towards conservative Christian views.397 For most Oklahoma 
schools outside of the large metropolitan areas (Oklahoma City and Tulsa), it must have 
been rather shocking for a student to wear a sign of their Muslim faith; Islam is 
growing, but remains a small percentage of the State’s population.398 Though the school 
authorities cited violation of an established dress code, which is entirely secular in 
nature, it can be presumed that the tension many conservative Christians feel in 
response to Islam may have been part of the problem. In a secular framework, the 
argument for excluding the symbol, even if religious reasons were behind it, could 
easily be made. Fortunately, the protection of religious liberty was successful in this 
case. If NAS were the dominant framework, however, like Frost’s situation it is unlikely 
that a court dispute would have needed to be threatened. By accepting the commons as a 
reality, Hearn’s identity would have been validated as legitimate, even if many were 
opposed to her beliefs. Teachers could have invited her to talk about her chosen symbol 
(privately and non-coercively), and the opportunity to engage in kindly discussion 
																																																						
396 I am aware of the debate among Muslim women as to whether or not the hijab is an 
appropriate religious symbol; regardless, it is a historical symbol of faith. 
397 “Seminole, Oklahoma Religion,” accessed March 17, 2016, 
http://www.bestplaces.net/religion/city/oklahoma/seminole. 
398 “Muslim Population Has Seen Dramatic Growth in Tulsa,” Tulsa World, accessed March 17, 
2016, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/religion/muslim-population-has-seen-dramatic-growth-
in-tulsa/article_876eb929-6780-5e79-91c7-b8d7d3f03a7f.html; “Snapshot,” accessed March 17, 
2016, http://okgazette.com/2015/04/10/islam-is-strong-growing-in-oklahoma/. 
	 187 
would have been present if Hearn was so inclined. School authorities, moreover, would 
not see their job as creating sameness, and would realize that they must recognize 
diversity and attend to the principles of NAS so that both civility and contestation had a 
place in the situation.  
 
Isaac, the “unnamed” child (2014) 
     As discussed earlier, I recently had a conversation with a colleague who is also a 
public school teacher (middle school). She recounted a situation in which some of her 
students – all Latinos – had been told they could no longer wear their rosaries. The 
school principal cited the excuse of gang wear, instructing them to remove the rosaries, 
which were, for the students, symbols of their Catholic faith and identity. To simplify 
matters, we will refer to these students simply as “Isaac.” The principal’s instruction is 
clearly unconstitutional for the school is not promoting religion nor excessive 
entanglement; the rosary is Isaac’s own silent statement of faith. It may be protected by 
free speech as well as by free exercise. Beyond the constitutional objections, however, a 
commitment to NAS would quickly solve this situation and protect Isaac’s identity at 
the same time. Acknowledging the commons, the validity of identity and experience, 
and the sincere protestations of Isaac that the rosary was a symbol of his faith and not a 
gang symbol, the Principal would have little choice to relent. Moreover, my friend 
would have the resources and support needed to challenge the Principal if it was 
necessary. And, in the spirit of openness and contestation, multiple conversations 
among the students could have taken place so that all learned from the situation.   
     These are just a few examples of real life situations in which NAS could have played 
a part. In each, the outcome would have been much more tenable with the ethos of 
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education and democracy. Some lawsuits could have been avoided, but beyond that the 
fabric of the community – be it a school or a larger community – could have been saved 
from tears that eventually, if left unhealed, lead to disintegration.  
 
Conclusion 
     Like its older version, the New American Settlement is not a neat package that can 
be easily and tidily applied. But, it does offer a solution for the century-long debate 
about religion in the public school and the issues we face with the polarization of 
society and the increase of religious diversity. NAS is built on the principles of the old 
settlement – contestation and openness, which lead to democratic compromise – but it 
goes beyond them, for a more fluid and yet deeper solution is necessary given the more 
complicated challenges we face. NAS is grounded in the idea of the commons – that all 
are members and thus all have value. NAS embraces the idea that, as members of the 
commons, we are all in relationship in some way – directly or indirectly – and that 
everyone impacts everyone else. The well-being of one contributes to the well-being of 
all, and the reverse is also true. Kindness is modes operandi of NAS; it is more 
complete than care, and suggests compassion along with the final component of NAS, 
kenotic mutuality. This kind of mutuality implies that in order to make room for one 
another there must be give and take, and sometimes there must be self-sacrifice or a 
giving up of certain expressions in order to allow others the opportunity to thrive. NAS 
does not suggest that all beliefs or opinions are equally valid or useful in cultivating a 
better society, but by creating this kind of framework, even things that do not serve the 
good can at least have a chance to be seen, heard, debated, and contested. NAS is not a 
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neat checklist of things to do; rather, it is a way of living. But, that is what education is 























VI. Concluding Thoughts – Climate Control, Relationship & the New 
American Settlement 
 
“The real role of leadership in education…is not, and should not be, ‘command and 
control’; the real role of leadership is ‘climate control.’” – Sir Ken Robinson399 
 
 
     In his now classic Ted Talk – viewed by an estimated 250 million people – 
educational scholar and activist Ken Robinson gives a lucid and inspiring examination 
of what he calls education’s “death valley” and what can be done about it.400 Robinson 
tells the story about Death Valley, California, the driest and hottest spot in the United 
States. It is called Death Valley, he says, because nothing can grow or live there, for it 
has no rain.401 But, one winter, the valley saw the unthinkable – seven inches of rain 
flooded the area over a short period of time. Nothing obvious changed in the valley 
right away as a result, but the following spring an apparent miracle occurred as flowers 
fleetingly blanketed the valley. The flowers did not come out of nowhere; the seeds 
were present all along, they simply needed the right conditions in which to flourish. 
Education is like that, Robinson argues; under the surface of all that seems to be wrong 
with American public schools lies the potential for learning to thrive. The potential is 
there because students and teachers are there, in all their diverse and varying forms, 
awaiting a change in climate so that flourishing is possible.402  
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     Robinson argues that there are three fundamental things about being human that 
American public schooling, particularly under the Federal program of No Child Left 
Behind (and, presumably, he would include Race to the Top were he to give the talk 
today), fails to take into account that is causing this “death valley” experience.403 The 
first is that “human beings are naturally different and diverse.”404 Standardized 
curriculum followed by an inordinate amount of standardized testing does not 
sufficiently address this phenomena – nor can it. For learning to take place, which is, for 
Robinson, the whole point of education, diversity within the classroom must be taken 
seriously and learning must be tailored toward the individual nature of students. Though 
he does not mention it, this is true for teachers as well – we are all different, with 
different capacities, identities, and interests. Second, children are naturally curious. 
Robinson remarks, “if you can light the spark of curiosity in a child” he or she will 
naturally learn. Sadly, the framework within which teachers and students have to go 
about the task of schooling often stifles curiosity.405 Finally, humanity is “inherently 
creative.” The process of living itself is creative; we imagine different alternatives and, 
to some degree at the very least, carve our lives out according to our creative powers 
and imagination. When those avenues are constricted by social structures of oppression 
or simply the lack of imagination, creativity lies dormant for all except the most 
rebellious or pioneering. Robinson notes that the teaching profession itself is a creative 
one, and that all too often, it is deprofessionalized in America as teachers become mere 
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test-givers and lack the authority to craft their own curriculum based on their expertise, 
experience, their sense of students’ capacities and interests, and the community in 
which they operate.406 According to Robinson, “one of the roles of education is to 
awaken and develop the powers of creativity.”407 But, how can this happen in a stifling 
environment that struggles under the weight of powerful committees who determine 
what should go on in the classroom without having any professional training in the area 
and with the endless pressure of excessive standardized testing? Though Robinson does 
not give a precise map of how to get out of this “death valley,” his observations are 
timely and delivered with clarity, and he also holds the teaching profession up – up to 
both its potential and to accountability. Teachers suffer under a heavy load, but without 
the efforts of teachers to embrace their own creativity and role as leaders and to engage 
with students from this perspective, it is unlikely that any but the occasional flower will 
bloom. 
     Robinson’s insights are useful for considering the benefits and difficulties with a 
New American Settlement. Indeed, one of the problems with NAS is feasibility; 
specifically, how can teachers take the time to consider, teach, and include the 
principles of NAS when they constantly struggle under the pressure of seemingly 
endless test-giving and rigid curriculum? Many of my colleagues in the public school 
system love the idea of more inclusivity in terms of religion, but in the next breath they 
say, “when do we possibly have time?” Their concerns are completely valid. Yet, as 





these struggles, and to a large degree, teachers are the only ones who can successfully 
lead the changes needed to create an environment in which students can flower. The 
point is less about how pragmatic it is to apply NAS under the current trends of public 
schooling; it is about transforming those very trends to include NAS and other elements 
of education that is so desperately needed in public schooling. 
     NAS fits naturally within Robinson’s observations. Human beings are diverse and 
different; their religious beliefs are a result of that, and impact such diversity. Indeed, it 
is not enough to say that there are different religions present in schools; rather, there are 
a myriad of different expressions of different religions in schools. Within the commons 
a plurality of dynamic and engaging beliefs exist – religious, non-religious, and all of 
those who cannot be completely defined as either one. For instance, consider the rise of 
the so-called “nones.” This is a sociological category that is intended to include people 
who are not affiliated with the major categories of religious beliefs or with a particular 
religious tradition.408 It can include Atheism and agnosticism, or the “spiritual but not 
religious.” But, consider those groups further, among Atheists, there are those who are 
staunchly anti-religion – often called the “New Atheists” because of their hardcore, 
fundamentalist-like intolerance for anything that appears to be related to religion.409 
There are also those who simply do not believe in the existence of a God or gods. This 
does not necessarily reject or condemn religion. In fact, some Christian theologians 
were accused of Atheism; they believed that God could not be a created being because 
to be so meant God was finite, thus God did not have existence in the sense that the rest 
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of the created world exists. Often, among young people, Atheism is a rejection on 
similar grounds and not a statement that religion has no value or that the universe is a 
ball of pure chaos. Agnosticism comes from the Greek term that means “unknown” or 
“unknowable;” in practice it may convey a shrug of the shoulders, an “I have no idea if 
God exists or not,” or it might mean that they believe Ultimate Reality is unknowable 
from finite expression. The category of “spiritual but not religious” is perhaps more 
troublesome – the “if it does not fit, put it here” category. When some people use this 
term, they indicate more precisely that they are unaffiliated with a particular institution 
or that they are “unchurched,” but not necessarily that they do not adhere to the broader 
beliefs of a particular religion. In the U.S. many Christians identity with “spiritual but 
not religious;” somewhat in a Jeffersonian manner, they believe what Jesus taught, they 
simply choose not to be part of a modern Christian church for various reasons (there are 
far too many reasons to recount here). “Spiritual but not religious” can also mean that 
someone believes there is something “more” – a universal presence/Ultimate Reality – 
and they choose to embark on practices that hone creativity and intuition but do not 
consider themselves affiliated beyond their that of a child of the universe. There are two 
primary difficulties with the category of “spiritual but not religious,” and both have to 
do with how it is identified or described. As a sociological classification, it is far too 
vague. As noted, it means different things to different people and, partly because its 
roots can be traced to myriad of historical traditions, such as Christianity, various pagan 
traditions, various uniquely American traditions, and modern approaches to spirituality 
from people like Deepak Chopra and Oprah Winfrey. The second issue is more 
disconcerting because, unlike a category that can be changed or clarified, it has to do 
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with a misunderstanding of what it means to be spiritual and what it means to be 
religious. The two are not exclusive of one another; quite the opposite. In most mystical 
traditions of the various world religions spirituality and religious experience are either 
one and the same or at least totally intertwined.410 Separating them out creates 
unnecessary compartmentalization and complexity where it does not exist and fails to 
see some of the complexity that does exist. Moreover, it pits religion against spiritualty, 
when the truth is that religion without robust spiritual understanding and practice is 
hardly worthy of the name. Thus, in the “nones” category alone there are a myriad of 
potential differences and immense diversity. This makes teaching about religion 
inherently complex and troublesome, and without a commitment to NAS such a task 
can alienate rather than educate. It is vital to step into a framework that allows for 
diversity and difference to become strengths rather than function to polarize through 
standardization and conformity.  
     In Robinson’s view, curiosity and creativity are also fundamental aspects of what it 
means to be human, however stifled they may be by systems and experiences designed 
in contradiction to them. NAS provides the principles and the framework for both to 
flourish, and, if children are naturally curious, then engaging in conversation about 
beliefs and identity is not something to be afraid of nor is it something that will take an 
exorbitant amount of effort or dangerously tread constitutional ground. I have noted that 
scholarship and legal precedent shows that our current system of public schooling has 
all but sanitized most schools of religious diversity; this is as true for schools that defy 
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the Supreme Court rulings and attempt to establish one religious position as it is for the 
more common secularist public school.411 Another way of putting this is that schools 
seek conformity, from their students and their teachers, which is also Robinson’s 
argument.412 Conformity stifles the natural aspects of what it means to be human in 
Robinson’s estimation: difference and diversity, curiosity, and creativity. NAS answers 
to those charges and claims that weaving its principles into school structures can help 
change all of that, for the same thing that is killing creativity in schools is also 
trampling upon an authentic commitment to religious liberty in the face of growing 
religious diversity.413  
 
Summary of the New American Settlement 
     New American Settlement is premised on four principles. These ideas are a 
convergence of secular educational thought and philosophy, articulated by thinkers such 
as John Dewey, Jane Roland Martin, Paulo Freire, Karen Warren, and Nel Noddings, 
and religious thought from a number of traditions. It is important to note that, just as not 
all educational thought is included in the process of NAS, neither is all religious 
thought. NAS pulls together some of the most useful theories and principles within 
various educational and religious traditions, but it does not in anyway claim to be 
exhaustive. There are probably many other ideas that could be useful. And, there are 
plenty that are not useful at all. I intentionally do not pull from the divisive aspects of 
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religious thinking because they are unhelpful; the point of NAS is to cultivate a 
framework that will allow diversity to flourish. That divisive thought will arise in an 
NAS environment is a given, but instead of being a polarizing force or being swept 
under the surface to fester as is likely to happen in a system of enforced conformity, 
NAS offers a way to address these ideas through contestation, debate and civility 
leading to compromise. The principles of NAS initially may seem idealistic, but this is 
not a problem either because they do not lack applicability. Ideals are important. 
Without them, we would have nothing for which to aim. Consider, for instance, the 
American Civil Rights Movement or the Suffragette movement in the U.S. and 
England: the grounding principles, the stuff that helped everyone sustain the daily 
struggle and danger, were ideals – ideals that all people have inherent dignity and 
should be included in democratic representation, free from binding bigotry and hatred 
that subverts yet another ideal, freedom. Our Bill of Rights is in part pragmatic, but it is 
also premised on ideals and grand ideas of what it means to be human: the right to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The soul of democracy is idealistic. Compromise is 
both an ideal and a practice. Ideals are only implausible when the willingness to put 
them into practice does not exist. Putting our noses to the grindstone can only be 
endured when we can also look up at the stars that give us reasons to move forward. 
Thus, NAS is full of ideals, but they are also applicable and well worth the struggle to 
put them into practice. Indeed, they are fundamental to good education and to what it 
means to cultivate good relationships – the heart of living together in a shared planet.  
     Borrowing from the concept of the common good and environmental theology from 
a number of traditions, NAS claims that schools and public life should be considered a 
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“commons.” The commons embodies the common good, but expands the ethical 
implications of it by suggesting that, living in a common space, all within the commons 
are impacted by everyone else. Suffering and thriving on the part of any member 
impacts every other member in some way, directly or indirectly. So, it is not sufficient 
to claim that the majority of citizens embrace a certain worldview and therefore all 
should conform; every member matters, and the act of sharing the commons means that 
all are influenced by everyone else. In practical terms, this means that students who 
hold religious or non-religious identities and that suffer marginalization in some manner 
because of them are not the only ones who lose something in the situation – all 
members of the commons either directly or indirectly are impacted by this 
miseducation. The commons is not only made up of members but of the events and 
experiences that create an atmosphere that either encourages flourishing and supports 
true learning or stifles it.  
     The nature of the commons is relationship. Following from Martin’s theory of 
education as encounter, this component of NAS goes further and is suggestive of 
another theory of education: education as relationship.414 Borrowing from First Nation 
thought about interrelationality, education as relationship notes that it is not only the 
encounters one has and that one is “yoked” to that are educative, but the relationships 
within which one exists that educate. In a certain sense, all encounters are educative (or 
mis-educative), for, within the commons, all encounters entail relationship. We come to 
know ourselves through our relationship to and through others; some of those 
relationships will be positive, others negative, others seemingly neutral. Regardless, 
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self-knowledge grows as our relationships with others grow; these “others” include 
other people, as well as the rest of the biotic world, Ultimate Realty/God, and even our 
inner self.415 However thoroughly we understand it, being human is all about being in 
relationship with and to others. In schools, relationships are vital components of 
learning. It is not so much if one will have relationships as it is the quality of those 
relationships. Within NAS, these relationships are not in isolation, but are part of the 
commons – the sense that we are all in some way connected with one another. It is, 
then, a sacred (not necessarily religious) trust to be in relationship; relationships matter 
for what they bring out in us, what they bring out in others, and what they cultivate in 
the school culture. 
     The third principle of NAS is a commitment to kindness. Woven from educational 
theories around care and care practices and from religious contributions to care, NAS 
embraces the idea of abundant kindness.416 Such kindness intentionally cultivates 
empathy and compassion, and it also highlights an important practice: that kindness is 
not only about what we give, but it is also about what we look for in others. Seeking 
kindness out in others is as important as acting with kindness; in fact, it is another way 
to act out kindness, for by seeking it in the other, we acknowledge their inherent dignity 
as well, regardless of our differences.  
     Such a practice of kindness leads into the fourth principle of NAS: kenotic 
mutuality. Adapting the religious concept of kenosis or self-emptying, this principle 
acknowledges that, at times, we are required to limit our own selves in order to live in 
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compassionate relationship with others. As teachers, kenotic mutuality is not only 
something we teach students, but something we model. Limiting ourselves – our 
opinions, even our discomfort with diversity – is an act of selfless caring for the other, 
who, by membership in the commons is related to us. In a sense, kenotic mutuality 
makes room for all to exist in the commons in spite of differences and diversity. Limits 
is antithetical to conformity, because it makes room for variation and different ways of 
being. Kenotic mutuality is necessary for compromise, a hallmark of democracy. 
Indeed, if the commons suggests that everything is on the table, and relationship 
acknowledges the impact that everyone’s beliefs and identity has for everyone else, 
kindness and kenotic mutuality help to dialogue through those things that encourage the 
commons to flourish, and then to place limits on those ideas that are not acceptable 
within a diverse populous like a school. Kenotic mutuality allows us to see what is 
there, and to discover its educational or miseducational capacity and value. And, it 
acknowledges that sometimes we must limit our own self-expression for the good of all, 
while at the same time, legitimizing it as part of our identity, for good or for ill. Kenotic 
mutuality, in the end, also recognizes that by giving of ourselves we are given a great 
gift in return – vibrant community, the capacity to care, and the opportunity to receive 
care from others. 
     NAS serves two overt purposes: 1) so that religion is a legitimate “live option” in 
public schools, even if religious observances are not permissible, and 2) so that we have 
a way to ethically and compassionately address the reality of both religious diversity 
and growing polarization between the religious right, religious left, and secularism.417 In 
																																																						
417 Nord, Does God Make a Difference?, 83. 
	 201 
order for religious liberty to be taken seriously, as our Constitution demands, religion 
must be a “live option” or a legitimate contender in an atmosphere of openness and 
contestation.418 Marginalizing student religious identities while in school, however 
inadvertently, is a gross injustice, and so is establishing a singular orthodoxy of belief in 
a country that is deeply diverse. This does not mean that all beliefs contribute to 
flourishing. Indeed, it is hard to defend movements like the Klu Klux Klan on any 
grounds. But, as Martin rightly points out, unless we broaden our understanding of what 
education is, educational agents – and miseducational ones – go unnoticed, though they 
continue to impact.419 So, too, do religious ideas and ideas about religion. When 
religion is a live option, sentiments that are dangerous, either towards religion or from a 
religious perspective, can be attended to by thoughtful educators.    
 
Tasked with Climate Control 
     Robinson sympathizes greatly with public school teachers; indeed, much of his 
audience for his Ted Talk on the “death valley” of education appeared to be made up of 
teachers. Teachers, he notes, are the “life blood” of successful schools.420 Parker Palmer 
goes further and says that “the teacher is a mediator between the knower and the known, 
between the learner and the subject to be learned. A teacher, not some theory, is the 
living link in the epistemological chain.”421 Teaching is a creative task, and it is also a 
sacred one, for teachers are tasked with the helping to form young people into what they 
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will become for the rest of their lives. It is an incredible opportunity, and an immense 
responsibility. We have all known marvelous teachers – some of them stick around and 
deal with the system the best they know how, others leave and pursue others ways of 
educating as they are called. A system such as ours, however, makes it difficult to be a 
great teacher even for those who are naturally inclined that way, and those to whom 
teaching does not come naturally often cannot receive the mentorship or guidance 
needed to cultivate their capacity for good teaching. Yet, for better or for worse, it is up 
to teachers to be about the task of “climate control.”  
     For NAS to be truly successful, it needs to be embraced system-wide, from the top-
down legislative and administrative levels, and from the ground up by teachers, parents 
and students. James Davidson Hunter makes the argument that change happens 
primarily at the level of ruling elites.422 The majority can try to create change in society, 
but it only firmly takes root if the ruling elites wish it to be so, for they control the 
capacity to make law and back decisions with the resources to put them into practice. 
His theory explains a number of things, including the phenomena of major social 
changes that happen in spite of the fact that they have little traction with ordinary 
citizens.423 At the same time, grass roots movements have power too; perhaps 
sometimes it is only the power to get the ruling elites to do something about a given 
situation, but they can certainly spark changes. Consider again the American Civil 
Rights Movement: the faces we remember are those everyday-looking Americans 
captured on film as they marched the streets for freedom. Places like Myles Horton’s 
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Highlander School and Jane Addams’ Hull House provided training for ordinary 
citizens to have voice and to raise awareness about injustices.424 So, even though 
teachers need the support of their immediate administrative supervisors, and districts 
need the support of legislative bodies, changing the curriculum to reflect the principles 
of NAS is absolutely possible one classroom at a time. These principles are, 
fundamentally, part of good teaching. They are part of what it means to be a dynamic 
and compassionate educator who helps students “learn to live.”425 Competent schooling 
is more than just learning about subjects, it is more than testing adequately in science 
and math; it is about the common school culture, about being in relationship and 
learning from and through those relationships, and it is about cultivating the character to 
show and look for kindness, to embrace kenotic mutuality, and to permit differences 
even when one is opposed to them. As those who are tasked with “climate control” it is 
up to teachers – despite the odds against them – to practice educative principles that can 
transform schooling itself, though it be a mighty struggle at times. For, ultimately, it is 
not about us, it is about the children – children we are privileged enough to help guide 
and to whom we owe a more just, more loving, and more flourishing. 
 
Our Relationships 
     As I write this final chapter, the world is in the midst of yet another crisis, this time 
strategized terrorist attacks on Brussels.426 Again, the attacks seem to be the work of 
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militants using religion as an excuse – radicalized Muslims to whom most Muslims 
would deny the title.427 Suicide bombers are among their weapons, but as dangerous are 
the weapons of insidious fear they inspire. How can anyone be convinced to do such a 
thing? Is there no end to the insanity that can grip a person, a group? Will the terror 
keep expanding beyond borders so that no one feels safe; will it ever end? There are 
many dangers here beyond the obvious, and although the lives lost and the families who 
mourn them are those with the most grief to bear, the world suffers with them. 
Whatever else these and other attacks say about international relations and politics, it is 
clear that the complexities of responding to religiously articulated extremism is not 
going away anytime soon. In light of these and other events, teachers must be able to 
respond in the classroom – to questions and concerns of students related to the attacks, 
yes, but also to the fear and intolerance that breeds fearful and intolerant responses. The 
attackers are not nameless monsters out of some science fiction novel; they are real 
human beings who went dangerously astray at some point during their own personal 
formation. For educators, this should give us pause to reflect on our own capacity to 
say, “not in my classroom.” That is not to say that one educator can prevent the 
psychological spiral of a person that leads to extremism; but cultures in which such 
things can grow and out of which hatred can respond are but a collective of 
relationships, encounters, and miseducative experiences. For the safety of the future we 
must take religious identity seriously in our schools.  
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     If education is partly, at least, about being in relationship and the dynamic push and 
pull of identity development through those relationships, then there is natural “spill 
over” from schooling. NAS is developed with public schools in mind, but it need not 
stop there; it is, in fact, a way in which the public commons can address religious 
diversity and polarization. On a small scale consider an example from a completely 
different source: animal welfare. There are many rescue groups across the country who 
have embraced education as a strategy for trying to bring awareness to animal welfare. 
They give talks in schools, introduce children to animals, teach them how to interact 
with dogs and the like. There is natural spill-over from this, much like riverbank 
overflowing. A child comes home from such an educative experience and sees her 
father kick the dog and immediately protests. Perhaps it is the first time the father sees 
he is taking his temper out on a live creature. Perhaps another child goes home and asks 
if their lovable pooch has been spayed; the parents may have never thought of it, but 
they do now. There is natural spill-over from all educational encounters by virtue of 
humans being relational creatures. So, too, where NAS is interwoven into the school 
culture, the kind of depth and capacity to engage with difference that embraces civility 
– even if one cannot develop respect for the particular difference – will flow from 
school to home, from home to other forms of relationships and public engagement.  
     Part of such engagement should also be with people and groups of community 
stakeholders who are members of various religious or non-religious groups. 
Communities of faith can help support the development of NAS within schools by 
lobbying school boards and legislative bodies to take religious liberty seriously, and 
they need not do so from a sectarian perspective or as a way of showing the superiority 
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of any particular tradition over another, but as a way to lend support to teachers and 
cultivate a public commons that makes room for us all, that subvert that which would 
diminish life not by marginalizing it but by shining a light on it. They can also be 
available for the kind of educative presentations that are done so well by the animal 
welfare activists in our example. 
     Another example might be illustrative at this point. In their book Slow Democracy: 
Rediscovering Community, Bringing Decision Making Back Home, Susan Clark and 
Woden Teachout describe an experiment in the city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 
which city officials partnered with the local middle school, including teachers, students, 
and parents, in order to see if they could discover a solution to the current problems of 
drugs and violence in schools.428 They embraced the method of “study circles” in which 
students actively participated along with parents, teachers, and other concerned 
community members. Organizers gave each group specific questions to dialogue about 
and encouraged participants to get to know one another during the discussions. Students 
were heartened to learn that the adults in their circle still struggled with many of the 
things that concern young people – embarrassment, fears and nerves, etc. They met for 
five weeks and concluded by presenting findings that ultimately were presented to the 
city council and school board.429 To the surprise of many adults, the dominant problems 
appeared not to be overt violence or drugs but bullying in school.430 In all likelihood, 
the city council would never have adequately addressed the issues these students faced 
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without including them – and others – in a conscientious dialogue. This model is 
instructive and easily adapted to NAS, which itself lays the groundwork necessary for 
open, honest, and interactive dialogue. Dialogue circles may, indeed, be the simplest 
way to begin the work of NAS within schools, using religious diversity and political 
polarization over religious matters as the topic of genuine conversation. 
     The famous child psychologist, Robert Coles, studied the “spiritual life” of children, 
noticing through decades of individual encounters with kids that young souls are as 
eager to embark on the journey of discovery as any adult.431 Indeed, they are perhaps 
more adventurous, less likely to allow fear to keep them from such a journey. As Coles 
puts it, they are pilgrims: “how young we are when we start wondering about it all, the 
nature of the journey and of the final destination.”432 The New American Settlement is 
also a journey, a kind of pilgrimage toward flourishing democracy. As such, it has 
guiding principles, but not rigid signposts, no standardized measurements, and no 
authoritative destination. It is about the task of protecting our First Amendment right to 
religious liberty, but, at its depth it is about so much more. Were we to embrace this 
journey, it is about developing the capacity to be fully human, to walk with one another 
despite our differences, and, if we are really lucky, to see that those differences are not a 
disadvantage at all but the stuff from which a great symphony of discovery and learning 







431 Robert Coles, The Spiritual Life of Children, Reprint edition (Boston: Mariner Books, 1991). 




10 Questions for the Dalai Lama. MONTEREY VIDEO, 2007. 
	
Abdelkader, Engy. “Muslim Women, Religious Freedom, and EEOC v. Abercrombie.” 





Abes, Elisa S, Susan R Jones, and McEwen, Marylu K. “Reconceptualizing the Model 
of Multiple Dimensions of Identity: The Role of Meaning-Making Capacity in 
the Construction of Multiple Identities.” Journal of College Student 
Development 48, no. 1 (February 2007): 1–22. 
	
Addams, Jane. Twenty Years at Hull-House. Unabridged edition. CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, 2013. 
	
Alcott, Louisa May. Little Women. New York: Bantam Classics, 1983. 
	
Anderson, Melinda D. “The Misplaced Fear of Religion in Classrooms.” The Atlantic, 
October 19, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/the-
misplaced-fear-of-religion-in-classrooms/411094/. 
	
Armstrong, Karen. A Short History of Myth. 1st edition. Edinburgh ; New York: 
Canongate U.S., 2005. 
	
———. Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence. 1st Edition edition. New 
York: Knopf, 2014. 
	
———. The Battle for God. New York: Ballantine Books, 2001. 
	
Badawi, Jamal. “Love: An Islamic Perspective.” The Fiqh Council of North America. 
Accessed March 9, 2016. http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/node/15. 
	
Barry, John M. Roger Williams and the Creation of the American Soul: Church, State, 
and the Birth of Liberty. New York: Penguin Books, 2012. 
	
Bates, Stephen. Battleground: One Mother’s Crusade, the Religious Right, and the 
Struggle for Control of Our Classrooms. New York, N.Y: Poseidon Press, 1993. 
	
Berger, Peter L., ed. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World 




———. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Reprint 
edition. New York: Anchor, 1990. 
	
Berg, Thomas. “Disestablishment from Blain to Everson: Federalism, School Wars, and 
the Emerging Modern State.” In No Establishment of Religion: America’s 
Original Contribution to Religious Liberty, edited by T. Jeremy Gunn and John 
Witte, Jr., 307–40. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
	
Blaisdell, Bob, ed. Great Speeches by Native Americans. First Edition edition. Mineola, 
N.Y: Dover Publications, 2000. 
	
Blumberg, Antonia. “North Carolina High School Denies Student Secular Club.” The 




Bohm, David, and Peter Garrett. “Dialogue- A Proposal,” 1991. http://www.david-
bohm.net/dialogue/dialogue_proposal.html. 
	
Bradford, Sarah. Harriet Tubman: The Moses of Her People. Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 2004. 
	
Brown, Brene. Daring Greatly: How the Courage to Be Vulnerable Transforms the Way 
We Live, Love, Parent, and Lead. 1 edition. New York, NY: Gotham, 2012. 
	
Bruce, Steve. God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. 1 edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2002. 
	
“Brussels Attacks: Zaventem and Maelbeek Bombs Kill Many.” BBC News. Accessed 
March 23, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869254. 
	
Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal. Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Academic, 
2009. 
	
Campbell, Joseph. The Hero with a Thousand Faces. Third edition. Novato, Calif: New 
World Library, 2008. 
	
Cantwell v. Connecticut, (United States Supreme Court 1940). 
	
Carter, Jimmy. A Call to Action: Women, Religion, Violence, and Power. Reprint 
edition. Simon & Schuster, 2015. 
	
Clark, Susan, and Woden Teachout. Slow Democracy: Rediscovering Community, 
Bringing Decision Making Back Home. 10.2.2012 edition. White River Junction, 
Vt: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2012. 
	
	 210 
Cobb, John B. Sustainability: Economics, Ecology, and Justice. Eugene, Or.: Wipf & 
Stock, 2007. 
	
Cobb, John B., Jr., ed. Progressive Christians Speak: A Different Voice on Faith and 
Politics. 1st Printing edition. Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2003. 
	
Coles, Robert. The Spiritual Life of Children. Reprint edition. Boston: Mariner Books, 
1991. 
	
Coogan, Michael D., ed. Eastern Religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, 
Confucianism, Shinto. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
	
Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. Reprint edition. Boston: Mariner Books, 2008. 
	
Dewey, John. A Common Faith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. 
	
———. Art as Experience. New York: Berkley Pub. Group, 2005. 
	
———. Democracy and Education. Radford, Virginia: Wilder Publications, 2009. 
	
———. Experience and Education. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997. 
	
———. My Pedagogic Creed. Amazon Digital Services, LLC, 2013. 
	
Dickinson, Emily. The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson. Edited by Thomas H. 
Johnson. Boston: Back Bay Books, 1976. 
	
Douglass, Frederick. Frederick Douglass on Slavery and the Civil War: Selections from 
His Writings. Mineola, N.Y: Dover Publications, 2003. 
	
Dubuisson, Daniel. The Western Construction of Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and 
Ideology. Translated by William Sayers. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007. 
	
Easwaran, Eknath. God Makes the Rivers To Flow: Sacred Literature of the World. 3rd 
edition. Tomales, Calif.: Nilgiri Press, 2003. 
	
Eck, Diana L. A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the 
World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation. 1 Reprint edition. San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 2002. 
	
———. Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously: Spiritual Politics on America’s Sacred 
Ground. Edited by Barbara A. McGraw and Jo Renee Formicola. Waco, Tex: 
Baylor University Press, 2005. 
	 211 
	
Education, Massachusetts Board of. Annual Report of the Board of Education, 1849. 
	
Edwards v. Aguillard, (United States Supreme Court 1987). 
	
Eisler, Riane. “Tomorrow’s Children: Education for a Partnership World.” In Holistic 
Learning And Spirituality In Education: Breaking New Ground, 47–68. New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2005. 
	
Eisler, Riane, and Ron Miller, eds. Educating for a Culture of Peace. Portsmouth, NH: 
Heinemann, 2004. 
	
Engel v. Vitale, (United States Supreme Court 1962). 
	
Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, (United States Supreme 
Court 1947). 
	
Following the Equator: A Journey Around the World. Revised ed. edition. New York: 
Dover Publications, 1989. 
	
Fowler, Robert Booth, Allen D. Hertzke, Laura R. Olson, and Kevin R. Den Dulk. 
Religion and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices. Fifth 
Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2013. 
	
Fraser, James W. Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a 
Multicultural America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2000. 
	
Freire, Paulo, and Richard Shaull. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Translated by Myra 
Bergman Ramos. 2nd edition. London; New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1996. 
	
Freud, Sigmund, and Peter Gay. Civilization and Its Discontents. Translated by James 
Strachey. The Standard Edition edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1989. 
	
———. The Future of an Illusion. Edited by James Strachey. 1 edition. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1989. 
	
Friedman, Thomas L. Hot, Flat, & Crowded Why We Need a Green Revolution & How 
It Can Renew America. 1 edition. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. 
	
Fröbel, Friedrich. Froebel’s Chief Writings on Education. University of California 
Libraries, 1912. 
	
Gaustad, Edwin S. Sworn on the Altar of God: A Religious Biography of Thomas 
Jefferson. 2nd edition. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996. 
	 212 
Gebara, Ivone. Longing for Running Water: Ecofeminism and Liberation. Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 1999. 
	
Ginzberg, Lori D. Elizabeth Cady Stanton: An American Life. First Edition edition. 
New York: Hill and Wang, 2009. 
	
God in America. PBS, 2010. 
	
Goldberg, Kirsten. “Federal Court Finds Secular Humanism a Religion.” Education 
Week, March 11, 1987, online edition. 
	
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, (Supreme Court of the United States 
2001). 
	
Gordon, Sarah Barringer. The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution 
in Modern America. 1 edition. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2010. 
	
Gore, Al. An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and 
What We Can Do About It. FIfth Edition. Emmaus, Pa: Rodale Books, 2006. 
	
Greene, Maxine. The Public School and the Private Vision: A Search for America in 
Education and Literature. New York: The New Press, 2007. 
	
Green, John C. The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections. 1 
edition. Washington, D.C: Potomac Books Inc., 2010. 
	
Green, Steven K. The Bible, the School, and the Constitution: The Clash That Shaped 
Modern Church-State Doctrine. Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2012. 
	
Gregory, Eric. “America and the Church: Introduction.” In An Eerdmans Reader in 
Contemporary Political Theology, edited by William T. Cavanaugh, Jeffrey W. 
Bailey, and Craig Hovey, First Edition edition., 217–22. Grand Rapids, Mich: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2011. 
	
Grim, Brian J., and Roger Finke. The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution 
and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
	
Gunn, T. Jeremy, Witte, John. No Establishment of Religion: America’s Original 
Contribution to Religious Liberty. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
	
Gyatso, Geshe Kelsang. Introduction to Buddhism: An Explanation of the Buddhist Way 
of Life. 2nd edition. Glen Spey, N.Y: Tharpa Publications, 2008. 
	 213 
Hackett, Conrad, and Brian J. Grim. “The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the 
Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010.” Pew-
Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, December 2012. 
	
Haney, Kimberly Giaudrone, Joy Thomas, and Courtney Vaughn. “Identity Border 
Crossings Within School Communities, Precursors to Restorative Conferencing: 
A Symbolic Interactionist Study.” The School Community Journal 21, no. 2 
(2011): 55–80. 
	
Harris, Amy Julia. “Here’s One Way Churches Are Getting Religion into Public 
Schools.” Reveal, April 1, 2015. https://www.revealnews.org/article/heres-one-
way-churches-are-getting-religion-into-public-schools/. 
	
Harris, Sam. The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason. Reprint 
edition. New York: W. W. Norton, 2005. 
	
Hart, John. Sacramental Commons Christian Ecological Ethics. Lanham, Md.: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2006. 
	
Haynes, Charles C. “A Teacher’s Guide to Religion in the Public Schools.” Nashville, 




———. “Religious Liberty in Public Schools.” In Religious Freedom in America: 
Constitutional Roots and Contemporary Challenges, edited by Allen D Hertzke, 
117–31. Studies in American Constitutional Heritage. Norman, OK: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2015. 
	
Haynes, Charles C, Oliver Thomas, Ph.D, and Christy Jerding. Finding Common 
Ground: A Guide to Religious Liberty in Public Schools. 2011 First Amendment 
Center edition. Nashville, TN: First Amendment Center, 2007. 
	
Heldman, Caroline. “Sexual Objectification (Part 1): What Is It? - Sociological 




Heldman, Caroline, and Michael Cahill. “The Beast of Beauty Culture: An Analysis of 
the Political Effects of Self-Objectification,” 1–39. Las Vegas, 2007. 
	
Herberg, Will, and Neil Gillman. Judaism and Modern Man: An Interpretation of 
Jewish Religion. Reprint edition. Woodstock, Vt: Jewish Lights Publishing, 
1997. 
	 214 
Hertzke, Allen D. “Religious Freedom in the American Constitutional Heritage: Gloabl 
Impact and Emerging Challenges.” presented at the Institute for the American 
Constitutional Heritage, September 7, 2011. 
	
———. , ed. The Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges. Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
	
Hook, Sidney. “Introduction.” In The Middle Works of John Dewey, Volume 9, 1899-
1924: Democracy and Education 1916, edited by Jo Ann Boydston. SIU Press, 
2008. 
	
Horton, Myles, and Judith and Herbert Kohl. The Long Haul: An Autobiography. First 
Edition edition. New York: Teachers College Press, 1997. 
	
Hunter, James Davison. To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of 
Christianity in the Late Modern World. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
	
Hunter, James Davison, and Alan Wolfe. Is There a Culture War?: A Dialogue on 
Values and American Public Life. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006. 
	
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. 
	
IFYC. “Build Pluralism on Campus.” IFYC. Accessed March 16, 2016. 
https://www.ifyc.org/campus-staff. 
	
———. “Our Movement. Our Stories. Our Leaders.” IFYC. Accessed March 16, 2016. 
https://www.ifyc.org/student-as-leaders. 
	
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District (No. 71, Champaign 
County, Illinois), (United States Supreme Court 1948). 
	
Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. “Conceptual Models in the Study of Religion.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, Reprint edition., 245–62. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
	
Johnson, Elizabeth A. Abounding in Kindness: Writing for the People of God. 
Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2015. 
	
———. She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse. New 
York: Crossroad, 2002. 
	
Johnson, Phillip E., and John Mark Reynolds. Against All Gods: What’s Right and 
Wrong About the New Atheism. Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Books, 2010. 
	 215 
Juniper, Tony. Saving Planet Earth. London: Harper, 2007. 
	
Knowlton, Brian. “U.S. Takes Opposite Tack from France in Head Scarf Debate.” The 
New York Times, April 3, 2004, sec. News. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/03/news/03iht-scarf.html. 
	
Kohn, Alfie. What Does It Mean to Be Well Educated? And More Essays on Standards, 
Grading, and Other Follies. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 2004. 
	
Kozol, Jonathan. Ordinary Resurrections. 1 edition. New York: Crown, 2000. 
	
Kuru, Ahmet T. “Assertive and Passive Secularism: State Neutrality, Religious 
Demography, and the Muslim Minority in the United States.” In The Future of 
Religious Freedom: Global Challenges, edited by Allen D. Hertzke, 235–55. 
New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
	
———. Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and 
Turkey. 1 edition. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
	
Lanza, Robert, and Bob Berman. Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness Are the 
Keys to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe. 1 edition. Dallas, Tex.: 
BenBella Books, 2010. 
	
Laozi, Jane English, and Gia-fu Feng. Tao Te Ching. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. 
	
LaPlante, Eve. American Jezebel: The Uncommon Life of Anne Hutchinson, the Woman 
Who Defied the Puritans. Reprint edition. New York, NY: HarperOne, 2005. 
	
Laugesen, Wayne. “Rosary Ban in Colorado School Sparks Controversy.” National 
Catholic Register. Accessed July 9, 2015. http://www.ncregister.com/daily-
news/rosary-ban-in-colorado-school-sparks-controversy/. 
	
Lee, Jesse. “Nashala’s Story.” The White House Blog, June 4, 2009. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/06/04/nashalas-story. 
	
Lee v. Weisman, (United States Supreme Court 1992). 
	
Lemon v. Kurtzman, (United States Supreme Court 1971). 
	
Lorenze, Edward N. The Essence of Chaos. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1993. 
	
Maitland Werner, Leslie. “Education; Religion Lack in Texts Cited.” The New York 
Times, June 3, 1986, U.S. edition. 
	
	 216 
Making a Way Out of No Way: Martin Luther King’s Sermonic Proverbial Rhetoric. 
First printing edition. New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 2010. 
	
Malamuth, Neil M., and James V.P. Check. “The Effects of Mass Media Exposure on 
Acceptance of Violence against Women: A Field Experiment.” Journal of 
Research in Personality, no. 15 (1981): 436–46. 
	
Marsden, George M. Fundamentalism and American Culture. 2nd edition. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. 
	
Martin, David. A General Theory of Secularization. 1st Harper Colophon Edition,1978 
edition. New York: Harper & Row, 1978. 
	
Martin, Jane Roland. Cultural Miseducation: In Search of a Democratic Solution. New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2002. 
	
———. Educational Metamorphoses: Philosophical Reflections on Identity and 
Culture. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. 
	
———. Education Reconfigured: Culture, Encounter, and Change. New York: 
Routledge, 2011. 
	
———. The Schoolhome: Rethinking Schools for Changing Families. Reprint edition. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
	
Martin, Robert R., and Roger Finke. “Defining and Redefining Religious Freedom: A 
Quantitative Assessment of Free Exercise Cases in the U.S. State Courts, 1981-
2011.” In Religious Freedom in America: Constitutional Roots and 
Contemporary Challenges, edited by Allen D. Hertzke, 91–116. Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2015. 
	
Marty, Martin E. Education, Religion, and the Common Good: Advancing a Distinctly 
American Conversation About Religion’s Role in Our Shared Life. 1 edition. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000. 
	
Masuzawa, Tomoko. The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. Chicago: University 
Of Chicago Press, 2005. 
	
McConnell, Michael. “Establishment at the Founding.” In No Establishment of 
Religion: America’s Original Contribution to Religious Liberty, edited by T. 
Jeremy Gunn and John Witte, Jr., 45–69. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
	
McFague, Sallie. A New Climate for Theology: God, the World, and Global Warming. 
Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 2008. 
	 217 
———. Blessed Are the Consumers: Climate Change and the Practice of Restraint. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. 
	
———. Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1982. 
	
———. “Sermon for Epiphany Chapel.” Vancouver, 2008. 
	
———. The Body of God: An Ecological Theology. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993. 
	
McGarvie, Mark D. “Disestablishing Religion and Protecting Religious Liberty in State 
Laws and Constitutions (1776-1833).” In No Establishment of Religion: 
America’s Original Contribution to Religious Liberty, edited by T. Jeremy Gunn 
and John Witte, Jr., 70–99. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
	
Meyerson, Michael I. Endowed by Our Creator: The Birth of Religious Freedom in 
America. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. 
	
Micklethwait, John, and Adrian Wooldridge. God Is Back: How the Global Revival of 
Faith Is Changing the World. Reprint edition. New York: Penguin Books, 2010. 
	
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, (United States Supreme Court 1940). 
	
Moe-Lobeda, Cynthia D. Resisting Structural Evil: Love as Ecological-Economic 
Vocation. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013. 
	
Montessori, Maria. The Absorbent Mind. Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2009. 
	
Moore, Thelma, and Carolyn Durling. Whispers on the Winds: Messages of Wisdom 
from the Ancients. S.l.: Strategic Book Publishing, 2012. 
	
Morken, Hubert, and Jo Renee Formicola. The Politics of School Choice. First Edition 
edition. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 
	
Munoz, Vincent Phillip. Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court: The 
Essential Cases and Documents. 1 edition. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2013. 
	
“Muslim Population Has Seen Dramatic Growth in Tulsa.” Tulsa World. Accessed 




Neeley, Devin. “Farmington Schools: Rosaries ‘Innapropriate’ at School, against Dress 
Code.” KOB Eyewitness News 4. April 29, 2015, online edition. 
http://www.kob.com/article/stories/s3781418.shtml#.VZ7hGGC4lcA. 
	 218 
Neusner, Jacob, ed. World Religions in America, Fourth Edition: An Introduction. 4 
edition. Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009. 
	
Newell, Philip. The Rebirthing of God: Christianity’s Struggle for New Beginnings. 1 
edition. Woodstock, Vermont: SkyLight Paths Publishing, 2014. 
	
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Nietzsche: Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Edited by Robert Pippin. 
Translated by Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006. 
	
Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Univ of 
California Press, 2013. 
	
———. Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief. New York: Teachers College 
Press, 1993. 
	
———. Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education. New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2002. 
	
———. Education and Democracy in the 21st Century. New York: Teachers College 
Press, 2013. 
	
———. The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education, 
Second Edition. 2 edition. New York: Teachers College Press, 2005. 
	
Nongbri, Brent. Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept. Reprint edition. New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2015. 
	
Nord, Warren A. Does God Make a Difference?: Taking Religion Seriously in Our 
Schools and Universities. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
	
———. Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma. 1st New 
edition edition. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995. 
	
Nord, Warren A, and Charles C Haynes. Taking Religion Seriously Across the 
Curriculum. First edition. edition. Alexandria, Va. : Nashville, Tenn: 
Association for Supervision & Curriculum Development, 1998. 
	
“N.Y. Teen Suspended for Wearing Rosary Sues School | First Amendment Center – 
News, Commentary, Analysis on Free Speech, Press, Religion, Assembly, 
Petition.” Accessed July 9, 2015. http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/n-y-
teen-suspended-for-wearing-rosary-sues-school. 
	
“Obergefell v. Hodges.” SCOTUSblog. Accessed July 9, 2015. 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/. 
	 219 




Palmer, Parker J. The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher’s 
Life. 1 edition. Jossey-Bass, 2009. 
	
———. To Know as We Are Known: Education as a Spiritual Journey. Reprint edition. 
San Francisco: HarperOne, 1993. 
	
Patel, Eboo. Acts of Faith: The Story of an American Muslim, the Struggle for the Soul 
of a Generation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2010. 
	
———. Sacred Ground: Pluralism, Prejudice, and the Promise of America, 2013. 
	
Philpott, Daniel. Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
	
“President’s Campus Challenge | Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships.” Accessed March 16, 2016. http://sites.ed.gov/fbnp/presidents-
campus-challenge/. 
	
Prothero, Stephen. God Is Not One The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World and 
Why Their Differences Matter. Harper,2010, n.d. 
	
———. Religious Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know--and Doesn’t. New 
York, N.Y.: HarperOne, 2008. 
	
———. Why Liberals Win the Culture Wars (Even When They Lose Elections): The 
Battles That Define America from Jefferson’s Heresies to Gay Marriage. San 
Francisco: HarperOne, 2016. 
	
Pui-lan, Kwok. Globalization, Gender, and Peacebuilding: The Future of Interfaith 
Dialogue. New York: Paulist Press, 2012. 
	
Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. American Grace: How Religion Divides 
and Unites Us. First Edition edition. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. 
	
Ravitch, Diane. Reign of Error: The Hoax of the Privatization Movement and the 
Danger to America’s Public Schools, 2013. 
	
Reilly, Mollie. “School Prayer Measure Gets Push From Democrats.” The Huffington 








Religious Pluralism in America: The Contentious History of a Founding Ideal. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 
	
Rieger, Joerg, and Pui-lan Kwok. Occupy Religion: Theology of the Multitude. Reprint 
edition. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013. 
	
Riemer, Neal. “Madison: A Founder’s Vision.” In Religion, Public Life, and the 
American Polity, edited by Luis E. Lugo, 37–50. Univ of Tennessee Pr, 1995. 
	
Rifkin, Jeremy. “RSA ANIMATE: The Empathic Civilisation - YouTube.” Accessed 
March 29, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7AWnfFRc7g. 
	
———. The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in 
Crisis. New York: J.P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2009. 
	
———. The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in 
Crisis. First Edition edition. New York: TarcherPerigee, 2009. 
	
“Rising Tide of Restrictions on Religion.” Washington, D.C: The Pew Forum on 
Religion & Public Life, 2012. 
	








Rosenstein, Jay. The Lord Is Not On Trial Here Today. Documentary, 2010. 
	
Sanchez, Carol Lee. “Animal, Vegetable, and Mineral.” In Ecofeminism and the Sacred, 
207–28. New York: Continuum, 1993. 
	
School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, (United States 
Supreme Court 1963). 
	
Scott, Alwyn. The Nonlinear Universe: Chaos, Emergence, Life. 2007 edition. 
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2007. 
	
	 221 
Seiple, Chris, and Dennis R. Hoover. “Religious Freedom and Global Security.” In The 
Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges, 315–30. New York, N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
	
“Seminole, Oklahoma Religion.” Accessed March 17, 2016. 
http://www.bestplaces.net/religion/city/oklahoma/seminole. 
	
Shange, Ntozake. Sassafrass, Cypress & Indigo: A Novel. St. Martin’s Griffin, 2010. 
	
“Sir Ken Robinson’s Original Talk on TED Talks Education | PBS.” TED Talks 
Education. Accessed March 22, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ted-talks-
education/speaker/ken-robinson/. 
	
Smith, Huston. The World’s Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions. Rev Rep edition. 
San Francisco: HarperOne, 1991. 
	
———. Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of Disbelief. 
New York, N.Y.: HarperCollins, 2001. 
	
Smith, Steven D. Foreordained Failure the Quest for a Constitutional Principle of 
Religious Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
	
———. The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom, 2014. 
	
———. The Rise and Decline of American Religious Freedom. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
	
“Snapshot.” Accessed March 17, 2016. http://okgazette.com/2015/04/10/islam-is-
strong-growing-in-oklahoma/. 
	
Soroush, Abdolkarim. Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings 
of Abdolkarim Soroush. Translated by Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri. New 
York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
	
Stevenson, Kelly, Meghan Keneally, Lee Ferran, and Julia Jacobo. “Brussels Attacks: 
Manhunt Underway as ISIS Claims Responsibility.” ABC News. Accessed 
March 23, 2016. http://abcnews.go.com/International/isis-claims-responsibility-
deadly-brussels-terror-attack/story?id=37832022. 
	
Stone v. Graham, (United States Supreme Court 1980). 
	
Street, 1615 L., NW, Suite 800 Washington, and DC 20036 202 419 4300 | Main 202 
419 4349 | Fax 202 419 4372 | Media Inquiries. “America’s Changing Religious 




———. “Religion in Latin America.” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life 
Project, November 13, 2014. http://www.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-
latin-america/. 
	
———. “The Shifting Religious Identity of Latinos in the United States.” Pew 




The AAR Religion in Schools Task Force. “Guidelines for Teaching About Religion in 





The First Amendment in Schools: A Guide from the First Amendment Center. Edition 
Unstated edition. Alexandria, Va: Assn for Supervision & Curriculum, 2000. 
	
“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed July 9, 2015. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml. 
	
Thoreau, Henry David, W. S. Merwin, and William Howarth. Walden and Civil 
Disobedience. Reissue edition. New York: Signet, 2012. 
	
Tillich, Paul. A History of Christian Thought. Edition Unstated edition. New York: 
Touchstone, 1972. 
	
Toft, Monica Duffy, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah. God’s Century: 
Resurgent Religion and Global Politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2011. 
	
“Using Religion to Discriminate.” American Civil Liberties Union. Accessed March 16, 
2016. https://www.aclu.org/feature/using-religion-discriminate. 
	
“U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious.” Religion in Public Life. Pew Research Center, 
November 3, 2015. 
	
Vaughn, Courtney Ann, and Daniel G. Krutka. “Self-Reflections, Teaching, and 
Learning in a Graduate Cultural Pluralism Course.” International Journal of 
Action Research 9, no. 3 (2013): 300–332. 
	
Viteritti, Joseph P. The Last Freedom: Religion from the Public School to the Public 
Square. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
	
Vitz, Paul C. Censorship: Evidence of Bias in Our Children’s Textbooks. Ex-library 
edition. Ann Arbor, Mich: Servant Books, 1986. 
	 223 
Volf, Miroslav. Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World. Yale 
University Press, 2016. 
	
Wallis, Jim. On God’s Side: What Religion Forgets and Politics Hasn’t Learned about 
Serving the Common Good. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press, 2013. 
	
Warren, Karen. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why 
It Matters. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 
	
Warren, Rick. The Purpose Driven Life: What on Earth Am I Here For? Expanded 
edition. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2013. 
	
Washington, Booker T. Up from Slavery: An Autobiography, n.d. 
	
Wertheimer, Linda K. Faith Ed: Teaching About Religion in an Age of Intolerance. 
Boston: Beacon Press, 2015. 
	
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (No. 591), (United States Supreme 
Court 1943). 
	
Wheeler Wilcox, Ella. Poems of Problems. Chicago: W.B. Conkey Company, 1914. 
	
Whitman, Walt. Walt Whitman: Poetry and Prose. Edited by Justin Kaplan. New York, 
N.Y: Library of America, 1982. 
	
Williams, Roger. A Plea for Religious Liberty. CreateSpace Independent Publishing 
Platform, 2014. 
	
———. The Complete Writings of Roger Williams, Volume 3: Bloudy Tenent of 
Persecution. Eugene, Or: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2007. 
	
Wing, Nick. “High School Sued For Allegedly Forcing Kids To Attend Christian 




Wisconsin v. Yoder, (United States Supreme Court 1972). 
	
Wolf, Frank. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 1998. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2297.pdf. 
	
Wuthnow, Robert. Inventing American Religion: Polls, Surveys, and the Tenuous Quest 




Zalan, Eszter. “Brussels Attacker Felt ‘hunted Everywhere.’” Accessed March 26, 
2016. https://euobserver.com/justice/132794. 
	














































     The following are sources that teachers may find particularly useful when teaching 
about religion or as they craft dialogues and activities that embrace NAS. The list is not 
exhaustive, but comprises some of the finest material available as well as sources of 
continuing research. These sources are primarily to aid teachers as they plan their own 
curriculum around religion and to answer specific questions about religion. Some, but 
not all, may be appropriate to discuss with or show to students, but teachers should use 
these resources at their own discretion. In all cases, teachers should preview the 




American Academy of Religion 
825 Houston Mill Road NE, Suite 300 
Atlanta, GA 30329-4205 
aarweb.org 
 





1700 N Broad Street, Suite 315 
Philadelphia, PA 19121-0843 
dialogueinstitute.org 
 
Faith in Public Life 
faithinpubliclife.org 
 




1250 24th St, NW, Suite 300 




Interfaith Youth Core 
325 N LaSalle St, Suite 775 
Chicago, IL 60654 
ifyc.org 
 
National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation 
ncdd.org 
 
Parliament of the World’s Religions 
70 East Lake St, Suite 205 
Chicago, IL 60601 
parliamentofreligions.org 
 
Pew Research Center, Religion in Public Life 
1615 L St, NW, Suite 800 
Washington, DC 20036 
pewforum.org 
 
Religious Freedom Project 
Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs 
berkleycenter.georgetown.edu 
3307 M St NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20007 
 






American Academy of Religion 
American Academy of Religion Guidelines for Teaching About Religion in K-12 Public 
Schools in the United States 
Online access to document: https://www.aarweb.org/about/teaching-about-religion-aar-
guidelines-for-k-12-public-schools 
 
ODIHR Advisory Council of Experts on Freedom of Religion or Belief 
Toledo Guiding Principles on Teaching About Religion and Beliefs in Public Schools 




The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Online access to document: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
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First Amendment Center 
Finding Common Ground: A First Amendment Guide to Religion and Public Schools 
Written and Edited by Charles C. Haynes and Oliver Thomas 





10 Questions for the Dalai Lama (2006) 
 
Beyond our Differences (2008) 
 
Bill Moyers: The Wisdom of Faith with Huston Smith (1996) 
 
God in America (2010) 
 
H.H. Dalai Lama - Essence of Mahayana Buddhism (2012) 
 
I Am (2012) 
 
Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth with Bill Moyers (1969) 
 
Karen Armstrong: What is Religion? (2007) 
 
Muhammed: Legacy of a Prophet (2002) 
 
New Faiths, Old Fears: Muslims and Other Asian Immigrants in American Religious 
Life (2002) 
 
Pillars of Faith - Religions Around the World (2006) 
 
Rabbit Proof Fence (2002) 
 
Religions of the World (2004) 
 
The Story of India (2007) 
 
We Shall Remain (2009) 
 
W.H. McLeod, The Sikhs: History, Religion, and Society (1989) 
 








     There are far too many excellent resources about religion to list here, however, the 
following list would provide a good initial background for teachers to begin to select 
their own texts (when allowed) and to dialogue about religious matters. 
 
Armstrong, Karen. The Case for God. New York: Anchor Books, 2010. (particularly the 
first few 
  chapters) 
 
Campbell, Joseph. The Power of Myth. New York: Anchor, 1991. 
 
Eck, Diana L. A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the 
World’s 
  Most Religiously Diverse Nation. New York: Harper One, 2001. 
 
Fowler, Robert Booth, Allen D. Hertzke, Laura R. Olson, and Kevin R. Den Dulk. 
Religion and 
  Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices. Fifth Edition, Boulder, 
CO: 
  Westview Press, 2013. 
 
Hertzke, Allen D. The Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges. New York: 
Oxford 
  University Press, 2012. 
 
Smith, Huston. Why Religion Matters: The Fate of the Human Spirit in an Age of 
Disbelief. New 
  York” HarperCollins, 2001. 
 
---. The World’s Religions: Our Great Wisdom Traditions. San Francisco: HarperOne, 
1991. (a 
  classic text on “world” religions and still a good place to start as teachers step into 
  exploring various faiths) 
 
